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Abstract 
 
This thesis defends naïve realism about the essential nature of perceptual experience, that is, the 
experiences that subjects enjoy when they hear, see, smell, taste, and touch things. It claims 
that the essential natures of such experiences are intrinsically constituted and relationally 
determined by the perceptible properties of those worldly objects with which perceiving 
subjects are immediately and irreducibly acquainted. In particular, this thesis defends naïve 
realism against the Problem of Misleading Experience which exploits the existence of misleading 
experiences (viz., dreams, hallucinations, and illusions) in order to show that no perceptual 
experience can be naïve realist in nature. 
 
Chapter 1 presents naïve realism’s metaphysical commitments and the Problem of Misleading 
Experience. In Chapter 2, I sketch three desirable constraints on any successful naïve realist 
solution: I argue that it is desirable for the Naïve Realist to (i) adopt some form of Basic 
Phenomenal Disjunctivism (i.e. the claim that perceptual and misleading experiences have 
different phenomenal natures), (ii) positively explain the phenomenal nature of misleading 
experience, and, (iii) tell the same fundamental story of dreams, hallucinations, and illusions. 
Chapter 3 introduces my own theory – Imaginative Disjunctivism (i.e. the claim that perceptual 
experiences have naïve realist natures whereas the natures of misleading experiences are 
perception-like imaginings) – that I argue has the right conceptual and empirical shape to meet 
these three constraints. 
 
I then put Imaginative Disjunctivism to work by showing how it can explain dreams (Chapter 
4), hallucinations (Chapter 5), and illusions (Chapter 6) in a way that is compatible with naïve 
realism. Though there is some precedent for explaining dreams (e.g. Ichikawa 2009) and 
hallucinations (e.g. Allen 2014) in terms of perception-like imaginings, my account is the first 
to extend this treatment to illusions, and so, provides a theoretically attractive unified .theory 
of misleading experience. 
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PREFACE 
 
Pause, whilst reading these words, and look at Brewer’s “macroscopic constituents” (2011: 
Ch.1:1) (e.g. persisting objects such as cats on mats; zebras; and part-submerged straight 
sticks) that apparently populate your immediate environment. Or, in a Moore-ean (1939) 
vein, raise a hand in front of your face. Unless, like some Cartesians, you are especially 
sceptically troubled or some obvious countervailing conditions obtain (e.g. “That’s clearly a 
badly disguised mule!” you might protest), your visual experience seems to present “itself as 
[…] an immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside” (Strawson 1979: 97) your 
mind. Pre-theoretically at least, you just seem to be immediately acquainted with things that 
do not ontologically depend in some way upon your experience or thought about them. This 
lay conception of everyday perceptual experience that I will be defending goes by the name 
naïve realism – ‘naïve’ to reflect folk intuition about such experience, and ‘realism’ to reflect 
the thought that such experiences are essentially of, and immediately acquaint us with, aspects 
of mind-independent reality. 
 
Now when you read these words and touch the smooth surface of this paper you are, most 
obviously, having a particular (i.e. token) perceptual experience, i.e. an event of some determinate 
duration1 that occurs in at .least one of the five standardly recognized sense-modalities (though 
I am inviting you to consider the visual and haptic case, you might also be e.g. smelling and 
tasting freshly brewed coffee, and hearing passing traffic). It is intuitively evident that there is 
a. peculiarly subjective aspect to conscious perceptual experience which is commonly called 
.phenomenal character2: ‘what it is like’ (e.g. Hellie 2007: 262; Nagel 1974: 435) to see a bright 
silver moon, for example, qualitatively differs from what it is like to see a blood red moon, 
and what it is like to taste a bell pepper qualitatively differs from what it is .like to taste a ghost 
pepper. Perhaps the most basic to say about it is this: when a subject S is having a perceptual. 
experience EP at time t, it is subjectively like something for her at t; and when it is subjectively 
like something for her at t, there is some F such that it is F for her at t – F is EP’s phenomenal 
character.3 
                                                     
1 Officially, I remain neutral as to whether perceptual experiences are instantaneous events which have zero 
duration or have a non-zero duration, though considerations concerning our experience of time and change 
incline me towards the latter (e.g. Gallagher 1998). 
2 Also appearing in the guise of “qualitative character” (e.g. Shoemaker 1994a: 22) and “subjective character” (e.g. 
Metzinger 1995: 9). 
3 This does not entail that S has any higher-order perspective on the nature of her mental state (if say, S is a cane 
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A perceptual experience’s phenomenal character is metaphysically built from what are 
commonly called phenomenal properties4, which as I will employ the term, are those determinate 
properties that type a perceptual experience according to what it is subjectively like to have it 
(see e.g. Byrne 2002: 9). By way of analogy: Palatinate purple is a determinate of the 
determinable purple (a shade is a determinate way of being coloured); likewise, the phenomenal 
property ‘purplish’ is a determinate of the determinable phenomenal character. The simplest 
thing to say is that phenomenal properties are particular aspects of what a perceptual 
experience is subjectively like, and phenomenal character is the total sum of what a perceptual 
experience is subjectively like.5 
 
The Naïve Realist takes a specific stance on the metaphysical nature of a perceptual 
experience’s phenomenal properties (hence its phenomenal character). A stance that is made 
explicit by Campbell: 
 
“[T]he phenomenal character of your experience, as you look around the room, is 
constituted by the actual layout of the room itself: which particular objects are there, 
their intrinsic properties, such as color and shape, and how they are arranged in 
relation to one another and to you.” (2002: 116, my emphasis) 
 
A perceptual experience’s phenomenal character is thus ‘out there in the world’ (in a sense to 
be explained in (§1.1)): when you “look around the room”, the only phenomenal properties of 
which you are directly aware are perceptible properties “such as color and shape” of mind-
independent objects themselves. The phenomenal character of a visual experience of purple, 
for example, is really a mind-independent instance of purple-ness itself. 
 
Some experiential culprits – namely, dreams, hallucinations, and illusions – are said to overthrow 
naïve realism. This is because they are misleading, that is, they seem.to immediately present 
things that are not aspects of mind-independent reality. The basic argument (to be developed in 
§1.3) runs thus: 
                                                                                                                                                                
toad). 
4 Also appearing in the guise of “subjective” properties (e.g. Peacocke 2008) and “qualia” (e.g. Shoemaker 1991). 
5 The phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is, no doubt, an extremely complex property (and perhaps 
not even capturable in words); hence I restrict myself to speaking of the phenomenal character of a perceptual 
experience of say, green or a certain shape. 
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1. Misleading experiences that are reflectively indiscriminable (i.e. based on 
introspective means alone, not knowably distinct from one another) from 
non-misleading experiences sometimes occur.6 
 
2. If two mental states are reflectively indiscriminable, then they have a common 
phenomenal character. (Intuitive premise) 
 
3. The phenomenal characters of misleading experiences cannot be naïve realist in 
nature. 
 
4. The phenomenal characters of non-misleading experiences cannot be naïve 
realist in nature. (2, 3) 
 
Consider (1): it seems possible, for example, to have a “hallucination as of a yellow banana” 
(Logue 2011: 268) that you cannot introspectively distinguish from the corresponding non-
misleading experience of seeing a banana, i.e. an experience that presents what is objectively 
there (in this case, a banana). In this case, the phenomenal ‘yellow-ness’ and ‘banana-shape’ of 
which you are directly aware cannot be properties that metaphysically spring from a mind-
independent banana. If this were to occur, you might then be persuaded by (2)’s intuitive 
claim that your banana-hallucination and the corresponding non-misleading experience share a 
common phenomenal character7.or “highest common factor” (McDowell 1998: 386) that 
explains your inability  to reflectively discriminate between them. But the phenomenal 
character of your banana-hallucination cannot, as (3) notes, be intrinsically world-involving (i.e. 
be metaphysically built from aspects of mind-independent reality) and world-acquainting (i.e. 
directly acquaint you with aspects of mind-independent reality); hence (4)’s conclusion that 
the phenomenal character of your corresponding non-misleading experience cannot be naïve 
                                                     
6 Smith thinks that the p.m.e “does not even require that [misleading experiences] ever” (2005: 29) occur, though 
as we will see, it is well-motivated by actual cases. 
7 That non-misleading and misleading experiences share the common property of being mental states is trivial: 
what is at issue is whether your banana-hallucination and corresponding non-misleading experience also share 
some ingredient which constitutively explains the type of mental states that they are (see Martin 2006: 7). Since I 
aim to defend a naïve realist conception of non-misleading experience, I take no line on what this purported 
ingredient might be (e.g. a Lockean idea (1690, Book II, Ch.8, §8), a sense-datum (e.g. O'Shaughnessy 2003), or 
perhaps an intentional trope (e.g. Sturgeon 1998)), though for exegetical purposes, we will meet one influential 
account in §1.2.1. 
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realist. Or so goes what I call the Problem of Misleading Experience (e.g. Moore 1918; Robinson 
1994). 
 
This thesis is an attempt to resist the move to (4) by rejecting (2): I will argue that the 
phenomenal characters of misleading experiences are typed by sensory or perception-like 
imaginings which are reflectively indiscriminable from the corresponding non-misleading 
experience; hence the phenomenal character of a hallucinatory experience as of a banana is 
typed by an imagined seeing of a banana. As these perception-like imaginings are no intrinsic 
part of a non-misleading experience’s phenomenal character, naïve realism survives unscathed. 
 
Before outlining each chapter, two restrictions will confine this thesis to manageable 
proportions. First, I cannot possibly explain the nature of every single possible misleading 
experience: rather, will I confine my attention to those cases that are oft-said to threaten naïve 
realism (e.g. paradigmatic illusions such as the part-submerged straight stick that is said to look 
bent). Second, as the first restriction suggests, I largely confine myself to explaining misleading 
experiences that are said to occur in one sense-modality: vision. This is because it is 
experience within this modality that is standardly said to motivate naïve realism (see e.g. 
Broad 1952: 6), and so, it is the apparent existence of misleading experiences within this 
modality that pose the most significant threat to naïve realism. 
 
Overview 
 
In the first chapter, I explain first, the naïve realism that I will be defending, or how aspects of 
the mind-independent world can constitutively, as Martin says, “shape the contours” (2004: 
64) of a non-misleading experience’s phenomenal character; and second, how Hellie’s (2007) 
p.m.e threatens this naïve realism. I have chosen Hellie’s version rather than its traditional 
ancestors (e.g. Broad: 1923; Russell: 1912a) since its premises are explicit, thus assuaging the 
complaint (e.g. Martin, forthcoming: 11; Moore, 1918: 19) that inexplicit premises – 
specifically, it has been complained that it is unclear how the argument’s cited cases of 
misleading experiences can motivate its conclusion that no experience is naïve realist – have 
muddied historical debate.8  
                                                     
8 Hence Dummett’s (1979: 2) insistence that the p.m.e is best construed as advancing a set of considerations (e.g. 
Broad’s (1925: 187) case of double vision; Russell’s (1912: 8, 1914: 84) case of perspectival variation as when the 
same table is said to look different shapes from different perspectives; and Ayer’s (1940: 4) weary traveller who is 
said to hallucinate a desert oasis) which constitute a starting point for reflection about in what the distinction 
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In the second chapter, I sketch three constraints on what I consider a successful naïve realist 
solution to the p.m.e. First, it is argued that naïve realism minimally entails a Basic Phenomenal 
Disjunctivism according to which “the most specific kind of experience one enjoys when one 
perceives [does] not occur when having an illusion or hallucination” (Martin, 2006: 8), i.e. 
non-misleading and misleading experiences are phenomenally type-distinct mental states. 
Second, it is argued that the phenomenal disjunctivist must positively explain a misleading 
experience’s “remarkable features” (Sturgeon, 1998: 186): specifically, why any 
misleading.experience is (i) reflectively indiscriminable from some metaphysically possible non-
misleading experience, (ii) seems to immediately present a scene that could also be presented by 
some metaphysically possible non-misleading experience, (iii) is subjectively like some 
metaphysically possible non-misleading experience, and, (iv) able to motivate the same beliefs 
and behaviours as some metaphysically possible non-misleading experience. Third, it is argued 
that the positive phenomenal disjunctivist is plausibly committed to telling a unified story of 
misleading experience, i.e. a story that treats dreams, hallucinations, and illusions as having 
the basic explanation. 
 
In the third chapter, I sketch a positive version of Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism called 
Imaginative Disjunctivism that, or so I will argue in remaining chapters, successfully meets all 
three constraints on a naïve realist solution to the p.m.e: in broad outline, I suggest that 
misleading experiences are not perceptual experiences, but rather, are perception-like imaginings 
that convincingly simulate the phenomenal characters of non-misleading experiences. This 
chapter can be seen as an attempt to rehabilitate a conception of misleading experience that has 
fallen out of favour: Hobbes, for example, thought that “the imaginations of them that sleep 
are those we call dreams” (1651, Part 1: Ch.2), and later, Hibbert characterized hallucinations 
as “the recollected images of the mind, which have been rendered more vivid than actual 
impressions” (1825: 5). For this rehabilitation to be successful, of course, two things must be 
shown: first, that subjects indeed occasionally mistake their imaginings for real perceptual 
experiences; and second, that perception-like imaginings do not turn out to be a ‘highest 
common factor’ that constitutively explains the phenomenal character of non-misleading 
experience. These then, are the main claims that I defend and develop in this chapter. 
 
In the fourth chapter, I explain Imaginative Disjunctivism’s theory of dreams according to which 
dream experiences are essentially perception-like imaginings that are presented to 
                                                                                                                                                                
between misleading and non-misleading experience might essentially consist. 
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consciousness (usually) during sleep. I defend this claim against the received view (e.g. Russell, 
1948: 214; Sebastián, 2014) according to which dreams are misleading perceptual 
experiences, and the dream fabrication view (e.g. Dennett, 1976; Stoneham, 2013) according to 
which dreams are false memories of experiences that never occurred. I have chosen the received 
view since any competing theory must convincingly explain why dreams are not what they 
intuitively seem to be (viz., perceptual experiences), and the dream fabrication view since it 
claims to convincingly explain away this intuition. I argue that both views are unsuccessful 
since they have narrower explanatory scope than Imaginative Disjunctivism: in broad outline, I 
argue that the received view is neither conceptually nor empirically satisfactory, whereas the 
dream fabrication view cannot convincingly explain away lucid dream reports, i.e. why subjects, 
on occasion, report that they were ‘awake whilst continuing to dream.’ 
 
In the fifth chapter, I explain Imaginative Disjunctivism’s theory of hallucination according to 
which hallucinatory experiences are essentially perception-like imaginings. I defend this claim 
against Johnston’s (2004) Sensible Profile theory according to which the phenomenal characters 
of reflectively indiscriminable non-misleading and hallucinatory experiences are typed by a 
structured arrangement of qualities and relations (viz., a ‘Sensible Profile’).that, in the 
hallucinatory case, are not instantiated by any candidate worldly object within the subject’s 
immediate environment. I have chosen Johnston’s account since any worked out theory which 
claims to posit a common element of awareness that explains the phenomenal nature of non-
misleading and hallucinatory experiences whilst preserving the former’s naïve realist status 
must be taken seriously. I argue that Johnston’s attempt to perform this spectacular 
metaphysical feat is ultimately unsuccessful since it runs headlong into another version of the 
p.m.e. 
 
In the sixth chapter, I explain Imaginative Disjunctivism’s theory of illusion. As is becoming 
conventional.in the philosophical (e.g. Fish 2009: Ch.6) and psychological (e.g. Gregory 
2009: 242) literature, I distinguish between three varieties of illusion: namely, (i) cognitive 
illusions which have a subject-dependent cognitive explanation (e.g. as when we see a rope as a 
snake), (ii) optical illusions which have a joint subject-independent physical and subject-
dependent perceptual explanation (e.g. as when the Müller-Lyer lines’ end-hashes somehow 
mislead our visual system into seeing them as unequal in length), and, (iii) physical illusions 
which admit of a purely subject-independent physical explanation (e.g. as when a part-
submerged straight stick is said to look bent). I argue that perception-like imaginings have 
some role to play in explaining cognitive and optical illusions, whereas physical illusions are 
13 
 
really non-misleading experiences. Finally, I consider Brewer’s (2008; 2011) object view of 
illusion according to which illusions occur when the worldly object with which the subject is 
directly acquainted has visually relevant similarities to a paradigm kind that it does not 
objectively exemplify. I argue that it is unsuccessful since it ultimately has narrower 
explanatory scope than Imaginative Disjunctivism. 
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1 
Mapping the Terrain 
 
This chapter maps the terrain upon which this thesis is built. I begin (§1.1, §1.1.2) by properly 
introducing the naïve realist conception of non-misleading experience to be defended. This 
conception is then (§1.2) contrasted with a rival conjunctivism (e.g. Foster 2000: 8; Johnston 
2004: 114) which asserts that non-misleading and misleading experiences are phenomenally 
typed by the same non-naïve ingredient to which (and this is the important conjunct) a normal 
– standardly, causal9 – relation is conjoined between that ingredient and worldly item in the 
former case. This contrast is further elucidated (§1.2.1) by considering one influential form of 
conjunctivism10, namely, a minimal representationalism (e.g. Harman 1990: 34; Lycan 
forthcoming: 1) which construes the common ingredient as being a certain sort of 
representational content, i.e. content that represents something as being a particular way. The 
essential difference then, is that the naïve realist construes non-misleading experience as being 
phenomenally typed by those worldly items with which the subject is immediately and 
irreducibly acquainted, whereas the conjunctivist construes such experience as being 
phenomenally typed by some non-naïve ingredient that is shared with misleading experience, 
and which only ever indirectly acquaints her with the world. 
 
I then (§1.3) sketch naïve realism’s main threat, viz., the p.m.e. In particular, we will meet 
Hellie’s (2007: 271-2) version which exploits the property of reflective2indiscriminability that 
non-misleading and misleading experiences share to show that even non-misleading experience 
cannot be naïve realist. Once this banishment of naïve realism is accepted, conjunctivism 
naturally gets a grip since it is said (e.g. Broad 1923: 240; Robinson 1994: 32) to be intuitively 
obvious and indubitable in the light of reflection upon experience that the subject is directly 
aware of something, which, as the p.m.e taught us, must be non-naïve. With the terrain 
                                                     
9 Though not always, e.g. Lewis (1980) construes this relation as being one of systematic counterfactual 
dependence. 
10 A less influential form is adverbialism (e.g. Sellars, 1968; Thomas, 2003) which asserts that experiences just are 
modes of sensing in particular ways that can be characterized by specialized adverbs, e.g. someone who 
experiences the colour green is said to be appeared to green-ly. Adverbialism will take a conjunctivist form if one 
thinks that being appeared to F-ly is the common phenomenal ingredient. Pace Conduct (2008), I am 
unconvinced that the naïve realist can accept adverbialism since there seems to be no coherent way (e.g. Jackson, 
1975) to individuate those determinate phenomenal properties that constitute an experience’s phenomenal 
character. 
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mapped, we will meet the beginnings of a solution in Ch.2. 
 
1.1 Naïve Realism 
 
In a nutshell, my naïve realism asserts that a non-misleading experience’s phenomenal 
character is intrinsically constituted and determined, in a sense to be shortly explained, by the 
perceptible properties (e.g. colour, shape) of those worldly objects – e.g. Strawson’s “clustered 
branches of the elms”, “dappled deer”, and “green grass” (2000: 454) – to which subjects stand 
in a sui generis, or metaphysically basic, direct acquaintance relation.11 Hume famously declared 
naïve realism a commitment of,    
 
“[…] the vulgar [who] confound perceptions and objects, and attribute a distinct 
continued existence to the very things they feel or see.” (1739/40: Bk 1, Part 4, 
§II) 
 
Hume’s complaint that “the vulgar confound perceptions and objects” is the complaint that we 
tend to unreflectively assume that everyday experience – unless something is obviously askew – 
directly acquaints us with aspects of the world itself which metaphysically ground its ‘what-it-
is-like’ aspects. So understood, naïve realism tells us that non-misleading experience 
essentially involves awareness of aspects of the external world. Hume’s “vulgar” realism has 
been elaborated by Martin: 
 
“According to Naïve realism, the actual objects of perception, the external things 
such as trees, tables and rainbows, which one can perceive, and the properties 
they can manifest to one when perceived, partly constitute one’s conscious 
experience. This talk of constitution and determination should be taken literally.” 
(1997: 83, my emphasis) 
 
And more recently, Conduct: 
 
“In enjoying a [naïve realist] perceptual experience, a subject stands in a relation to 
the thing that they perceive, such that the subjective aspect of their experience 
[…] is constituted by that which they perceive.” (2012: 727, my emphasis) 
 
                                                     
11 Or as Russell (1921: 234) put it, the acquaintance relation is a “mystic union of knower and known.” 
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Two distinct theses which encapsulate naïve realism’s core metaphysical commitments can be 
extracted from these remarks. First, Conduct’s remark that a non-misleading experience’s 
phenomenal character “is constituted by that which they perceive”, where, as Martin says, such 
“talk […] should be taken literally” suggests what I will call naïve realism’s Constitution Thesis 
(first-pass formulation): 
 
Constitution Thesis: For all subjects s: If s has a non-misleading experience 
ENM, then necessarily, ENM’s phenomenal character is intrinsically constituted 
by naïve properties PN1, PN2 … PNN.
12
 (Metaphysical commitment of Naïve 
Realism) 
 
A naïve property, to borrow Hellie’s (2009: 264) terminology, is simply a determinate 
property of a non-misleading experience’s overall phenomenal character which is directly 
grounded in the perceptible properties of those worldly objects that are immediately 
presented to the subject, i.e. a purely mental property whose nature is directly inherited13 
from, or constituted by, aspects of the external world itself. This reflects Foster’s (2000: 2) 
general conception of constitution according to which “[…] a fact F is constituted by a fact F´ 
[if and only if] F obtains in virtue of the obtaining of F´.” For instance, an object’s being a generic 
shape (F) can be constituted by the fact that it has the determinate shape property of being 
hexagonal (F´), i.e. the object’s having a generic shape obtains in virtue of the fact that it is 
determinately hexagonal. Likewise, to borrow Hellie’s (ibid) example, a non-misleading 
experience has the naïve property being-a-case-of-visual-awareness-of-a-white-picket-fence in virtue 
of the fact that the subject non-misleadingly sees a white picket fence. 
 
This notion of non-misleading experience as being constituted by naïve properties is not, pace 
traditional causal theories of perception (e.g. Russell 1927: 197; Dilworth 2004) to be 
understood in a causal sense. Such theories assert that non-misleading experience essentially 
consists in the fact that subjects stand in a certain sort of causal relation to the world. For 
instance, Locke spoke of “imperceptible bodies” from worldly objects that strike our “eyes, 
and thereby convey to the brain some motion, which produces these ideas which we have of 
                                                     
12 Obviously, a complete specification of every naïve property that constitutes an experience’s overall phenomenal 
character would undoubtedly be extremely complex, if indeed, such a property complex is specifiable at all (for it 
would have to describe every determinate perceptual property in the subjects perceptual field) – it matters only 
that such a specification is possible in principle. 
13 Campbell (1997: 189) is responsible for this metaphor of phenomenal inheritance. 
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them in us” (1690: Ch.8, §12).  And in Hellie’s example, this Lockean story goes: Physics tells 
us that a white picket fence reflects particles of light or “imperceptible bodies”; this light 
strikes, and is refracted through the subject’s eyes, producing a retinal image of that fence; her 
visual machinery processes this perceptual information or “conveys to” her “brain some 
motion” which culminates in a visual experience of a white picket fence. Causal theories of 
perception thus assert that perceptual experiences are not intrinsically world-involving (hence 
Locke’s assertion that that causal relation which holds between subject and worldly object 
“produces [in her] ideas [that resemble] them”: Rather, what makes perceptual experiences 
world-involving is the fact that subjects stand in the correct type of causal relation (however 
that is specified) to worldly objects themselves. 
 
Naïve realism’s constitution thesis resists this traditional dictum and claims instead that it is the 
presence of such objects themselves which make the experience intrinsically world-involving. I 
am not strangely denying that there is no causal story to be told about non-misleading 
experience in the sense that a certain sort of causal relation must necessarily hold between 
subject and worldly object in order for such experience to occur: what I am denying is that 
non-misleading experience essentially consists in any such causal relation. Fish (2009: 6) 
provides an illuminative analogy: Just as a hillside shapes a landscape by being the contours of 
that landscape, so the world constitutively contributes to a non-misleading experience’s 
phenomenal character by being the contours of its phenomenal character. There will naturally 
be some causal story to be told of why the landscape has that particular shape (e.g. one 
involving glacial retreat), but that is entirely consistent with the thought that its hillside is its 
shape. Likewise, that there is some causal story of why a particular non-misleading experience 
has the naïve properties it does is entirely consistent with the thought that its phenomenal 
character is intrinsically constituted by aspects of the world.  
 
Second, Conduct’s remark that, in non-misleading experience, “a subject stands in a relation” 
to what they perceive suggests what I will call naïve realism’s Acquaintance Thesis (first-pass 
formulation): 
 
Acquaintance Thesis: For all subjects s: If s has a non-misleading experience 
ENM, then necessarily, s stands in a direct sui generis acquaintance relation r to 
a worldly object, ow’s, perceptible properties PP1, PP2 … PPN, (Metaphysical 
commitment of Naïve Realism) 
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This acquaintance relation is to be understood as relationally determining an experience’s 
naïve properties. In Hellie’s example, the naïve property being-a-case-of-visual-awareness-of-a-
white-picket-fence which is said to phenomenally type the experience will be relationally 
determined by the fact that the subject stands in a direct sui generis acquaintance relation to a 
white picket fence – that perceptual experience cannot be had absent the presence of that 
white picket fence. A non-misleading experience’s naïve properties then, are relationally 
determined by the particular worldly item with which the subject is directly acquainted. 
 
We can now see that naïve realism’s constitution and acquaintance theses mesh together as 
follows: Its constitution thesis ensures that a non-misleading experience’s phenomenal character 
is intrinsically constituted by naïve properties, whereas its acquaintance thesis ensures that a 
direct sui generis acquaintance relation relationally determines those naïve properties that 
perform the crucial phenomenal constitutory work. This yields our first proper sighting of 
naïve realism (first-pass formulation14): 
 
Naïve Realism: For all subjects s: If s has a non-misleading experience ENM, then; 
 
(i) ENM’s phenomenal character is intrinsically constituted by naïve properties PN1, 
PN2 … PNN; and,  
 
(ii) S stands in a direct sui generis acquaintance relation r to a worldly object, ow’s, 
perceptible properties PP1, PP2 … PPN, where PP1, PP2 … PPN, directly ground 
ENM’s naïve properties PN1, PN2 … PNN.
15 (Conjunction of Constitution and 
Acquaintance Theses) 
 
Thus (i) tells us that, when a subject non-misleadingly sees a white picket fence, the most 
fundamental characterization of her experience’s phenomenal character can be given by 
specifying its naïve properties (e.g. being-a-case-of-visual-awareness-of-a-white-picket-fence), 
whereas (ii) tells us that the fence’s perceptible properties directly ground her experience’s 
naïve properties. This then, is what it means to enjoy a naïve realist experience.  
 
1.1.1 Four Refinements 
                                                     
14 To be refined in §2.1.2 where I develop the concept phenomenal character.  
15 For related formulations, see e.g. Brewer (2008: 171); Fish (2009: 15); Logue (2010: 23); McDowell (1986: 
390-1); and Nudds (2009: 335). 
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1. Naïve Realism is not Phenomenal Relationalism 
 
It is instructive to distinguish the naïve realism that I will be defending from phenomenal 
relationalism16 according to which non-misleading experiences “are relations between material 
objects and minds” (Langsam 1997: 33). The phenomenal relationalist thus assigns a 
phenomenally constitutive, and not simply a relationally determinative, role to that 
acquaintance relation which holds between subject and worldly object, e.g. it will be claimed 
that a subject’s visual experience of a white picket fence is intrinsically constituted by the 
relation and not the relatum (viz. the fence) itself. Possible confusion between phenomenal 
relationalism and naïve realism ostensibly stems from Campbell who describes naïve realism as 
a “relational view of experience” (2002: 116/117). But Campbell’s thought, I suggest, entails 
no more than that the acquaintance relation which holds between subject and world in non-
misleading experience plays a relationally determinative, and not a phenomenally constitutive, 
role.  
 
The reason that I distinguish naïve realism from phenomenal relationalism is that assigning a 
phenomenally constitutive role to just an acquaintance relation means, or so it strikes me, that 
we needlessly risk losing our grip on naïve realism’s key thought that it is the presence of 
worldly objects themselves that make non-misleading experience intrinsically world-involving. 
Put another way, imbuing all of a non-misleading experience’s phenomenal character into an 
acquaintance relation unnecessarily risks ‘screening off’ the world itself from constitutively 
contributing to that character in any explanatory significant way since that relation would 
then, in a conceptually unintelligible move, become the direct object of awareness. If 
phenomenal relationalism really is innocuous, then nothing significant will be lost. But 
distinguishing the two views at least ensures that my investigation begins on as secure a 
worldly footing as possible. 
 
2. Naïve Realist Experience Presents Subjects with Worldly Object-Property Couples 
 
Fish claims that “when we see an object […] we see […] at a minimum, that object’s bearing a 
property” (2009: 52). This minimal condition on object perception is extremely plausible. 
Definitionally, worldly objects are never presented in loginquitas as possessing no properties 
whatsoever, but are always presented as possessing at least one property. Even if you hold that 
                                                     
16 This distinction is also made by Hellie (2007: 264). 
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non-misleading experience presents subjects with more than worldly objects bearing properties 
(e.g. perhaps Wittgenstein’s (1922: §1.1) states of affairs), it is conceptually nonsensical to 
speak of perceiving worldly objects that are somehow size-less, shape-less, and colour-less – 
being such an object presupposes possession of at least one property. Hence Johnston speaks of 
tasting the “astringency of calvados” (2006: 281) and Matthen speaks of “visual apprehensions 
of features in objects” (2005: 281). A worldly object, then, constitutively contributes to an 
experience’s phenomenal character through presenting the subject with certain of its 
perceptible properties. This is why I will speak of subjects being directly acquainted with 
worldly object-property couples in naïve realist experience. 
   
3. Naïve Realist Experience Does Not Present Subjects with Every Worldly Object-Property Couple within 
their Perceptual Field 
 
This is because what a subject perceives is constrained by three main factors: namely, (i) the 
observational conditions (e.g. the fence that looks white in daylight may not be visually discerned 
in the dark) (ii) the perspective (e.g. the fence that looks three-dimensional when viewed head-
on will look two-dimensional from a certain height), and, (iii) the subject’s perceptual abilities 
(e.g. the myopic, unlike the non-myopic, subject will likely report that the fence’s boundaries 
look ‘fuzzy’). Of (iii), I suggest that the experience had by the subject whose perceptual 
equipment is functioning normally has more naïve properties (e.g. the myopic subject’s 
experience might be typed by the naïve property being-a-case-of-visual-awareness-of-a-white-fence, 
whereas the non-myopic subject’s might be typed by the naïve properties being-a-case-of visual-
awareness-of-a-white-picket-fencePN1-with-ten-postsPN2. This does not mean that perceptually 
impaired subjects will have non-naïve realist experiences, as if something non-naive ‘plugs’ the 
‘gaps’ in their phenomenal characters: rather, the thought is that the subject whose perceptual 
equipment is functioning normally has the capacity to experientially detect more naïve 
properties; hence, two token experiences of the same scene can have different phenomenal 
characters. 
 
4. Naïve Realist Experience is constitutively Non-Conceptual 
 
My naïve realism resists the general thought voiced by experience conceptualists of various stripes 
(e.g. Brewer 1999; early-McDowell 1994) that the very having of non-misleading experience 
requires that subjects possess conceptual-recognitional capacities17 for those worldly object-
                                                     
17 However these are understood: specifically, it is disputed whether subjects must possess determinate (e.g. 
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property couples that are immediately presented to them. On this, I am clearly in agreement 
with Johnston who claims that a subject “need not [though she may] conceptualize” (2006: 283) 
that which she experiences: specifically, I claim that the having of a naïve realist experience 
requires no more than that the subject’s perceptual machinery be capable of physically 
registering, and discriminating between, certain rudimentary object-properties such as shape 
and colour. Suppose that Hellie’s subject lacks the concept white picket fence (or indeed, any 
concept at all). My claim is that she will still have a naïve realist experience providing that her 
visual machinery is capable of processing a sufficient amount of light (a specification best left to 
the optical sciences) that enables her to visually discriminate at least the fence’s rough shape and 
colour from that of its surrounding objects, where this sub-personal physical process is 
independent from any concepts that she may possess.18 Pace McDowell, a concept-less subject 
is not confined to a mere environment that is “a succession of problems and opportunities” 
(1994: 116) but, owing to her perceptual discriminative capacities, fully experiences the 
world.19 Generalizing, then, a subject’s ability to have a naïve realist experience does not 
asymmetrically depend upon the possession of any conceptual-recognitional capacities for 
those worldly-object property couples that metaphysically ground her experience’s naïve 
properties. 
 
It is mistaken to think that the subject’s acquiring more concepts can fundamentally change her 
experience’s phenomenal character. For my claim that naïve realist experiences are 
constitutively non-conceptual entails no further claim about the extent of the subject’s 
conceptual repertoire. Consider Crane’s (1992: 1) familiar example of the child and scientist 
who are both looking at the same cathode ray tube, where only the scientist possesses the 
determinate concept cathode ray tube. It is intuitively obvious that since the child lacks the 
scientist’s concept, only the latter can see the object as a cathode ray tube. This intuition might 
then be taken to motivate an experience conceptualism which asserts that the child and 
scientist’s experiences are phenomenally type-distinct mental states since the former lacks a 
concept possessed by the latter that determinately describes the common object that is seen: 
specifically, it will be said that only the scientist’s experience can have the naïve property being-
                                                                                                                                                                
‘rhomboid’), less determinate (e.g. ‘That shape’) or even referentially pauce (e.g. ‘That is thus’) concepts for 
those items which are experienced.  
18 Compare Peacocke’s (1998: 301) ‘Three Level’ view of experience which distinguishes between (i) the worldly 
object itself (e.g. a shape), (ii) the way that object is presented in experience (e.g. as a diamond), and, (iii) those 
demonstrative concepts which the subject deploys to describe the object in (ii) (e.g. ‘That diamond’) – crucially, 
the subject’s ability to have a naïve realist experience does not depend upon (iii). 
19 The environment-world distinction is explicated in e.g. Gadamer (2004: 441) and Scheler (1961: 37). 
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a-case-of-visual-awareness-of-a-cathode-ray-tube. My content non-conceptualism resists this and holds 
instead that both child and scientist will – in line with those three constraints previously 
sketched – have experiences that have many of the same naïve properties, i.e. their 
experiences do not phenomenally differ in any fundamental way because the scientist possesses 
a concept that is lacked by the child. 
 
The main reason that I claim naïve realist experience is constitutively non-conceptual is that 
introducing something conceptual into a non-misleading experience’s phenomenal character 
means, or so it strikes me, that we needlessly risk losing our grip on naïve realism’s key 
thought that such experience is directly world-acquainting. For that conceptual item would 
seemingly become the direct object of awareness with the risk that it mediates the subject’s 
awareness of the external world. That is, experience conceptualism carries with it the worry that 
subjects can only be acquainted with worldly object-property couples in virtue of first being 
directly acquainted with some non-naïve realist conceptual item. My content non-conceptualism20 
avoids this worry by insisting that an unmediated and brute acquaintance relation holds 
between subjects and worldly object-property couples. 
 
1.1.2 Summary 
 
Hume’s ‘vulgar’ naïve realism with which I began has now been revealed to be a substantive 
metaphysical thesis about the phenomenal nature of non-misleading experience: specifically, 
the naïve realist insists that such experience is phenomenally typed by naïve properties which 
metaphysically spring from the perceptible properties of those worldly objects to which 
subjects stand in a direct sui generis acquaintance relation. Naïve realism was then refined in 
four ways: namely, (i) it is distinct from phenomenal relationalism, (ii) naïve realist experience 
directly acquaints subjects with worldly object-property couple, (iii) subjects are highly 
unlikely to be directly acquainted with every worldly object-property couple within their 
perceptual field, and, (iv) naïve realist experience is constitutively non-conceptual. With a 
more robust conception of naïve realism in place, I can now contrast it with its main rival, 
viz., conjunctivism. 
 
1.2 Conjunctivism 
 
                                                     
20 I take no line on what non-conceptual content might be, e.g. Evan’s (1982) informational content; Peacocke’s 
(1992) scenario content; or Tye’s (2005) Russellian non-conceptual content. 
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In a nutshell, conjunctivism asserts that non-misleading and misleading experiences share a 
common phenomenal ingredient, to which a normal – standardly, causal – relation is conjoined 
between that ingredient and worldly object in the former case. In Johnston’s words, 
 
“[…] the direct object of [the subject’s] visual awareness is not some particular in 
the external environment, but something that she could be aware of even if she were 
hallucinating. By contrast […] her visual awareness is appropriately caused by some 
external particular in the scene before the eyes.” (2004: 114, my emphasis) 
 
First, Johnston’s remark that the direct object of non-misleading experience is “something” 
that the hallucinating subject “could [also] be aware of” suggests what I, following Martin 
(2007: 4), will call conjunctivism’s Common Kind Thesis: 
 
Common Kind Thesis: For any non-misleading experience ENM and 
metaphysically possible misleading experience EM (or vice-versa), ENM and EM are of 
phenomenal type F, where particular tokens of F are the direct objects of the 
subject’s awareness. (Metaphysical commitment of Conjunctivism) 
 
Hellie’s subject who sees a white picket fence is thus said to be directly aware of a token of 
some phenomenal ingredient (e.g. a ‘white-ish’ sense-datum) that would also be the direct 
object of her awareness if her experience were misleading. For this reason, that direct object 
of awareness is traditionally said to be something mind-dependent21 whose instantiation is 
ontologically distinct from, and does not relationally depend upon, the existence of the 
candidate worldly object itself, viz., a white picket fence. The conjunctivist’s first basic 
thought, then, is that non-misleading, dream, hallucinatory, and illusory experiences have a 
common phenomenal character or exemplify instances of the same basic phenomenal kind. 
 
Second, Johnston’s remark that non-misleading and misleading experiences differ in virtue of 
the fact that the former is “appropriately caused22” by some “connection” that holds between 
the direct object of awareness and candidate worldly object suggests what I will call 
                                                     
21 Though not always, see e.g. Price (1950: 246–52) and Smythies (2003: 52). 
22 Though Johnston does not spell out in what “appropriate” causation consists, the natural assumption is that the 
candidate object is the external distal cause of the subject’s experience; hence, Grice’s thought that, intuitively, 
we would be reluctant to say that a subject genuinely perceived a pillar x if, unknown to her, she perceived a 
mirror image of a numerically distinct but qualitatively similar pillar, y (1961: 42). 
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conjunctivism’s Indirect Acquaintance Thesis: 
 
Indirect Acquaintance Thesis: For all subjects s: If s has a non-misleading 
experience ENM which is of phenomenal type F, then necessarily, a normal causal 
relation r holds between particular tokens of F and worldly objects ow1, ow2 … 
own, such that F’s tokens indirectly acquaint s with ow1, ow2 … own. (Metaphysical 
commitment of Conjunctivism) 
 
Hellie’s subject who sees a white picket fence is thus acquainted with it in virtue of first standing 
in a direct acquaintance relation to a particular token of some basic phenomenal kind that 
‘shapes the contours’ of her experience’s phenomenal character. This direct object of 
awareness is a mental intermediary that, when a normal causal relation holds between it and 
the white picket fence, mediates her “visual awareness” of that worldly object. Smith (2005: 6) 
provides an illuminative analogy: Just as the subject inside a camera obscura (i.e. a ‘dark room’) 
is said to see worldly objects in virtue of first seeing images projected onto a surface, so the 
subject having a non-misleading experience is said to see worldly objects in virtue of first being 
directly aware of particular tokens of some common phenomenal kind, where normal causal 
relations hold between those tokens and worldly objects.23 The conjunctivist’s second basic 
thought, then, is that subjects indirectly experience the world through their being directly 
acquainted with particular tokens of some common phenomenal kind. 
 
This basic thought can be made more precise. I am not concerned with denying that Hellie’s 
subject can have a non-misleading experience which is mediated by her first seeing the fence’s 
facing surface (biological limitations dictate that she cannot see through it): What I do deny is 
the conjunctivist’s thought that there is never any point at which she is directly acquainted with 
the world. Perceptual experience, Foster says, becomes direct when “there is no further 
perceptual mediation within the physical domain” (2000: 6).  And there is no physical item 
which is more directly experienced than the fence’s facing surface. It is at this final point that a 
particular token of the conjunctivist’s common kind is said to replace the facing surface, and 
hence, become the direct object of awareness. Thus, I am insisting that there is always a 
                                                     
23 A less illuminative analogy is that seeing is like looking through a windowpane, where the ‘image’ on the 
window is that common kind which is the direct object of awareness irrespective of whether or not there exist 
any worldly objects ‘beyond.’ This does not capture the Conjunctivist’s notion of indirectness since the subject sees 
the world through a windowpane, whereas the common kind is better construed as something that precludes her 
direct awareness of the world. 
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terminal point in non-misleading experience where the subject is directly acquainted with the 
world, whereas the Conjunctivist insists that there is never any such terminal perceiving. 
 
We can now see that conjunctivism’s Common Kind and Indirect Acquaintance theses mesh 
together as follows: Its common kind thesis ensures that non-misleading and misleading 
experiences are tokens of the same phenomenal type, whereas its Indirect Acquaintance Thesis 
ensures that an experience is non-misleading whenever a normal causal relation is conjoined to 
the former’s direct object of awareness. This yields: 
 
Conjunctivism: For all subjects s: If s has a non-misleading experience ENM, then; 
 
(i) ENM’s phenomenal character is of phenomenal type F, where particular tokens 
of F would be the direct objects of s’s awareness were ENM misleading; and,  
 
(ii) A normal causal relation r holds between F’s tokens and worldly objects ow1, 
ow2 … own, such that F’s tokens indirectly acquaint s with ow1, ow2 … own. 
(Conjunction of Common Kind and Indirect Acquaintance Theses) 
 
A stronger grip on the contrast with naïve realism can be gotten by considering 
conjunctivism’s main guise, viz., minimal representationalism. 
 
1.2.1 Minimal Representationalism 
 
The minimal representationalist – minimal since I am unconcerned with the ontological nature of 
what is doing the representing24 – asserts that an experience’s phenomenal character is typed 
by a certain sort of representational content.25 Experience, Burge says, 
   
“[…] represents or is about objects, properties, and relations […] a person may 
have a perceptual representation even though he or she is perceiving nothing of 
the kind that is perceptually represented.” (2007: 198) 
 
                                                     
24 Some candidates are Frege’s (1892) senses; Lewis’s (1986) possible world content; and Schellenberg’s (2010) 
‘Gappy’ de re modes of presentation. 
25 Perhaps by non-reductively supervening upon (e.g. Chalmers 1996; Crane 1998), or by being reductively 
identical to (e.g. Dretske 1995; Tye 2000), such content – nothing significant turns upon this difference here. 
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  A thought perspicuously illustrated by Lycan:  
 
“You see a grey rat. The greyness you see is that of the rat; your visual system 
correctly and veridically represents greyness in that part of the environment. 
Deranged Desmond hallucinates a pink rat […] The pinkness Desmond sees is 
that of the rat; it’s just that that rat doesn’t exist, but is merely […] a 
representatum.” (Forthcoming: 1) 
 
First, Burge’s remark that both non-misleading and misleading experience represent certain 
“objects, properties, and relations” such as Lycan’s “rat” or “greyness” to the subject suggests 
what I will call minimal representationalism’s Common Kind Thesis:  
 
Minimal Representationalism’s Common Kind Thesis: For any non-
misleading experience ENM and possible misleading experience EM (or vice-versa), 
ENM and EM are of representational type F, where particular tokens of F represent 
objects, o1, o2 … oN, properties p1, p2 … pN, and relations r1, r2 … rN to the 
subject’s consciousness. (Metaphysical commitment of Minimal 
Representationalism) 
 
Lycan’s seeing subject is thus said to be directly aware of a “representatum” that would also be 
the direct object of her awareness if her experience were misleading. It is just that, in non-
misleading experience, this representatum correctly represents the fact that a grey rat is in 
“some part of [the subject’s] environment”, whereas in the misleading case, it incorrectly 
represents items to her consciousness such as a hallucinatory “pink rat.” This common 
representatum, since its instantiation is ontologically distinct from, and does not relationally 
depend upon, the existence of the candidate worldly object itself (viz., a grey rat), is 
standardly said to be mind-dependent. The minimal representationalist’s first basic thought, 
then, is that non-misleading, dream, hallucinatory, and illusory experiences have a common 
representational content or exemplify instances of the same fundamental representational 
kind. 
 
Second, Burge and Lycan’s claim that non-misleading and misleading experiences differ in 
virtue of the fact that, in the former case, the common representatum correctly represents 
worldly items suggests what I will call minimal representationalism’s Indirect Acquaintance 
thesis: 
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Minimal Representationalism’s Indirect Acquaintance Thesis: For all 
subjects s: If s has a non-misleading experience ENM which is of representational 
type F (where F’s tokens correctly represent worldly objects ow1, ow2 … own, 
properties p1, p2 … pN, and relations r1, r2 … rN to s’s consciousness), then 
necessarily, F’s tokens indirectly acquaint s with ow1, ow2 … own, p1, p2 … pN, r1, 
r2 … rN (Metaphysical commitment of Minimal Representationalism) 
 
Lycan’s subject who sees a grey rat is thus acquainted with it in virtue of first standing in a direct 
acquaintance relation to some representational ingredient that ‘shapes the contours’ of her 
experience’s phenomenal character. This representational ingredient is thus a mental 
intermediary that, when it correctly represents the grey rat, mediates her seeing that worldly 
object. The minimal representationalist’s second basic thought, then, is that subjects indirectly 
experience the world through their being directly acquainted with particular tokens of some 
common representational kind.  
 
We can now see that minimal representationalism’s common kind and indirect acquaintance theses 
mesh together as follows: Its common kind thesis ensures that non-misleading and misleading 
experiences are tokens of the same representational type, whereas its indirect acquaintance thesis 
ensures that an experience is non-misleading whenever it correctly represents those worldly 
objects, properties and relations within the subject’s immediate environment. This yields: 
 
Minimal Representationalism: For all subjects s: If s has a non-misleading 
experience ENM, then; 
 
(i) ENM’s phenomenal character is of representational type F, where particular 
tokens of F would be the direct objects of s’s awareness were ENM experience 
misleading; and,  
 
 (ii) F’s tokens correctly represent worldly objects ow1, ow2 … own, properties p1, 
p2 … pN, and relations r1, r2 … rN to s’s consciousness, such that F’s tokens 
indirectly acquaint s with ow1, ow2 … own, p1, p2… pN, r1, r2 … rN. 
(Conjunction of Common Kind and Indirect Acquaintance Theses) 
 
Thus (i) tells us that when a subject sees a grey rat, the most fundamental characterization of 
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her experience is to be given by specifying the nature of that representational kind which is 
also shared by some metaphysically possible misleading experience; whereas (ii) tells us that 
that the direct object of her awareness is not the naïve property being-a-case-of-visual-awareness-
of-a-grey-rat, but rather, something mental that correctly represents the presence of a grey rat. 
This then, is what it means to enjoy a minimally representationalist experience.  
 
1.2.2 Summary 
 
Two views are now on the table: namely, 
 
 Naïve Realism: For all subjects s: If s has a non-misleading experience ENM, 
then; (i) ENM’s phenomenal character is intrinsically constituted by naïve 
properties PN1, PN2 … PNN; and, (ii) S stands in a direct sui generis acquaintance 
relation r to a worldly object, ow’s, perceptible properties PP1, PP2 … PPN, where 
PP1, PP2 … PPN, directly ground ENM’s naïve properties PN1, PN2 … PNN.  
 
And, 
 
 
Conjunctivism: For all subjects s: If s has a non-misleading experience ENM, then; 
 
(i) ENM’s phenomenal character is of phenomenal type F, where particular tokens 
of F would be the direct objects of s’s awareness were ENM misleading; and,  
 
(ii) A normal causal relation r holds between F’s tokens and worldly objects ow1, 
ow2 … own, such that F’s tokens indirectly acquaint s with ow1, ow2 … own. 
(Conjunction of Common Kind and Indirect Acquaintance Theses) 
 
This, as we have seen, standardly comes in the guise of minimal representationalism. It is now 
time to meet the p.m.e which is the problem of how to reconcile naïve realism with the 
existence of misleading experiences given that such experiences are said to banish naïve realism 
and motivate some form of conjunctivism. 
 
1.3 The Problem of Misleading Experience 
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Hellie’s (2007: 271-2) p.m.e employs an argument from hallucination26 in order to show that 
even non-misleading experience cannot be intrinsically naïve realist. Like its traditional 
ancestor’s, Hellie’s p.m.e also has two stages. In the first, it is simply noted that, definitionally, 
hallucinations cannot be naïve realist. In the second – a manoeuvre that Smith calls the 
“generalizing step” (2005: 27) and Snowdon the “negative revision” (1992: 69) – it is argued 
that if hallucinatory experience is not naïve realist, then ex hypothesi, non-misleading 
experience cannot be naïve realist. Hellie’s p.m.e thus has this structure: if misleading 
experience is a certain way, then ex hypothesi, non-misleading experience must too be that way. 
Here is how Hellie expresses the p.m.e (call this the basic formulation27): 
 
Hellie’s Basic P.M.E 
 
First, Hellie invites us to accept three premises. The first, which can be assumed for reductio, 
is: 
 
(1) Naïve Realism: “Phenomenal characters of veridical visual experiences are naïve 
properties.” (2007: 264) (Assumption) 
 
Hellie then invites us to accept the conjunction of, 
 
(2) Base: “No phenomenal character of a hallucinatory experience is a naïve 
property.” (2007: 271) (Premise) 
 
And, 
 
(3) Spreading: “If some phenomenal character of a veridical experience is a naïve 
property, some phenomenal character of a hallucinatory experience is that same 
naïve property.”28 (Premise)  
                                                     
26 Though Hellie ignores illusions (perhaps he thinks that they are metaphysically on a par with hallucinations, and 
so, what goes for hallucinations, goes mutatis mutandis for illusions), I explain later how his p.m.e can – given their 
importance in motivating most versions – accommodate them. 
27 For a similar formulation see Hellie’s (2006: 2).  
28 Hellie (2007: 291) motivates Spreading by appeal to a premise he calls Apparent Spreading, i.e. the non-
controversial claim that non-misleading and misleading experiences can phenomenally appear to have naïve 
properties. For reasons of simplicity and space, discussion of this move is postponed until §2.1.2 where I consider 
the Argument from Phenomenal Infallibility. 
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This, since hallucinatory experiences lack naïve properties, clearly negates (1) and is 
said to compel acceptance of,  
 
(4) Conjunctivism: For all subjects s: If s has a non-misleading experience ENM, 
then; (i) ENM’s phenomenal character is of phenomenal type F, where 
particular tokens of F would be the direct objects of s’s awareness were ENM 
misleading; and, (ii) a normal causal relation r holds between F’s tokens and 
worldly objects ow1, ow2 … own, such that F’s tokens indirectly acquaint s with 
ow1, ow2 … own. (Conjunction of Common Kind and Indirect Acquaintance 
Theses) (Traditional implication of (3), replacement of (1)) 
 
Groundwork laid, it is time to take each stage of Hellie’s p.m.e in turn. 
 
1.3.1 Base 
 
Driving premise (2)’s Base is the obvious thought that, definitionally, hallucinatory experiences 
must lack naïve properties since their natures are not intrinsically constituted by, nor do they 
acquaint subjects with, the world, i.e. naïve realism’s constitution and acquaintance theses are 
false for hallucination. Call this first background assumption the Standard Hallucination Thesis: 
 
(2.a) Standard Hallucination Thesis: For all subjects s: If s has an experience e 
in which objects o1, o2 … oN phenomenally appear to be F, and o1, o2 … oN 
do not objectively exist within s’s environment, then s has a hallucinatory 
experience. (Assumption) 
 
Hellie cites non-lucid dreaming as a paradigmatic instance of hallucination: 
 
“Suppose that Bill falls asleep on a lawn facing a white picket fence. Is Bill visually 
aware, in his dream, that a white picket fence is before him? No! To accept this 
would be to accept that dreams […] can provide us with the same sort of 
psychological contact with our environments as veridical experiences.” (2007: 
271) 
 
That Bill’s dream is not naïve realist is just obvious since no worldly picket fence is directly 
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presented to his consciousness during sleep. In addition to dreams, we also have (i) permanent 
hallucination (e.g. Putnam’s envatted brain that is said to hallucinate everything (2000: 388)), 
(ii) veridical hallucination (e.g. Johnston’s patient who is said to hallucinate white lights exactly 
where there are operating theatre lights (2004: 122), and, (iii) clinical hallucination (e.g. 
hallucinations that accompany various physical-psychological disorders such as Charles Bonnet 
Syndrome in which the subject may report hallucinating complex scenes). None of these 
varieties, since they are endogenously (Austin, 1964: 23) “conjured” from certain of the 
subject’s physical-psychological features, involve “psychological contact” with anything 
worldly. Hallucinatory experiences then – whatever else is true of them – lack any naïve 
properties. 
 
Assumption (2.a) might be questioned on the grounds that partial hallucinations (i.e. 
hallucinations that involve only a part of the subject’s sensory field) are partly world-involving 
and world-acquainting, and so, partly naïve realist. The thought is that the subject who 
hallucinates something against a non-misleading background scene simply misperceives some 
candidate worldly object, e.g. Johnston’s patient simply misperceives the operating theatre 
lights. Partial hallucinations are thus illusions as standardly conceived. 
 
This suggestion is implausible for three reasons. First, in some hallucinations, no candidate 
worldly object can be identified that is ostensibly misperceived: The suggestion that someone 
who hallucinates a pink elephant rampaging around the room misperceives objects such as the 
wall or the shape of a table when those things have radically different properties from, and are 
likely to be occluded by, the ‘elephant’ is plain strange. Second, in some hallucinations, 
nothing worldly even exists to be misperceived: The non-lucid dreamer or envatted brain 
cannot point to something and say that that is misperceived, and these total hallucinations are 
all that assumption (2.a) requires. Third, even if I am wrong and partial hallucinations reduce 
to illusions, illusory experiences, as standardly conceived, are not intrinsically naïve realist. 
 
Enter illusions. The standard conception of illusion asserts that illusory experiences occur when 
the subject misperceives a worldly object, where the misperception is either that the object 
looks to have some property (or properties) that it objectively lacks or looks to lack some 
property (or properties) that it objectively has (e.g. Ayer 1956: 87; Smith 2005: 3). Illusory 
experiences are thus said to be intrinsically world-acquainting but not world-involving mental 
states, i.e. naïve realism’s acquaintance, but not constitution, thesis holds of illusory experience. 
Call this second background assumption the Standard Illusion Thesis: 
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(2.b) Standard Illusion Thesis: For all subjects s: If s has an experience e in 
which worldly objects oW1, oW2 … oWN phenomenally appear to be F, but 
oW1, oW2 … oWN are objectively G, then s has an illusory experience. 
(Assumption) 
 
Examples oft-marshalled to illustrate assumption (2.b) include experiences involving 
phenomenally apparent size such as the Müller-Lyer illusion in which it is said that two lines of 
equal length look unequal in length.  
 
The Müller-Lyer Illusion 
 
 
 
Or experiences involving phenomenally apparent shape such as the ‘Bent Stick’ illusion in 
which it is said that a straight stick looks bent when part-submerged in water. 
 
The Bent Stick Illusion 
 
 
Image reproduced from http://interactagram.com/physics/optics/refraction/BentStick.jpg 
 
Or experiences involving phenomenally apparent ambiguity such as Jastrow’s (1899) ‘Duck-
Rabbit’ illusion in which it is said that a line drawing looks to ‘flip’ between depicting a duck-
then-rabbit (or vice-versa).  
 
Jastrow’s Duck-Rabbit Illusion 
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These examples are traditionally described as being experiences in which the subject is directly 
acquainted with some worldly object (lines with exverted and inverted end-hashes; a straight 
stick; a line drawing) that looks, in some sense, to possess some property (being unequal-in-
length; being bent; flipping) that it objectively lacks. Because certain of the experience’s 
phenomenal properties (looking unequal-in-length; looking bent; looking to flip) cannot, ex 
hypothesi, metaphysically spring from any of the candidate object’s perceptible properties 
(nothing is unequal-in-length, bent, or flips), it is concluded that illusory experiences cannot 
be naïve realist mental states.  
 
Hellie’s (2006: 5-7) argument29 that our ordinary colour experiences lack naïve colour 
properties signals acceptance of the standard conception of illusion. Hellie invites us to 
consider three colour experiences: first, a white card seen under white light that is gradually 
brought under blue light (ww); second, a white card seen under blue light (wb); and third, a 
blue card seen under white light (bw). It is then claimed that in ww we experience, since the 
card’s surface is white and illuminated by white light, a token of surface-whiteness and 
illumination-whiteness; in wb we experience, since the card’s surface is white and illuminated 
by blue light, a token of surface-whiteness and illumination-blueness; and in bw we experience, 
since the card is blue and illuminated by white light, a token of colour-blueness and 
illumination-whiteness.  
 
According to Hellie, wb and bw share some basic non-naïve realist phenomenal kind k that ww 
lacks. This phenomenal mismatch, Hellie reasons, occurs because k cannot be metaphysically 
instantiated in wb’s and bw’s phenomenal character by any one of four possible candidate 
phenomenal properties: namely, the property of at least representing (a) a token of surface-
blueness, (b) a token of surface-whiteness, (c) a token of illumination-blueness, or, (d) a token 
of illumination-whiteness. For wb phenomenally has (b) and (c) but lacks (a) and (d); bw 
phenomenally has (a) and (d) but lacks (b) and (c); and ww phenomenally has (b) and (d) but 
                                                     
29  A similar argument can be found in e.g. Russell (1914: 86) and Smith (2005: 25).  
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lacks (a) and (c). Hellie concludes that if k grounds wb and bw’s phenomenal F-ness (where F is 
the property of appearing such-and-such to a subject s), and if F is not satisfied by any candidate 
property, then ex hypothesi, F cannot be an object’s surface colour or illumination property, i.e. 
a naïve colour property. This argument signals acceptance of assumption (2.a) since its 
conclusion is that wb and bw exemplify experiences in which it is said that worldly objects 
phenomenally appear to possess colour properties (phenomenal blueness in wb and 
phenomenal whiteness in bw and) that, since the card is white in wb and blue in bw, they 
objectively lack.  
 
A tempting thought is that paradigm illusions are too familiar to be truly misleading experiences 
– we would, Austin wrote, “be badly put out” (1964: 26) were a round penny not to look 
elliptical from certain perspectives. We might as well, Austin continues, “ask whether 
producing a photograph is producing an illusion” which is just silly” (1964: 27). That 
photographed objects cannot be qualitatively identical to their worldly counterparts does not 
mean that we experience an illusion every time we look at a photograph, e.g. a photographer 
might use a tilt-and-shift lens to produce a photograph of a skyscraper that looks like a 
miniature scale model, but we hardly conclude that we misperceive its real size since that is just 
how a photograph produced in that way should look. Likewise, that two objectively equal-in-
length lines with exverted and inverted end hashes look unequal-in-length does not mean that 
we experience an illusion since that is just how they should look. Thus, the standard illusion 
thesis’ antecedent does not eo ipso entail its consequent since familiarity means that not all 
mismatches between phenomenal appearances and mind-independent reality are true illusory 
experiences. 
 
I reject Austin’s tempting thought for two reasons. First, the reduction of familiar illusions to 
non-misleading experiences does not preclude subjects from experiencing unfamiliar illusions. 
For instance, Wexler’s (2011) ‘Turning Wheel’, at least for most subjects at the time of 
writing, is an unfamiliar motion after-effect illusion in which a rotating wheel looks to ‘jump’ 
backwards as the normally sighted subject fixates on a dot in its centre. Austin (1964: 24) 
compared such cases to the proof-reader who misreads ‘causal’ as ‘casual’: Just as the 
unfamiliar token experience exemplifies an instance of the familiar type of experience we call 
misreading, so a subject’s unfamiliar token experience of Wexler’s ‘Turning Wheel’ 
exemplifies an instance of the familiar type of experience called motion after-effect. But it is far 
from obvious that motion after-effect experiences are, for most of us, as familiar as misreading; 
and even if they were, the standard illusion thesis requires only one unfamiliar example from a 
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familiar class to be upheld. 
 
The more problematic second reason is that familiar ‘illusions’ still involve a mismatch 
between phenomenal appearances and mind-independent reality – indeed, Austin conceded 
that “the trouble is just that one [Müller-Lyer] line looks longer than the other, though it isn’t” 
(1964: 28, my emphasis).  Familiarity with Müller-Lyer lines does not preclude them from 
phenomenally appearing unequal-in-length, which is just the standard conception of illusion that 
motivates Base. Familiarity would just seem to be irrelevant to the standard illusion thesis. 
 
It is time to explain how the assumptions (2.a) and (2.b) metaphysically entail premise (2)’s 
Base. Assumption (2.a) tells us that hallucinatory experiences do not directly acquaint subjects 
with worldly items and are not phenomenally typed by naïve properties; assumption (2.b) tells 
us that, although illusory experiences directly acquaint subjects with worldly items, they are 
not phenomenally typed by naïve properties; hence the phenomenal characters of hallucinatory 
and illusory experiences cannot be intrinsically naïve realist. In this way, we arrive at a more 
developed version of,  
 
(2) Base: For all subjects s: If s has a misleading experience EM, then EM’s 
phenomenal character is not typed by any naïve properties PN1, PN2 … PNN. 
((2.a), (2.b), Negation of Naïve Realism qua misleading experience) 
 
I turn now to the Spreading step according to which no non-misleading experience is 
fundamentally naïve realist. 
 
1.3.2 Spreading 
 
Driving premise (3)’s Spreading is a background argument that relies upon three premises. The 
first of which is the a priori assumption that a non-misleading experience’s phenomenal 
appearance can always, in principle, be matched by that of some metaphysically possible 
misleading experience. Call this Match:  
 
(3.a) Match: For any non-misleading experience ENM, ENM’s phenomenal 
appearance stands in a matching relation r to the phenomenal appearance 
that is instantiated by some metaphysically possible misleading experience, 
EM. (A priori assumption) 
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Hellie (2007: 291-2) illustrates Match by inviting us to reflect upon the phenomenal 
appearances of dreams. For instance, he describes (ibid) a “very realistic” dream that, vis-à-vis 
its phenomenal appearance, seemed to match his non-misleading experience of writing 
philosophy. Framed this way, Match is uncontroversial. For the notion that any non-misleading 
experience’s phenomenal appearance can be convincingly matched by that instantiated by 
some metaphysically possible misleading experience is conceptually coherent, and Match 
requires only this.  
 
Hellie’s second premise is an intuitive implication of Match: specifically, Hellie claims that 
non-misleading and misleading experiences have matching phenomenal appearances only if they 
are, in some sense, indiscriminable, i.e. share a certain type of indiscriminability property 
(hence “very realistic” dreams). Call this Basic Indiscriminability: 
 
(3.b) Basic Indiscriminability: If a non-misleading experience ENM has a 
phenomenal appearance that stands in a matching relation r to the 
phenomenal appearance that is instantiated by some metaphysically 
possible misleading experience EM, then ENM and EM are indiscriminable. 
(Intuitive Implication of (3.a)) 
 
Basic Indiscriminability seems obvious. For instance, we naturally think that two numerically 
distinct objects, o1 and o2, match in respect of the perceptible property size only if that 
property is not an identifier that enables the subject to perceptually discriminate their 
respective sizes. Likewise, we naturally think that a non-misleading experience matches a 
misleading experience in respect of the property phenomenal appearance only if that property is 
not an identifier that enables the subject to discriminate between them in some way.    
 
Hellie’s third premise plausibly follows from Basic Indiscriminability: specifically, Hellie claims 
that non-misleading and matching misleading experiences have indiscriminable phenomenal 
appearances only if the subject cannot reflectively discriminate the former’s phenomenal 
appearance from the latter’s, and vice-versa. Call this Reflective Indiscriminability: 
 
(3.c) Reflective Indiscriminability: For all subjects s: It is phenomenally 
possible that s cannot reflectively discriminate between (i) a non-
misleading experience ENM’s phenomenal appearance from some 
37 
 
metaphysically possible misleading experience EM’s phenomenal 
appearance, and, (ii) a misleading experience EM’s phenomenal appearance 
from some metaphysically possible non-misleading experience ENM’s 
phenomenal appearance. (Metaphysical implication of (3.b)) 
 
Hellie illustrates Reflective Indiscriminability by inviting us to,  
 
“[…] focus on our current experience from the inside, by phenomenological study, 
and focus on the experience in the skeptic’s story as envisage it to be when we 
project ourselves into having it […] when we do this, the experiences are 
indiscriminable.”30 (2007: 293, my emphasis) 
 
For instance, I presently seem to be experiencing worldly events and objects such as seeing my 
fingers moving across the keyboard and hearing the sound of rain striking the skylight above. Hellie’s 
thought is that phenomenal reflection upon my “experience from the inside” cannot establish 
whether or not it is naïve realist31 – I cannot, phenomenally at least, “activate” (Williamson, 
1990: 8) any sort of knowledge that enables me to discern whether or not my experience is 
truly world-involving. Of course, I may be “tipped off” (Martin, 2007: 11) by someone who 
knows that my experience is misleading and resist believing that it is naïve realist, or an 
observer may numerically distinguish my hallucination from some other previous naïve realist 
experience. But the former is second-order knowledge that I have acquired through testimony 
(analogy: Just as the news can provide you with second-order knowledge of Eyjafjallajökull’s 
eruption in Iceland, so testimony can provide you with second-order knowledge of your 
present experience’s worldly status), and the latter is just irrelevant to my present mental 
state. My predicament is that, when confined to phenomenally reflecting upon appearances, I 
cannot identify some property (or properties) of my apparently naïve realist experience in 
virtue of which it is discriminable from some metaphysically possible misleading counterpart, 
or vice-versa.  
 
Reflective Indiscriminability, Hellie reasons, is best explained by the hypothesis that non-
misleading and misleading experiences “share all their phenomenal characters” (2007: 272) 
                                                     
30 For similar remarks, see, e.g. Broad (1952: 12); Johnston (2006: 287); and Neta (2008: 317). 
31 This is why Hellie (2007: 294) thinks that I am never epistemically justified in judging that my present experience 
is non-misleading. I sidestep this epistemic move since I am concerned only with how things phenomenally seem 
rather than thorny issues of epistemic justification. 
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(thus Reflective Indiscriminability has now emerged as abductively motivating the common kind 
thesis). That is, a subject’s inability to reflectively discriminate between two token 
experiences, E1 and E2, (and vice-versa) is best explained by the thought that E1 and E2 are 
tokens of phenomenal type F, where F ultimately explains their mental nature. Hence,  
 
(3) Spreading: “If some phenomenal character of a veridical experience is a 
naïve property, some phenomenal character of a hallucinatory experience is 
that same [naïve] property.” (Premise) 
 
Or slightly more formally, 
 
(3) Spreading: For all subjects s: If s cannot reflectively discriminate (i) a non-
misleading experience ENM’s phenomenal appearance from some 
metaphysically possible misleading experience EM’s phenomenal appearance, 
or, (ii) a misleading experience EM’s phenomenal appearance from some 
metaphysically possible non-misleading experience ENM’s phenomenal 
appearance, then ENM and EM are of phenomenal type F. (Abductive 
implication of (3.c)) 
 
Hellie appears to find the inferential transition from Reflective Indiscriminability to Spreading 
intuitively obvious.32 Still, an analogy is helpful. Consider the oncologist who is confronted 
with two tumours, T1 and T2, that look indiscriminable to her on scans, and at the cellular level 
when viewed through a microscope. Her medical knowledge abductively justifies her inference 
that T1 and T2 are primarily caused by the same genetic mutation. That partial genome 
sequencing then reveals that T1 and T2 fundamentally consist in the same genetic mutation is, 
given their visual indiscriminability, thoroughly unsurprising (it would be unexpected, though 
not medically impossible, were T1 and T2 primarily caused by something else). Likewise, 
someone seeking to explain why a subject cannot reflectively discriminate between two token 
experiences, E1 and E2, is prima facie abductively justified to infer that E1 and E2 are of the same 
phenomenal type – not because some metaphysical principle dictates this (one has not yet been 
discovered), but because something intuitively fantastic would be occurring were E1 and E2 
“utterly different” (Price 1950: 31-2) mental states. 
 
                                                     
32 As does Foster who thinks it plain that reflectively indiscriminable experiences have “the same psychological 
character through and through” (2000: 8). 
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Hellie’s story behind Spreading can now be summarized. A priori reflection established that a 
non-misleading experience’s phenomenal appearance can always, in principle, be convincingly 
matched by that of some possible misleading experience (Match). This matching relation was 
intuitively understood in terms of some type of indiscriminability property that non-
misleading and misleading experiences share (Basic Indiscriminability). This indiscriminability 
property was identified as being the subject’s inability to reflectively discriminate a non-
misleading experience’s phenomenal appearance from some possible misleading experience’s 
phenomenal appearance, or vice-versa (Reflective Indiscriminability). It was then argued that, since 
such reasoning usually works well in everyday cases, and since we have no obvious reason for 
thinking that the mental genus experience is exceptional, non-misleading and misleading 
experiences are phenomenally type-identical mental states (Spreading). 
 
1.3.3 Goodbye to Naïve Realism 
 
It is perhaps obvious how the conjunction of Base and Spreading threaten naïve realism. First, 
since it is the view at issue, assume that, 
 
(1) Naïve Realism: For all subjects s: If s has a non-misleading experience ENM, 
then, (i) ENM’s phenomenal character is intrinsically constituted by some set 
of naïve properties PN1, PN2 … PNN, and, (ii) S stands in a direct sui generis 
acquaintance relation r to a worldly object, ow’s, perceptible properties PP1, 
PP2 … PPN, where PP1, PP2 … PPN, metaphysically ground ENM’s naïve 
properties PN1, PN2 … PNN. (Assumption) 
 
is true. Now, if we accept, 
 
(2) Base: For all subjects s: If s has a misleading experience EM, then EM’s 
phenomenal character is not typed by any naïve properties PN1, PN2 … PNN. 
(Assumption) 
 
And,  
 
(3) Spreading: For all subjects s: If s cannot reflectively discriminate (i) a non-
misleading experience ENM’s phenomenal appearance from some 
metaphysically possible misleading experience EM’s phenomenal appearance, 
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or, (ii) a misleading experience EM’s phenomenal appearance from some 
metaphysically possible non-misleading experience ENM’s phenomenal 
appearance, then ENM and EM are of phenomenal type F. (Assumption) 
  
Then, since Base tells us that misleading experiences are not intrinsically naïve realist, and since 
Spreading tells us that reflectively indiscriminable non-misleading and misleading experiences 
are phenomenally type-identical mental states, ex hypothesi, even non-misleading experiences 
cannot be intrinsically naïve realist.  
 
1.3.4 Conjunctivism (Again) 
 
Conjunctivism would now seem to replace naïve realism qua leading theory of non-misleading 
experience. For it is said to be intuitively obvious and indubitable in the light of reflection 
upon experience that phenomenal appearances must be experientially instantiated by some 
direct object of awareness (e.g. Broad 1923: 240; Smith 2005: 224-5). A thought encapsulated 
by Robinson’s Phenomenal Principle:  
 
“If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular 
sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is aware which does 
possess that sensible quality.” (1994: 32, my emphasis) 
 
Or,   
 
(4.a) Phenomenal Principle: For all subjects s: If s has an experience E of a 
phenomenally apparent property F, then necessarily, s is directly aware of 
an object, o, which experientially instantiates F. (Premise) 
 
Smith (2005: 36) illustrates the Phenomenal Principle by inviting us to consider a standard 
illusory experience in which the subject describes a white wall as looking yellow. As a rational 
subject, she does not randomly “pick a colour term” to describe this look; rather, she describes 
the white wall as looking, in some sense, yellow because that is the phenomenal property of which 
she is directly aware. Base tells us that that that yellow look cannot, since the wall is objectively 
white, be experientially instantiated by any naïve property. And since Spreading tells us that her 
illusory and corresponding non-misleading experience are tokens of the same phenomenal 
type, we get,  
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(4.b) For all subjects s: If s has a non-misleading experience ENM of a 
phenomenally apparent property F, then necessarily, s is directly aware of 
an object, o, which experientially instantiates F, where o is intrinsically 
non-naive. (Spreading, (4.a)) 
 
And if it is the presence of a white wall that is not illuminated yellow which determines that 
her experience is non-misleading, then it seems plain that it must be appropriately causally 
related to that non-naïve item which is also the direct object of awareness in the illusory case. 
Hence, 
 
(4) Conjunctivism: For all subjects s: If s has a non-misleading experience ENM, 
then; (i) ENM’s phenomenal character is of phenomenal type F, where 
particular tokens of F would be the direct objects of s’s awareness were ENM 
misleading; and, (ii) a normal causal relation r holds between F’s tokens and 
worldly objects ow1, ow2 … own, such that F’s tokens indirectly acquaint s with 
ow1, ow2 … own (Metaphysical implication of (4.b), Replacement of Naïve 
Realism) 
 
Naïve realism has now not only been banished, but replaced as the leading theory of non-
misleading experience. 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I outlined two theories of non-misleading experience: First, a naïve realism 
which insists that the phenomenal characters of non-misleading experiences are intrinsically 
constituted and relationally determined by those worldly-object property couples with which 
subjects are immediately and irreducibly acquainted; and second, a conjunctivism which insists 
that the phenomenal characters of non-misleading and misleading experiences are type-
identical, where a suitable causal relation holds between the direct object of awareness and 
worldly objects in the former case. I then explained Hellie’s p.m.e, and in particular, how he 
exploited the property of reflective indiscriminability that non-misleading and misleading 
experiences share to topple naïve realism. Finally, I explained how the Phenomenal Principle is 
said to positively motivate conjunctivism. This completes my mapping of the essential terrain.  
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2 
Three Constraints on a Solution 
 
In this chapter I argue that a successful naïve realist solution to the p.m.e takes the shape of 
three constraints on a theory of misleading experience. The first (§2.1) metaphysical constraint 
is that the naïve realist is minimally committed to a view I will Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism 
(e.g. Alston 1989; Langsam 1997) which denies Spreading by insisting that reflectively 
indiscriminable non-misleading and misleading experiences are phenomenally type-distinct 
mental states. Two objections to naïve realism’s disjunctivist stratagem are discussed and rejected. 
The first (§2.1.1) is Conduct’s (2012) objection that, since phenomenal intuition shows that 
non-misleading and hallucinatory experience is presentational of experience-independent 
objects33, naïve realism entails Spreading, and hence, Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism must fall. 
The second (§2.1.2) is Hellie’s (2007) objection that Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism 
problematically violates the strong intuition that an experience’s phenomenally apparent 
properties must intrinsically constitute its phenomenal character. Conduct’s objection is 
rejected on two counts: first, that phenomenal intuition equally shows that hallucination is 
pseudo-presentational, i.e. merely seems to be presentational of experience-independent 
objects; and second, that any naïve realist who accepts Spreading is put out of experiential 
business by the p.m.e. Hellie’s objection is rejected on the grounds that it presupposes a 
conception of phenomenal character that there is no obvious reason for the phenomenal 
disjunctivist to accept. An alternative conception of phenomenal character is then outlined. 
 
The second (§2.2) explanatory constraint is that the phenomenal disjunctivist is committed to a 
positive explanation of misleading experience. This is because simply denying Spreading cannot 
meet Sturgeon’s (1998) highly plausible Adequacy Condition on experience according to which 
non-misleading and misleading experiences are (i) reflectively indiscriminable, (ii) scene-immediate, 
i.e. seem to immediately present the same scene, (iii) subjectively equivalent, i.e. seem to be 
subjectively like each other, (iv) rationally equivalent, i.e. can rationally motivate the same 
beliefs, and, (v) behaviourally equivalent, i.e. can rationally motivate the same behaviours. Two 
influential forms of phenomenal disjunctivism are discussed and rejected. The first (§2.2.1) 
seeks to positively explain features (ii)-(v) by appeal to a primitive conception of (i)’s reflective 
                                                     
33 This position, called Object Disjunctivism claims that what makes an experience hallucinatory is something about 
the type of experience independent object with which the subject is acquainted (e.g. Byrne & Logue (2008: 63); 
Thau (2004: 195)). 
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indiscriminability (e.g. Langsam 1995; Martin 2004). The second (§2.2.2) seeks to positively 
explain features (i)-(v) by appeal to the fact that a misleading experience produces 
indiscriminable cognitive effects (i.e. beliefs and behaviours) in the subject that the 
corresponding non-misleading experience would have produced in that doxastic setting (Fish, 
2008; 2009). The first form is rejected on the grounds that its conception of reflective 
indiscriminability is just too weak to robustly secure features (ii)-(v). The second form is 
rejected on the grounds that it is objectionably circular since a misleading experience’s 
cognitive effects are analytically equivalent to features (i)-(v). These objections point towards 
the need for a different form of phenomenal disjunctivism that can perform this explanatory 
work – a form which I introduce in Ch.3. 
 
The third (§2.3) unificatory constraint is that a persuasive positive phenomenal disjunctivism is 
committed to a unified theory of misleading experience, i.e. a theory that tells the same 
fundamental story of dream, hallucinatory, and illusory experiences. I motivate this constraint 
by arguing that a unified theory of misleading experience, or what I call unidisjunctivism, enjoys 
three important advantages over non-unified theories: namely, it is (i) elegant, i.e. concise, 
simple, and explanatory satisfying, (ii) can explain hard to classify cases, i.e. experiences that 
resist neat categorization as being dreams or hallucinations or illusions, and, (iii) of the right 
theoretical shape to save naïve realism.  
 
2.1 Naïve Realism’s Disjunctivist Stratagem 
 
The thought that the Naïve Realist is committed to a basic phenomenal disjunctivism is made 
explicit by Fish34, who writes that,  
 
“[...] the visual experience we enjoy [is] a matter of the subject’s being acquainted 
with elements of the mind-independent environment, where a relationship of this 
kind would not hold were the subject’s environment not to be as the experience 
presents it as being. Thus, naive realism entails disjunctivism: if naive realism is 
true, then the kind of mental state that is involved in a veridical perception [...] 
could not be involved in a hallucinatory situation.” (2009: 37, my emphasis) 
 
Hence, 
 
                                                     
34 See also e.g. Campbell (2002: 117); Martin (2006: 14); and Nudds (2009: 335). 
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“[…] where the spreading step [...] takes the indiscriminability of perception and 
hallucination to show that there is only one kind of object we can perceive […] 
the disjunctive response aims to resist this and hold instead that the objects of 
visual experience might be of one kind or of another, it is just that objects of 
different kinds might yet be indiscriminable.” (2009: 34) 
 
Thus, since the naïve realist asserts that a non-misleading experience’s phenomenal character is 
relationally individuated by worldly object-property couples, and since Base tells us that a 
relation “of this kind” cannot hold in misleading experience, she is committed to at least a basic 
phenomenal disjunctivism: an experience’s phenomenal character is either typed by (i) 
relationally individuated naïve properties (if non-misleading), or, (ii) something else (if 
misleading). Exploiting the thought that reflectively indiscriminable experiences can have 
distinctive phenomenal ingredients thus allows the naïve realist to sensibly resist the 
conjunctivist intuition that naïve realist and misleading experiences are phenomenally type-
identical mental states. 
 
Naïve realism’s disjunctivist stratagem can be elaborated in two stages. In the first stage, all parties 
agree that there are three varieties of looks: if something looks like a dog, then that look is 
either a non-misleading perception of a dog; or a dog-illusion; or a dog-hallucination.35 ‘Looks’ 
statements can thus be characterised disjunctively (D). We can say that,  
 
(D) L is a look as if a worldly object, ow, is F iff either, 
 
(D.i) L is a non-misleading perception of the fact that ow is F; or 
(D.ii) L is an illusion as if ow is F; or,  
(D.iii) L is a hallucination as if ow is F. 
 
I am not claiming that this disjunctive schema neatly individuates all looks (e.g. perhaps there 
are ‘hybrid’ illusory-hallucinatory looks); only that it is a mutually agreed sensible starting 
point. In the second stage, we can sketch truth-makers for (D.i) – (D.iii). (D.i)’s truth-makers 
receive purely naïve realist treatment. So, 
 
 (D.i) (a) A non-misleading perception of a worldly object, ow, which is 
                                                     
35 This tripartite individuation of looks is also made explicit in Sturgeon’s (2000: 10; 2008: 112-5). 
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objectively F is determined by an object-dependent sui generis 
acquaintance relation, r, that is instantiated between a subject s, ow, 
and ow’s perceptible properties PP 1, PP2 … PPN. (Acquaintance Thesis) 
 
(b) A non-misleading perception’s phenomenal character is typed by naïve 
properties PN1, PN2 … PNn. (Constitution Thesis) 
 
Next, (D.ii)’s truth-makers receive partly naïve and non-naive realist treatment. So, 
 
     (D.ii)  (a) An illusory perception as if a worldly object, ow, is F is determined 
by an object-dependent sui generis acquaintance relation, r, that is 
instantiated between a subject s and ow. 
 
    (b) An illusory perception’s phenomenal character is not typed by any 
naïve properties PN1, PN2 … PNN.
36 (Instance of Base) 
 
Finally, (D.iii)’s truth-makers receive purely non-naive realist treatment. So, 
 
       (D.iii) (a) A hallucinatory perception as if a worldly object, ow, is F is not 
determined by an object-dependent sui generis acquaintance 
relation, r, that is instantiated between a subject s and ow. 
 
(b) A hallucinatory perception’s phenomenal character is not typed by 
any naïve properties PN1, PN2 … PNn. (Instance of Base) 
  
To illustrate each disjunction, consider Foster’s (2000: 23) character, Henry, who is sitting on 
a riverbank watching a salmon leaping. Let’s assume that Henry’s visual system is working well 
and that the viewing conditions are conducive to seeing salmon leaping. Call Henry’s non-
misleading experience salmon-experience1: in salmon-experience1, a salmon-leaping look is 
made true by the fact that Henry stands in a direct sui generis acquaintance relation to a salmon 
that is pink and leaping. Introducing some disjunctivist terminology that will be staying with 
us, salmon-experience1
 
can be described as a ‘Good’ case since its phenomenal character is 
relationally typed by that worldly object-property couple (viz., a pink salmon) with which 
                                                     
36 Some (e.g. Brewer 2011; Child 1992; Snowdon 1980) treat illusions as ‘Good’ cases. For simplicity, I keep to 
this traditional characterization until Ch.6 which tells my story of illusion. 
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Henry is irreducibly and immediately acquainted – such cases occur when phenomenal 
appearances are “fully grounded in […] perceptual contact with” (Sturgeon 2008: 115) the 
world. Salmon-experience1, since it is both intrinsically world-involving and world-
acquainting, thus exemplifies the best possible experience a subject can enjoy.  
 
Now, suppose that Henry is presented with a worldly object that is cleverly designed to 
produce (at least to him) a misleading look as of a salmon that is pink and leaping, and reports 
‘seeing’ a salmon that he cannot reflectively discriminate from the worldly one that was 
presented in salmon-experience1. Call Henry’s reflectively indiscriminable illusion salmon-
experience
2
: in salmon-experience
2
, a salmon-leaping look is made false by the fact that Henry 
stands in a sui generis direct acquaintance relation to some candidate worldly object. 
Introducing some more disjunctivist terminology that will be staying with us, salmon-
experience2
 
can be described as a ‘Bad’ case since its phenomenal character is not relationally 
typed by that worldly object-property couple with which he is directly acquainted – such cases 
occur when, phenomenal appearances are “yoked to, but not drawn wholly from, perceptual 
contact with” (Sturgeon 2008: 114) the world. Salmon-experience2, since it is intrinsically 
world-acquainting but not intrinsically world-involving, thus exemplifies the second best possible 
experience a subject can enjoy.  
 
Finally, suppose that the mad scientist has attached a remote controlled apparatus to Henry’s 
optic nerve, where this device, when active, allows total control over those neural signals 
which are transmitted to his brain. As Henry looks at the same spot where the salmon was 
leaping, the implant is activated which then produces qualitatively identical neural signals as 
those which are proximately produced by a salmon that is pink and leaping. In this scenario, 
my objector reasons that since intuition dictates that experiences locally supervene upon the 
subject’s internal physical constitution, and since Henry’s internal constitution that he had at 
the time of salmon-experience1 has been exactly duplicated, he must experience a hallucination 
that, according to Robinson, “exactly resembles [salmon-experience
1
] in its subjective 
character” (2001: 151), i.e. Henry’s mental state is phenomenally type-identical to the one 
that he was in during salmon-experience
1
.37 Call Henry’s indiscriminable hallucination salmon-
experience
3
: in salmon-experience3, a leaping-salmon look is made false by something that is 
not a leaping salmon. In now familiar terminology, Salmon-experience3
 
can be described as a 
very ‘Bad’38 case since none of its phenomenal character metaphysically springs from the 
                                                     
37 This is our first glimpse of the Argument from Local Supervenience, discussion of which must wait until §3.3.  
38 Future references to ‘Bad’ experience will include hallucination unless otherwise indicated. 
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perceptible properties of anything worldly – such cases occur when phenomenal appearances 
are “unyoked to perceptual contact with” (Sturgeon 2008: 114) the world. Salmon-
experience3, since it is neither intrinsically world-acquainting nor world-involving, thus 
exemplifies the worst possible experience a subject can enjoy.  
 
Of salmon-experience
2
 and salmon-experience
3
, I claim that, if naïve realism’s supposition that 
non-misleading experience is phenomenally typed by naïve properties is true, then ex hypothesi, 
they cannot be phenomenally type-identical to salmon-experience1 since their phenomenal 
characters were not relationally typed by naïve properties. As a result, the kind of experience 
Henry had in salmon-experience
1
 cannot be enjoyed in salmon-experience
2
 and salmon-
experience
3
.  
 
I can now bring naïve realism’s disjunctivist stratagem to a close. Hellie’s journey began with: 
 
      Base: For all subjects s: If s has a misleading experience EM, then EM’s 
phenomenal character is not typed by any naïve properties PN1, PN2 … PNN. 
(Conclusion of the p.m.e’s first stage) 
 
The “indiscriminability of perception and hallucination” was then said to abductively motivate, 
 
Spreading: For all subjects s: If s cannot reflectively discriminate (i) a Good 
experience EG’s phenomenal appearance from some metaphysically possible Bad 
experience’s EB’s phenomenal appearance, or, (ii) a Bad experience’s EB’s 
phenomenal appearance from some metaphysically possible Good experience EG’s 
phenomenal appearance, then EG and EB are of phenomenal type F. 
 
I resist Spreading by arguing that: if phenomenal characters are relationally individuated, then ex 
vi termini, ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experiences must differ in phenomenal type. Hence,  
  
Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism: For all subjects s:  
 
(i) If s has a Good experience EG, then EG’s objective phenomenal character is of 
type F, where F is naïve realist. 
 
(ii) If s has a Bad experience EB, then EB’s objective phenomenal character is of 
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type G, where G is not naïve realist. (Metaphysical commitment of naïve 
realism)    
 
Because the reflective indiscriminability of ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experience is not to be denied, I 
can now replace Spreading with, 
 
Apparent Spreading: If some Good experience EG phenomenally appears to a 
subject s to have a naïve property PN, then some metaphysically possible Bad 
experience EB can phenomenally appear to s to have PN, where EG and EB are 
tokens of different phenomenal types.  
 
Thus ensuring that naïve realism remains in play.  
 
2.1.1 Naïve Realism minus Phenomenal Disjunctivism 
 
One suspicion is that naïve realism does not, since its metaphysical commitments are 
compatible with the intuition that reflectively indiscriminable experience share phenomenal 
character, eo ipso metaphysically entail Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism. This position has 
recently39 been articulated by Conduct, who begins by arguing that, 
 
“[…] there is phenomenological support for the thought that […] hallucination40 
is presentational, and hence relational, in nature. [there is] good reason to 
suppose that for experience to be genuinely presentational, the objects of 
experience must be independent of their presence in experience, […] to satisfy 
this phenomenological intuition that hallucination is presentational, we should 
think that the objects of such experiences are awareness-independent.” (2012: 
731) 
 
But because the Naïve Realist claims that ‘Good’ experience is likewise “presentational, and 
hence relational in nature”, she is committed to … 
 
                                                     
39 The sheer counterintuitiveness of this position probably explains why it is has been historically overlooked. 
40 Though Conduct’s objection employs only hallucinations, there is no obvious reason for thinking that it does 
not also extend to dreams and illusions. For this reason, I assume that Conduct would also claim that naïve 
realism is compatible with the thought that ‘Good’ and all ‘Bad’ experience has the same basic nature. 
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“[…] conceiving of hallucinatory experience as having the same nature as 
perceptual experience.” (2012: 728) 
 
Conduct, then, begins by defining naïve realism as the view that non-misleading experience 
essentially consists in a direct sui generis acquaintance relation that holds between subject and 
worldly object. This suggests, 
 
(1) Conduct’s Naïve Realism: For all subjects s: If s has a non-misleading 
experience ENM, then ENM’s phenomenal character essentially consists in a 
direct sui generis acquaintance relation r in which s stands to worldly objects 
ow1, ow2 … own, where ow1, ow2 … own are immediately presented to s’s 
consciousness. (Assumption) 
 
He then proceeds by claiming that we have “good reason” to accept two related constraints on 
presentational experience, i.e. experiences that are immediately “presentational of the objects 
of perception” (2012: 727). First, Conduct’s claim that presentational experience is “relational 
[…] in nature” suggests that we should accept: 
        
 (2) Relational Constraint: For all subjects s: If s has a presentational experience 
EP, then EP essentially consists in an acquaintance relation r that holds 
between s and objects o1, o2 … on, where o1, o2 … on are immediately 
presented to her consciousness. (1st metaphysical constraint) 
 
Whereas Conduct’s claim that the objects of “genuinely presentational” experiences are 
“independent of their presence in experience” suggests that we should also accept: 
 
(3) Experience Independent Constraint: For all subjects s: If s has a genuinely 
presentational experience EP in which objects o1, o2 … on are immediately 
presented to her consciousness, then o1, o2 … on have the ontological 
property of existing independently of EP. (2
nd metaphysical constraint) 
 
Now, if genuinely presentational experiences essentially consist in the property of being 
relational mental states, and if the objects of such experiences have the ontological property of 
being experience independent, then making sense of a “genuinely relational state of affairs 
between the subject and object” (Conduct 2012: 730) obviously requires that, in genuinely 
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presentational experience, she stands in an acquaintance relation to objects that have the 
ontological property of being experience independent. The Relational and Experience Independent 
constraints thus mesh together like this: 
 
(4) For all subjects s: If s has a genuinely presentational experience EP, then EP 
essentially consists in an acquaintance relation r that holds between s and 
experience independent objects o1, o2 … on, where o1, o2 … on are 
immediately presented to her consciousness. ((2) & (3)) 
 
Conduct’s next, and crucial, move is to argue that premise (4) is also a metaphysical constraint 
on hallucination. This is because he thinks that “phenomenological intuition” shows that 
hallucination is genuinely presentational. That is, he argues that since, 
 
(5) For all subjects s: If s has a hallucinatory experience EH, then EH immediately 
presents objects o1, o2 … on to her consciousness. (Premise) 
 
is phenomenally compelling, we have good reason to accept that, 
 
(6) For all subjects s: If s has a hallucinatory experience EH, then EH essentially 
consists in an acquaintance relation r that holds between s and experience 
independent objects o1, o2 … on, where o1, o2 … on are immediately 
presented to consciousness. (Inductive implication of (4) & (5)) 
 
is true. Now, since Conduct understands the Naïve Realist as asserting that non-misleading 
experience also essentially consists in an acquaintance relation that holds between subject and 
experience independent objects that are immediately presented to consciousness, he concludes 
that she is committed to “conceiving of hallucinatory experience as having the same nature as 
perceptual experience.” In other words, she is committed to this instance of Spreading (relation 
‘r’ replaces phenomenal type F).   
 
(7) Spreading*: For all subjects s: If s cannot reflectively discriminate (i) a non-
misleading experience ENM’s phenomenal appearance from some 
metaphysically possible hallucinatory experience EH’s phenomenal 
appearance, or, (ii) a hallucinatory experience EH’s phenomenal appearance 
from metaphysically some possible non-misleading experience ENM’s 
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phenomenal appearance, then ENM and EH essentially consist in an 
acquaintance relation r that holds between s and experience independent 
objects o1, o2 … on, that are immediately presented to her consciousness. ((1) 
& (6), Negation of Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism) 
 
To illustrate. It presently looks to me as if Scrabble, the Terrier, is dozing underfoot. Now, 
Conduct’s naïve realism (premise (1)) tells us that, if my experience is ‘Good’, then its 
phenomenal character essentially consists in an acquaintance relation in which I stand to 
Scrabble, the dozing Terrier who is that experience independent object of which I am 
immediately aware. Premise (6) tells us that, if I am hallucinating, then my experience’s 
phenomenal character essentially consists in an acquaintance relation in which I stand to some 
experience independent object that is reflectively indiscriminable from Scrabble, the worldly 
dozing Terrier. Conjoining premises (1) and (6) entail premise (7): For since my reflectively 
indiscriminable experiences are said to essentially consist in the property of being relational 
mental states, and since this property is their common experiential ingredient, we are not, 
Conduct concludes, to straightforwardly accept that naïve realism metaphysically entails 
phenomenal disjunctivism. In which case, Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism will not, contra my 
insistence, constitute a requirement on a successful answer to the p.m.e. 
 
My response relies solely upon rejecting the supposition that hallucinatory experience is 
genuinely presentational, so it is premise (5)41 which requires elaboration. Conduct’s 
argument for it is that since ‘Good’ experience presents worldly objects in “an ontologically 
immediate way” (2011: 730), and since ‘Good’ and hallucinatory experiences are reflectively 
indiscriminable, ex hypothesi, hallucinatory experience must also present objects in “an 
ontologically immediate way.” For a hallucinatory experience that was not presentationally 
immediate would then have a phenomenal property in virtue of which it is reflectively 
discriminable from some possible non-misleading experience, and this is not the case. This, in 
conjunction with premise (4)’s claim that genuinely presentational experience essentially 
consists in an acquaintance relation that holds between subject and experience independent 
object then motivates premise (6): Hallucinatory experiences likewise essentially consist in an 
acquaintance relation that is instantiated between subject and experience independent object. 
 
As it stands, premise (5) is overly strong. Once it is accepted that hallucination is genuinely 
                                                     
41 The curious reader can find independent argument for premises (2) and (3) in Conduct’s (2011: 730) and 
Foster’s (2000: 164-170).  
53 
 
presentational, it is tempting to conclude that hallucinatory and ‘Good’ experiences are 
phenomenally type-identical mental states. But once it is accepted that hallucination only seems 
genuinely presentational, then, since premise (4) will cease to apply to hallucination, we can 
deny that hallucinatory and ‘Good’ experiences share a common phenomenal kind. 
 
What I am suggesting is that by substituting, 
 
(5) Strong Presentation: For all subjects s: If s has a hallucinatory experience EH, 
then EH immediately presents objects o1, o2 … on, to her consciousness. 
(Premise) 
 
With, 
 
(5*) Weak Presentation: For all subjects s: If s has a hallucinatory experience 
EH, then EH seems to immediately present objects o1, o2 … on to her 
consciousness. (Premise) 
 
We can resist premise (7) and save Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism.  
 
Someone who endorses weak presentation is – whether they are committed to my naïve realism 
or Conduct’s (ostensibly phenomenal relationalism) – plausibly committed to Basic Phenomenal 
Disjunctivism. Let’s assume that either my, 
 
(1*) Naïve Realism: For all subjects s: If s has a non-misleading experience ENM, 
then, (i) ENM’s phenomenal character is intrinsically constituted by naïve 
properties PN1, PN2 … PNN, and, (ii) S stands in a direct sui generis 
acquaintance relation r to a worldly object, ow’s, perceptible properties PP1, 
PP2 … PPN, where PP1, PP2, … PPN, metaphysically ground ENM’s naïve 
properties PN1, PN2 … PNN. (Assumption) 
 
Or, 
 
(1) Conduct’s Naïve Realism: For all subjects s: If s has a non-misleading 
experience ENM, then ENM’s phenomenal character essentially consists in a 
direct sui generis acquaintance relation r in which s stands to worldly objects 
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ow1, ow2 … own, where ow1, ow2 … own are immediately presented to s’s 
consciousness. (Assumption) 
 
is correct. Then since, 
 
(4) For all subjects s: If s has a genuinely presentational experience EP, then EP 
fundamentally consists in an acquaintance relation r that holds between s and 
experience independent objects o1, o2 … on, where o1, o2 … on are 
immediately presented to her consciousness. (Conjunction of Relational and 
Experience independent constraints) 
 
will not apply to, 
 
(5*) Weak Presentation: For all subjects s: If s has a hallucinatory experience 
EH, then EH seems to immediately present objects o1, o2 … on to her 
consciousness. 
 
We can, on either mine or Conduct’s naïve realism, preserve Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism. 
 
To illustrate. Suppose that I am hallucinating Scrabble, the Terrier, dozing underfoot. It is 
obvious that someone who endorses my naïve realism and weak presentation is committed to Basic 
Phenomenal Disjunctivism since, unlike a genuinely presentational look, no acquaintance relation 
holds between myself and some experience independent object to relationally determine my 
experience’s phenomenal character. It is also plausible that someone who endorses Conduct’s 
naïve realism and weak presentation is likewise committed to Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism since, 
unlike a genuinely presentational look, no acquaintance relation holds between myself and 
some experience independent object to intrinsically constitute my experience’s phenomenal 
character.42 What both naïve realists will claim is that my hallucination essentially consists in 
some phenomenally type-distinct property that makes it seem genuinely presentational, where 
this property then explains my inability to reflectively discriminate it from a corresponding 
‘Good’ experience of Scrabble, the Terrier, dozing underfoot. On neither naïve realism, is 
there any move to be made from the existence of this indiscriminability property to the claim 
that my hallucination and corresponding ‘Good’ experience are phenomenally type-identical 
mental states. 
                                                     
42 Though Johnston thinks otherwise, I ultimately reject his theory of hallucination in §5.3.2. 
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Having sketched a possibility that either naïve realist can exploit, I want to conclude by 
sketching two reasons for preferring weak presentation. First, Conduct said that phenomenal 
reflection established strong presentation. But there is an important reading of the concept 
reflection which equally shows that hallucinations are pseudo-presentational. Consider the 
cognitively sound subject who, owing to macular degeneration, develops Charles Bonnet 
Syndrome and reports ‘seeing’ things that are very small in size (so-called ‘Lilliputian’ 
hallucinations). In this case, she is likely to unreflectively judge, since that is how things 
phenomenally seem, that her hallucinations are genuinely presentational of certain experience-
independent objects. But when she rationally reflects upon her initial judgement, she is likely 
to reject it since such reflection informs her that her hallucinations depend upon her ocular 
pathology. And in those cases where subjects think that their hallucinations are presentational 
(e.g. as in the famous case of the mathematician, John Nash, who thought it rational to believe 
that extra-terrestrials were sending him encrypted messages through the New York Times, 
since those messages cognitively arrived in ways that were similar to his mathematical 
theorems) it is surely we who can rationally judge that their hallucinations depend upon some 
pathology. 
 
Conduct’s argument for strong presentation, then, relies upon too narrow a reading of the 
concept reflection. If reflection just means phenomenal reflection, then hallucination will seem 
genuinely presentational; but if reflection also incorporates rational reflection about relevant 
non-phenomenal facts, then hallucination will seem pseudo-presentational. We should not, I 
submit, straightforwardly accept Conduct’s narrow reading of reflection which underlies 
premise (5)’s strong presentation when a wider reading well-motivates weak presentation. 
 
Second, Conduct’s argument is vulnerable to the p.m.e. Assume that ‘Good’ and hallucinatory 
experiences essentially consist in a direct sui generis acquaintance relation to experience 
independent object(s) – it is just that, in the latter, there is “something about the kind of 
entity” (Conduct 2011: 278) to which the subject is related that explains the experience’s non-
world involving status. Conduct’s “something” cannot, otherwise the experience would not be 
hallucinatory, be a naïve property, i.e. he must accept Base qua hallucination. This, in 
conjunction with the claim that ‘Good’ and hallucinatory experiences can be reflectively 
indiscriminable, now threatens naïve realism: For it can now be reasoned that, since 
hallucinatory experience essentially consists in a direct sui generis acquaintance relation to some 
experience independent non-naïve realist object (instance of Base), and since indiscriminable 
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experiences share a phenomenal kind (Spreading), ‘Good’ experience must likewise essentially 
consist in a direct sui generis acquaintance relation to some experience independent non-naïve 
realist object. 
 
Conduct might deny that those non-naïve realist experience independent objects which 
hallucination ‘spreads’ over to ‘Good’ experience do not, unlike the latter’s naïve properties, 
do any important phenomenal work. But then he owes us some story of why those objects 
magically become epiphenomenal once they figure in ‘Good’ experience. It is surely better to 
avoid this ad hoc worry by resisting Spreading in the first place. I submit that the difficulties 
involved in making sense of strong presentation means that the preferred story of hallucination is 
one that involves weak presentation. In this way, the Naïve Realist can tell a phenomenally 
attractive story of hallucination (it seems presentational) whilst cleaving to a Basic Phenomenal 
Disjunctivism that is not vulnerable to the p.m.e. 
 
2.1.2 The Argument from Phenomenal Infallibility 
 
Another suspicion is that Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism is intuitively unseated by what Hellie 
calls an “interestingly strong” thesis about phenomenal character that “seems free from 
counterexample” (2007: 283). This is: 
  
“Infallibility 
If an experience phenomenally appears to have a certain property, it has that 
property as a phenomenal character.43” (2007: 282) 
 
Hellie’s thought is that if “expert phenomenological study under ideal circumstances44” (2007: 
                                                     
43 Infallibility is one arm of a stronger premise called Revelation which asserts that phenomenal reflection can fully 
reveal an experience’s true phenomenal character. Revelation’s other arm is: 
 
Self-Intimation: Necessarily, for any phenomenal experience E of a subject s and phenomenal property P, if E 
has P, then E phenomenally appears P to s. (Converse of Infallibility) 
 
Because the phenomenal disjunctivist can accept self-intimation (she need not deny that an experience’s 
phenomenal character cannot be hidden from its phenomenal appearance), I am concerned only with Infallibility 
here. 
44 Ideal circumstances, Hellie suggests (2007: 267), are simply those conducive to phenomenological study, e.g. 
the subject is cognitively sound, understands what she is doing, and has considered relevant alternatives. Such 
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267) reveals that a property P phenomenally appears to be in the phenomenal character of 
experience, then necessarily, P is in the phenomenal character of experience. Infallibility can be 
stated slightly more formally: 
 
Infallibility: Necessarily, for any phenomenal experience E had by a subject s 
and phenomenal property P, if careful reflection by s under ideal circumstances c 
reveals that E phenomenally appears to have P, then E has P.  
 
Suppose that you have just experienced a papercut across your eyeball and I cheerfully inform 
you that the phenomenally apparent pain which you now seem to be experiencing is not really a 
property of your experience’s phenomenal character. You may well incredulously splutter “B-
b-but I am experiencing pain! And that is evidence enough. Of course pain is a real phenomenal 
property. Otherwise it could not be phenomenally apparent.” Or suppose I tell you that, when 
you look at the sky, the phenomenally apparent blue-ness that you consciously see is not really a 
part of your experience’s phenomenal character. Again, you may well be incredulous: “Of 
course blue-ness is a real phenomenal property. Otherwise I could not be consciously aware of 
it. You are just talking metaphysical nonsense.” Driving Infallibility, then, is the thought that 
there is no mismatch between an experience’s phenomenal appearance and its true 
phenomenal character since its appearance just is its phenomenal character. 
 
Hellie now advances, 
 
“Apparent Spreading 
If some veridical experience phenomenally appears to have a naïve property, 
some hallucinatory experience phenomenally appears to have that same naïve 
property.” (2007: 280) 
 
Or, 
 
Apparent Spreading: If some Good experience EG phenomenally appears to a 
subject s to have a naïve property PN, then some hallucinatory experience EH can 
phenomenally appear to s to have PN.  
 
Apparent Spreading, in conjunction with Infallibility clearly imperils Basic Phenomenal 
                                                                                                                                                                
circumstances do not require elucidation since Infallibility requires only that they are specifiable in principle. 
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Disjunctivism: For if an experience cannot phenomenally appear to the suitably reflective 
subject to have some property P without P being in its phenomenal character, then ex hypothesi, 
reflectively indiscriminable ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experiences cannot phenomenally appear to the 
suitably reflective subject to each have the same naïve property without that property being in 
their phenomenal characters. In this way, Hellie resurrects,  
 
Spreading: For all subjects s: If s cannot reflectively discriminate (i) a Good 
experience EG’s phenomenal appearance from some metaphysically possible Bad 
experience’s EB’s phenomenal appearance, or, (ii) a Bad experience’s EB’s 
phenomenal appearance from some metaphysically possible Good experience EG’s 
phenomenal appearance, then EG and EB are of phenomenal type F. (Conjunction 
of Infallibility and Apparent Spreading, negation of Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism) 
 
Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism is now banished from featuring in a successful naïve realist answer 
to the p.m.e. 
 
It is not obvious that Hellie’s intuitive motivation for Infallibility constitutes an independent 
argument rather than a problematic presupposition concerning how the phenomenal 
disjunctivist understands the concept phenomenal character. Hellie’s stipulation that 
“phenomenal characters are just […] phenomenally apparent features” (2007: 282) trivially 
precludes his opponent from marshalling any convincing counterexamples against Infallibility, 
but Infallibility’s denial45 is already operative in Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism. For if, as I insist, 
a ‘Good’ experience’s phenomenal character essentially consists in, and is relationally 
determined by, those worldly object-property couples with which the subject is immediately 
and irreducibly acquainted (naïve realism); and if ‘Bad’ experiences are not intrinsically world-
involving mental states (Base); then reflectively indiscriminable ‘Bad’ experiences must have 
phenomenal appearances that mislead about their true phenomenal characters. That is, since I 
deny that an identity relationship necessarily exists between an experience’s phenomenally 
apparent type and its true phenomenal character, reflectively indiscriminable ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ 
experiences can phenomenally appear to be, though they are not, type-identical mental states. 
Hellie has plainly begged the question by presupposing a mutually agreed conception of 
phenomenal character. 
                                                     
45 Successfully denying Infallibility and Spreading also blocks Hellie’s final move that associates naïve realism with 
paradox – the paradox being that ‘Good’ experience does (from Infallibility & Spreading), and does not (from the 
p.m.e), have naïve properties (2007: 272). 
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At this stage, it might be suspected that I have merely accomplished a linguistic impasse. Hellie 
insists that an experience’s phenomenally apparent properties cannot mislead the suitably 
reflective subject about its true phenomenal character, whereas I am insisting that this is just 
what occurs in ‘Bad’ experience. But my claim is not implausible. That is, we have reason to 
accept, 
 
No-Infallibility Thesis: Necessarily, for any phenomenal experience E had by a 
subject s and phenomenal property P, if careful reflection by s under ideal 
circumstances c reveals that E phenomenally appears to have P, then it is 
metaphysically possible that E lacks P.  
 
To illustrate. Carefully reflect upon the phenomenally apparent character of your visual 
experience (we can assume that the circumstances are ideal): You should seem to see a range 
of colours and bounded shapes that are clearly presented within a broadly stable visual field of 
approximately 30 degrees, or maybe more. At least, this is how things phenomenally appear to 
me, e.g. I seem to clearly see a wide swath of text against a white background, a number of 
books to my right, and a mug of tea to my left, all at once. In these everyday cases, we can say 
that careful reflection in ideal circumstances reveals that visual experience phenomenally 
appears to have the property of wide clarity. 
 
Now, follow Schwitzgebel’s (2008: 255) instruction to continuously move your eyes around 
the scene whilst continuing to carefully reflect upon your visual experience’s phenomenally 
apparent character in those regions away from any determinate focal points. Because human 
biology dictates that the preciseness with which we see shapes and colours precipitously 
declines outside of a central, foveal area of vision of around 1 to 2 degrees, most people who 
attempt Schwitzgebel’s experiment eventually conclude that the character of visual experience 
is not as clear as it originally seems.46  In this case, we can say that careful reflection in ideal 
circumstances reveals that visual experience phenomenally appears to have the property of 
narrow clarity.  
 
                                                     
46 Likewise, in Dennett’s (1991: 53-4) ‘Playing Card Experiment’, most of us have to bring a playing card held at 
arm’s length very close towards the centre of our visual field before we can clearly identify its suit, colour, and 
value. 
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Schwitzgebel’s experiment plausibly shows that, since visual experience cannot simultaneously 
have wide and narrow clarity, careful reflection in ideal circumstances can fail to reveal an 
experience’s true nature.47 This suggests that we can, despite Hellie’s insistence that “it is 
difficult to see any daylight between being a property which is [phenomenally] presented and 
being a phenomenal character of [the subject’s] experience” (2007: 283), find “daylight” 
between an experience’s phenomenally apparent properties and its phenomenal character by 
distinguishing between two concepts of phenomenal character: namely, (i) subjective48 
phenomenal character which is an experience’s phenomenally apparent properties, and, (ii) 
objective phenomenal character which is an experience’s fundamental nature or true 
phenomenal type.49 ‘Good’ experiences are cases in which (i) does not mislead about (ii), e.g. 
someone who sees a white picket fence will have an experience that phenomenally appears to 
have the naïve property being-a-case-of-visual-awareness-of-a-white-picket-fence because a white 
picket fence is really there. Thus, the first-pass formulation of naïve realism that we met in 
(§1.1) now becomes:  
 
 Naïve Realism: For all subjects s: If s has a non-misleading experience ENM, then; 
 
(i) ENM’s subjective and objective phenomenal character is intrinsically constituted 
by the same naïve properties PN1, PN2 … PNN; and,  
 
(ii) S stands in a direct sui generis acquaintance relation r to a worldly object, ow’s, 
perceptible properties PP1, PP2 … PPN, where PP1, PP2 … PPN, directly ground 
ENM’s naïve properties PN1, PN2 … PNN.
  
 
Experiences with this metaphysical structure thus comprise Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism’s 
‘Good’ disjunct.  
 
                                                     
47 Schwitzgebel (2008) also argues that we can be mistaken about our cognitive phenomenology as evidenced by 
the unsurprising fact that a group of philosophers at a 2002 conference could not agree if thought has any 
distinctive phenomenological characteristics. 
48 Hellie (2007: 288) calls this projective phenomenal character and describes it as weakening his original concept. 
Though a refinement that saves naïve realism is, I think, a strengthening of that concept. 
49 Alternatively, some (e.g. Dennett 1976; Sundström 2008) deny Infallibility by denying that ‘Bad’ experiences 
are phenomenally characterful mental states, and so, mislead about having phenomenal character. This tack is 
rejected in §2.2.1 and §2.2.2. 
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In contrast, ‘Bad’ experiences are cases in which (i) misleads about (ii), e.g. someone 
hallucinating a white picket fence has an experience that phenomenally appears to have, but 
objectively lacks, the naïve property being-a-case-of-visual-awareness-of-a-white-picket-fence. 
Following Hellie (2007: 280), I call this strategy Epistemological Rejectionism:  
 
Epistemological Rejectionism: For all subjects s: If s has a Bad experience EB, then; 
 
(i) EB’s subjective phenomenal character phenomenally appears to be intrinsically 
constituted by naïve properties PN1, PN2 … PNN; and,   
 
(ii) EB’s objective phenomenal character lacks any naïve properties PN1, PN2 … 
PNN. (Negation of Infallibility) 
  
Experiences with this metaphysical structure thus comprise Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism’s 
‘Bad’ disjunct. An explanation of how (i) can mislead about (ii) must wait until the next 
chapter. Until then, it is enough that epistemological rejectionism is available for the phenomenal 
disjunctivist to conceptually exploit.  
 
2.1.2 Summary 
 
I have argued that the Naïve Realist is minimally committed to a Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism 
which resists the p.m.e’s Spreading step by denying that reflectively indiscriminable ‘Good’ and 
‘Bad’ experiences are phenomenally type-identical mental states. Conduct’s objection that 
naïve realism entails Spreading was then shown to rely upon a concept of reflection that the 
Naïve Realist need not accept, and further, that that entailment risks resurrecting the p.m.e. 
Hellie’s objection that phenomenal appearances are reductively identical to phenomenal 
characters was then shown to beg the question relying upon a conception of phenomenal 
character that there is no obvious reason to accept, and further, that reflection in ideal 
circumstances is not an infallible guide to an experience’s true phenomenal character. I turn 
now to the second constraint on a successful naïve realist solution to the p.m.e.  
 
2.2 Five Remarkable Features 
 
At this stage in the dialectic, a natural objection is that a suasive phenomenal disjunctivism 
must explain what – in absentia worldly things – types a ‘Bad’ experience’s objective 
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phenomenal character. The worry is that the negative phenomenal disjunctivism sketched thus 
far simply denies that ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experiences are phenomenally type-identical mental 
states, and in turn, “avoids saying anything [substantive] about the nature” (Martin 2006: 9) of 
the latter at all. I argue that this quietist worry is well-motivated, and in turn, aim to establish 
our second constraint on any explanatorily adequate theory of misleading experience: namely, 
that the phenomenal disjunctivist is committed to telling some positive story of ‘Bad’ 
experience. 
 
The worry that phenomenal disjunctivism is unacceptably quiet about the nature of ‘Bad’ 
experience is vociferously expressed by Sturgeon50 who says that, 
 
“[…] we have no positive story about the phenomenology of illusion, and no 
positive story about hallucination at all. Disjunctive Quietism denies [that] a 
common thread runs through its [‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ disjuncts], and then remains 
studiously silent. (1998: 184) […] it treats neither illusion nor hallucination 
effectively.” (1998: 186) 
 
The worry is not that, as Sollberger (2007: 14) points out, the phenomenal disjunctivist’s 
failure to explain the ‘Bad’ disjunct is counterintuitive – after all, I already buck intuition by 
denying that indiscriminable ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experiences share objective phenomenal 
character. Nor is it, as Sturgeon (1998: 186) points out, that no such explanation is necessarily 
available. Rather, it is that failing to positively explain its ‘Bad’ disjunct precludes the 
phenomenal disjunctivist from meeting an adequacy condition on any explanatorily adequate 
theory of experience which, Sturgeon claims, is jointly constituted by five “remarkable 
features.” This is, 
 
Adequacy Condition: A theory t of experience is explanatorily adequate iff t explains 
why a Good experience EG and Bad experience EB are (i) reflectively indiscriminable 
(EG ≡RI EB) (ii) scene-immediate (EG ≡SI EB) (iii) subjectively equivalent (EG ≡SE EB) (iv) 
rationally equivalent (EG ≡RE EB), and, (iv) behaviourally equivalent (EG ≡BE EB). 
 
Sturgeon’s argument is that, since the necessary conditions (i)-(v) are pre-theoretic facts about 
experience that constrain any theory about its essential nature, and since phenomenal 
                                                     
50 See also, e.g. Dancy (1995: 435) and Foster (2004: 124). 
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disjunctivism’s standard theory of ‘Bad’ experience is no more than a mere negation of naïve 
realism’s thought that ‘Good’ experience is intrinsically world-involving and world-
acquainting, it cannot explain anything substantive about ‘Bad’ experience at all. For example, 
suppose that you are on a Safari and it looks as if a lion is gaining ground. You desire not to 
become lion-food. Five things seem obvious. 
 
First, recall that ‘Looks’ statements are characterized disjunctively. The thought now is that 
when,  
 
(D*) It looks to you as if a lion is approaching. 
 
You cannot reflectively discriminate between,   
 
(D.i*) L is a non-misleading perception of the fact that a lion is approaching (‘Good’ 
disjunct); or 
(D.ii*) L is an illusion as of a lion approaching (‘Bad’ disjunct); or,  
(D.iii*) L is a hallucination as of a lion approaching. (‘Bad’ Disjunct)  
(Instances of D-D.iii, §2.1) 
 
That you cannot reflectively discern any phenomenal differences between (D.i*)-(D.iii*) does 
not mean that you cannot exercise those cognitive capacities which can determine what kind of 
look-state you are in: if you have warrant for thinking that you are hallucinating, then you may 
well know that your experience is ‘Bad.’ But in line with reflective indiscriminability, what is 
phenomenally available to you does not enable you to reflectively discriminate between a 
‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ lion-experience. ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experiences, then, share the remarkable 
phenomenal feature of being reflectively indiscriminable. 
 
Second, irrespective of its essential nature, your experience as of a lion approaching will seem 
to immediately present some scene, viz., a lion approaching – ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experiences, 
as Sturgeon says, “seem to place objects and their features directly before the mind” (1998: 
182). That is, irrespective of whether or not your lion-experience is ‘Good’ or ‘Bad’, it 
phenomenally strikes you that a lion is approaching. ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experiences, then, share 
the remarkable phenomenal feature of scene-immediacy. 
 
64 
 
Third, irrespective of its essential nature, your experience as of a lion approaching is subject to 
three plausible intuitions that comprise subjectivity. First, it is subjectively like something for 
you when a lion looks to be approaching; second, to fully understand your experience, you 
must know what it is subjectively like; and third, to know what it is subjectively like, you must 
have had that kind of experience (or failing that, a very similar kind of experience). Your 
describing the scene (e.g. ‘I anticipated feeling intense pain as the lion’s teeth shredded my 
flesh’) won’t allow me to fully capture those subjective qualities since I have not had your kind 
of experience.51 ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experiences, then, share the remarkable phenomenal feature 
of subjective-equivalence. 
 
Fourth, irrespective of its essential nature, your experience as of a lion approaching can 
rationally occasion certain beliefs such as a lion looks to be approaching. Since those beliefs that 
are rationally occasioned by ‘Bad’ experience will lack factive support, rationally occasioned 
belief does not eo ipso entail knowledge. Still, when you judge that a lion is approaching in 
circumstances where you have no obvious reason to suspect that countervailing conditions 
obtain, you are epistemically blameless since you cannot reasonably be expected to form no 
such beliefs in that scenario (you would be epistemically irresponsible to judge that a lion is 
approaching if you have warrant for thinking that you are hallucinating). Good’ and ‘Bad’ 
experiences, then, share the remarkable intentional feature of rational equivalence.52 
 
Fifth, irrespective of its essential nature, your experience as of a lion approaching can rationally 
occasion certain behaviours. For instance, if a look rationally occasions your belief that a lion is 
approaching, then that belief plausibly conjoins with your desire not to become lion-food, and 
the two will rationally occasion your fleeing. And even if you suspect that your experience is 
‘Bad’, it can still rationally occasion e.g. a reflexive shriek as the hallucinatory lion roars 
(compare: recently, even though I knew the event was fictional, I reflexively ducked at a 
‘meteorite’ that looked to hurtle out of the screen whilst watching a 3-D film). Good’ and 
‘Bad’ experiences, then, share the remarkable intentional feature of behavioural equivalence. 
 
                                                     
51 Such intuitions presumably explain our reluctance to attribute a phenomenal understanding of visual experience 
to the congenitally blind, e.g. describing a city-scape – ‘Straight ahead, a shiny steel skyscraper’ – to such subjects 
does not seem to capture the experience’s subjective qualities since they have not had that kind of experience.  
52 Later (§4.1.1, §4.2.2, §5.1.1), I deny that all ‘Bad’ experiences rationally occasion real beliefs. Still, this 
unqualified assumption works well until then. 
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It might be suspected that the phenomenal disjunctivist need not explain a ‘Bad’ experience’s 
remarkable features since there are no such features to explain. This is unintelligible. If a ‘Bad’ 
experience as of a lion approaching conjoins with your desire not to become lion-food and you 
are motivated to flee, then your experience does not merely seem to have the remarkable 
feature of behavioural equivalence – it truly does as evinced by you fleeing! (this goes mutatis 
mutandis for remaining remarkable features). And even if such a denial is intelligible, we are 
still owed some story of why ‘Bad’ experience seems to have remarkable features that it 
objectively lacks. In other words, I am arguing that if,  
  
Adequacy Condition: A theory t of experience is explanatorily adequate iff t explains 
why a Good experience EG and Bad experience EB are (i) reflectively indiscriminable 
(EG ≡ RI EB) (ii) scene-immediate (EG ≡SI EB) (iii) subjectively equivalent (EG ≡SE EB) (iv) 
rationally equivalent (EG ≡RE EB), and, (iv) behaviourally equivalent (EG ≡BE EB). 
 
can be denied, then we should accept:  
 
Adequacy Condition*: A theory t of experience is explanatorily adequate iff t 
explains why a Good experience EG and Bad experience EB seem (i) reflectively 
indiscriminable (EG ≡RI EB) (ii) scene-immediate (EG ≡SI EB) (iii) subjectively equivalent 
(EG ≡SE EB) (iv) rationally equivalent (EG ≡RE EB), and, (iv) behaviourally equivalent 
(EG ≡BE EB). 
 
An analogy may persuade: Just as my task is to explain why reflectively indiscriminable ‘Good’ 
and ‘Bad’ experiences do not, contra intuition, share a common phenomenal ingredient, so it 
is the task of someone who denies that ‘Bad’ experience lacks remarkable features to explain 
why this nevertheless seems to be the case. Explaining real (Adequacy Condition) or apparent 
remarkable features (Adequacy Condition*) thus constitutes a plausible constraint on any 
explanatorily adequate theory of ‘Bad’ experience. 
 
2.2.1 Positive Disjunctivism (A First Attempt) 
 
One story that the phenomenal disjunctivist might tell of ‘Bad’ experience is that its 
remarkable features spring from the indiscriminability property that it shares with ‘Good’ 
experience. This story is implicit in Langsam who says that, 
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“ … a perceptual experience that presents an appearance of redness instantiates a 
phenomenal feature that I shall refer to as […] redness
1
, whereas an 
[indiscriminable] hallucinatory experience that presents an appearance of red 
instantiates a different phenomenal feature [that] of redness
2
. […] the 
phenomenal features of redness
1
 and redness
2
 are determinate properties of a 
determinable to which only they belong.” (1995: 40) 
 
In Langsam’s example, a ‘Good’ experience presents the subject with a red look in virtue of 
instantiating the determinate phenomenal feature redness
1
, where this feature is metaphysically 
grounded in the worldly object’s perceptible property of being coloured red. In contrast, a 
hallucinatory experience presents the subject with a reflectively indiscriminable red look in 
virtue of instantiating the reflectively indiscriminable determinate phenomenal feature redness
2
, 
where this feature is not metaphysically grounded in any worldly object’s perceptible property 
of being coloured red. Langsam elucidates this claim by analogy: Just as the determinate concepts 
red and yellow exemplify distinct instances of the determinable concept colour, so a ‘Good’ 
experience of redness
1 
and indiscriminable hallucinatory experience of redness
2
 exemplify 
instances of the determinable colour property red (it is easy to see how Langsam’s remarks 
apply to other perceptible properties, e.g. a ‘Good’ experience as of something looking square 
(square1) and a reflectively indiscriminable hallucinatory experience (square2) will exemplify 
instances of the determinable shape property square. 
 
Langsam’s analogy might seem suspect. For science robustly explains the physical basis of 
colours in terms of the interaction between the nomological-physical laws of light (e.g. the 
phenomenon of Rayleigh scattering is thought to be the physical basis of the sky’s looking, to 
most persons, blue) and properties of the subject’s visual system (e.g. the sensitivity of her 
photoreceptor cells). But Langsam does not likewise robustly explain how a hallucinatory 
experience instantiates its phenomenally type-distinct “feature” – it is simply presupposed that 
the determinable colour property red somehow instantiates the reflectively indiscriminable 
phenomenal features redness1 and redness2. In which case, we have no substantive conception 
of hallucination at all.  
 
Langsam can resist this tack by taking Martin’s (2004; 2006) line that hallucinatory experience 
consists in no more than the negative epistemic property of being reflectively indiscriminable 
from some metaphysically possible ‘Good’ experience; hence no substantive conception of 
reflective indiscriminability is required, i.e. it is a primitive property requiring no higher-order 
67 
 
explanans. On this conception, logical space opens for Langsam to argue that reflective 
indiscriminability can ground a hallucinatory experience’s other remarkable features. 
 
Take scene-immediacy. According to Langsam, ‘Good’ scene-immediacy springs from naïve 
realism’s acquaintance relation. That is, when,  
 
(1) A subject s has a Good experience EG of a worldly object, ow, that is F. 
 
We have, 
 
(2) Scene-Immediacy: S’s Good experience EG immediately presents a worldly 
object, ow, that is F.  
 
Because, 
 
(3) S stands in a direct sui generis relation r to ow’s worldly F-ness.
53 
 
Langsam’s thought is that a ‘Good’ experience is scene-immediate because the subject stands 
in a direct acquaintance relation to those worldly items that are presented to her. Now, 
Sturgeon (2000: 14) objects that (3) cannot be (2)’s truth-maker since naïve realism’s thought 
that, in ‘Good’ experience, a subject stands in an acquaintance relation to worldly object-
properties does not a priori entail that they are presented in a scene-immediate way. For there 
exist, Sturgeon says, “countless [r-like] relations definable” (ibid) that are unrelated to scene-
immediacy. But Sturgeon’s demand for a priori entailment is overly stringent. That other non-
perceptual r-like relations exist is irrelevant to perceptual experiences. In ‘Good’ experience, 
Langsam can insist that, if naïve realism is true, then an acquaintance relation does secure scene-
immediacy. 
 
Less compelling is the explanation of hallucinatory scene-immediacy. Definitionally, 
hallucinatory scene-immediacy cannot spring from naïve realism’s acquaintance relation. Now, 
since Langsam’s thought seems to be that hallucinatory experience essentially consists in the 
negative epistemic property of being reflectively indiscriminable from some metaphysically 
                                                     
53 Though I would say that scene-immediacy springs from the fact that a ‘Good’ experience’s objective phenomenal 
character is constituted by oW’s F-ness (likewise for remaining remarkable features). Fortunately, nothing 
important hinges upon this difference. 
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possible ‘Good’ experience, he must employ the remarkable feature of reflective 
indiscriminability to secure hallucinatory scene-immediacy. His argument presumably goes: 
‘Good’ and hallucinatory experiences can be reflectively indiscriminable; ‘Good’ experience is 
phenomenally scene-immediate; so, reflectively indiscriminable hallucinatory experience is 
likewise scene-immediate. That is, when, 
 
(1) A subject s has a hallucinatory experience EH, where EH seems to immediately 
present an object, o, as being F. 
 
It is because, 
 
(2) S cannot reflectively discriminate EH’s phenomenal appearance from some 
metaphysically possible scene-immediate Good experience EG’s phenomenal 
appearance. 
 
Langsam’s thought is that a hallucinatory experience is scene-immediate because it is 
reflectively indiscriminable from some metaphysically possible ‘Good’ experience, e.g. my 
hallucination as of a mango seems to immediately present me with a mango because I cannot 
reflectively discriminate it from a ‘Good’ experience of a mango that is scene-immediate. But 
it is unclear how (2) can be (1)’s truth-maker in absentia some positive story of how scene-
immediacy can phenomenally spring from reflective indiscriminability.54 One such story might 
appeal to the subject’s beliefs: specifically, Langsam might reason that, since the subject 
believes that her hallucination is reflectively indiscriminable from some ‘Good’ counterpart, 
and since ‘Good’ experience is scene-immediate, her reflectively indiscriminable hallucination 
is likewise scene-immediate. But that just shifts the bump around the remarkable rug: For now 
we are owed some story of how hallucinatory scene-immediacy can phenomenally spring from 
the subject’s intentional state. Again, it is unclear what this story might be: We have intentional 
facts about beliefs on one hand and phenomenal facts about scene-immediacy on the other, 
with no positive story of how to alchemize the latter from the former. At best, it is just opaque 
how reflective indiscriminability can robustly secure scene-immediacy (this objection applies mutatis 
mutandis to the remarkable phenomenal feature of subjective equivalence). 
                                                     
54 Of course, Langsam can claim that the object-immediacy of illusion is secured by direct contact with the worldly 
object, but that cannot secure reflectively indiscriminable property-immediacy, e.g. direct contact with Müller-
Lyer lines can secure their scene-immediacy but not their reflectively indiscriminable unequal-in-length scene-
immediate look.   
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This problem is not limited to explaining remarkable phenomenal features. Take rational 
equivalence. Definitionally, hallucinatory rational equivalence cannot spring from naïve 
realism’s acquaintance relation. Now, since Langsam’s thought seems to be that hallucinatory 
experience fundamentally consists in the negative epistemic property of being reflectively 
indiscriminable from some possible ‘Good’ experience, he must, again, employ the 
remarkable feature of reflective indiscriminability to secure hallucinatory rational equivalence. 
Again, his argument presumably goes: ‘Good’ and hallucinatory experiences can be 
reflectively indiscriminable; ‘Good’ experience rationally occasions beliefs; so, reflectively 
indiscriminable hallucinatory experience likewise rationally occasions beliefs. That is, when, 
 
(1) A subject s has a hallucinatory experience EH, where EH rationally occasions 
her belief that it is as if a worldly object, ow, is F.  
 
It is because, 
 
(2) S cannot reflectively discriminate EH’s phenomenal appearance from some 
metaphysically possible Good experience EG’s phenomenal appearance, 
where EG would rationally occasion her belief that ow is F. 
 
Langsam’s thought is that a hallucinatory experience can rationally occasion a belief because it 
is reflectively indiscriminable from some metaphysically possible ‘Good’ experience that 
would rationally occasion that belief, e.g. my hallucination as of a mango can rationally 
occasion my belief that a mango is in front of me because I cannot reflectively discriminate it 
from a ‘Good’ experience of a mango that would rationally occasion that belief. But it is unclear 
how, even if rationally occasioned belief is minimally construed as causally (rather than 
epistemically) motivated belief, (2) can be (1)’s truth-maker in absentia some positive story of 
how rational equivalence can intentionally spring from reflective indiscriminability. Again, it is 
unclear what this story might be: We have phenomenal facts about indiscriminability on one 
hand, and epistemic facts about belief on the other, with no positive story of how to alchemize 
the latter from the former.55 At best, it is opaque how reflective indiscriminability can robustly 
                                                     
55 Appealing to scene-immediacy is obviously unhelpful: specifically, it might be reasoned that, since a hallucination 
and some metaphysically possible ‘Good’ experience are indiscriminable vis-à-vis scene-immediacy, the former can 
rationally occasion particular beliefs and actions. But, again, that story still shifts the bump around the remarkable 
rug: For we are now owed some positive story of how hallucinatory scene-immediacy can spring from the shared 
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secure rational equivalence (this objection applies mutatis mutandis to the remarkable intentional 
feature of behavioural equivalence). 
 
The problem here is that although Langsam can plausibly employ naïve realism’s acquaintance 
relation to secure a ‘Good’ experience’s remarkable features, no positive story is forthcoming 
about how a hallucinatory experience’s remarkable features can spring from a shared 
indiscriminability property. This does not mean that no such story is available. It is just that the 
phenomenal disjunctivist who presupposes that reflective indiscriminability is a primitive given 
that can then automatically secure a hallucination’s other remarkable features unwittingly 
deprives herself of being able to convincingly explain a ‘Bad’ experience’s remarkable 
phenomenal and intentional features. 
 
2.2.2 Positive Disjunctivism (A Second Attempt) 
 
The reader might suspect that I have misconstrued the nature of reflective indiscriminability. If 
we take the tack that a hallucinatory experience essentially consists in no more than the negative 
epistemic property of being reflectively indiscriminable from some possible ‘Good’ 
experience, then reflective indiscriminability will obviously be too deflationary to secure its 
remarkable features. But if we take Fish’s (2008; 2009) tack that a hallucinatory experience 
essentially consists in the fact that it produces indiscriminable cognitive effects in the subject that 
some metaphysically possible ‘Good’ experience would have produced in that doxastic setting, 
then, or so Fish argues, reflective indiscriminability becomes robust enough to secure its 
remarkable features. This is because a hallucinatory experience’s remarkable features just are 
those cognitive effects which explain everything about its mental nature that needs to be 
explained.  
 
In Fish’s words, 
 
“[…] a hallucination is a mental event that, while lacking phenomenal character, 
produces the same cognitive effects in the hallucinatory subject that a veridical 
perception of a certain kind would have produced in a rational subject in the same 
overall doxastic setting.” (2009: 114)  
 
This means that, 
                                                                                                                                                                
indiscriminability property in the first place! 
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“[…] the subject will […] take himself to be having a perceptual experience of 
that kind, which in turn enables us to explain everything that the hallucinating 
subject thinks, does, and says.” (2008: 155) 
 
As a result, my … 
 
“[…] demand for a more substantial intrinsic characterization of the hallucinatory 
mental state is misguided.” (2008: 156)  
 
Unlike Langsam’s primitive conception of reflective indiscriminability, the reflective 
indiscriminability of hallucination is now said to essentially consist in those cognitive effects 
that a ‘Good’ experience would have produced in that doxastic setting. Hence, 
 
Fish’s Hallucination Thesis: A mental event m is a pure hallucination iff m (i) lacks 
objective phenomenal character56, and, (ii) produces in a rational subject s the 
same cognitive effects that a Good experience EG would also have produced in s in 
those doxastic circumstances. 
 
A mental event is thus a hallucination as of a mango iff that event cognitively motivates the 
subject to form beliefs such as ‘I see something that looks like a mango57’, where a ‘Good’ 
experience of a mango would likewise cognitively motivate her to form a highly similar belief 
in those doxastic circumstances. Construing the indiscriminability property that hallucinatory 
and ‘Good’ experience share as indiscriminability of cognitive effects thus enables us to 
“explain everything” about hallucination that requires explanation – in this case, why the 
subject thinks that she sees a mango that is not objectively there. For this reason, Fish 
concludes, I am mistaken to demand a “substantial intrinsic” or ‘Top Down’ explanation of the 
cognitive effects themselves.  
 
                                                     
56 This conjunct can be ignored since we need only Fish’s idea that reflective indiscriminability fundamentally 
consists in indiscriminability of cognitive effects. 
57 Or, if the subject resists believing that she really sees a mango, then she is likely to form the more cautious 
belief that (Fish, 2008: 165) ‘I believe that [it is as if I see that {there is a mango}], where this cognitive effect is 
indiscriminable from one which would be produced by a resisted ‘Good’ experience (i.e. one that she mistakenly 
believes is ‘Bad’) in those overall doxastic circumstances.  
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Fish is not denying that cognitive effects have no ‘Top Down’ explanation. Someone peering 
into an objectively trapezoidal Ames room is likely to see that it looks cube-shaped, and that 
someone positioned left looks significantly smaller than someone positioned right (when of 
similar height). To illustrate: 
 
 
Image reproduced from http://www1.appstate.edu/~kms/classes/psy3215/Depth/AmesDiagram.htm 
 
The size-distance scaling explanation posits that, since the room’s trapezoidal shape physically 
means that person A’s visual angle is smallest, and since the perceived distance is the same for 
both persons, person A looks smaller than person B, i.e. the room’s misleading cube-shape 
‘overrides’ our tendency to perceive objects as looking constant in size. But the size-relative 
explanation posits that, since an object’s perceived size at least partly depends on its size 
relative to other objects, and since person B looks to occupy all of the distance between the 
room’s floor and ceiling whilst person A looks to occupy only a part of the distance, person A 
looks smallest, i.e. our tendency to perceive objects as looking constant in size ‘overrides’ the 
room’s misleading cube-shape. For Fish, it is of secondary importance which antecedent 
physicalist explanation is right (which is why it is also consistent with Fish’s view that no such 
explanation exists). What matters is that someone looking into an Ames room will typically be 
cognitively motivated to believe things such as ‘Person A looks smaller than person B’ and ‘The 
room looks cube-shaped’, where very similar beliefs would be formed when looking at two 
people who significantly differ in height that are stationed in top opposite corners of a cube-
shaped room. Similarly, there may well be some antecedent physicalist explanation of a 
subject’s mango hallucination – it is just that that explanation will not then ground the 
mentalistic explanation of her beliefs and behaviours. 
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In taking this tack, Fish (2008: 155) can be understood as retaining an explanatory claim 
according to which a hallucinatory experience’s indiscriminable cognitive effects explain 
everything substantive about its mental nature whilst rejecting a constitutive claim according to 
which a hallucinatory experience’s fundamental nature is exhaustively constituted by such 
effects. That is, Fish retains, 
 
Explanatory Claim: For all subjects s: If a subject s has a hallucinatory experience 
EH, then necessarily, EH produces in s cognitive effects c1 … cn that a Good 
experience EG would also have produced in s in those doxastic circumstances, 
where c
1
 … c
n
, sufficiently explain EH’s fundamental nature. 
 
And denies the, 
 
  Constitutive Claim: For all subjects s: If s has a hallucinatory experience EH, then 
necessarily, EH produces in s cognitive effects c1 … cn that a Good experience EG 
would also have produced in s in those doxastic circumstances, where c
1
 … c
n
 
constitute EH’s fundamental nature.  
 
Traditionally (e.g. Armstrong 1961: 83; Pitcher 1971), c
1
 … c
n
 have been construed as a 
subject’s false beliefs. The constitutive claim has then been invoked to ensure that, whenever she 
hallucinates, she believes that she sees something, whereas the explanatory claim has been 
invoked to explain her beliefs and behaviours. Against this, Fish insists that the constitutive claim 
need not (thought it may) metaphysically ground the explanatory claim.58 He (2008: 156) 
provides an analogy: Just as everything substantive about the concept bacherlorhood can be 
explained by pointing out that bachelors are unmarried men (we need not appeal to some 
antecedent reductive explanation such as a man’s desire to remain unmarried), so, everything 
substantive about a hallucinatory experience can be explained by pointing out that it produces 
indiscriminable cognitive effects in the subject as some possible ‘Good’ experience (we need 
not appeal to some antecedent reductive explanation involving, say, neurophysical facts). 
                                                     
58 The reason that Fish (2008: 154) resists the thought that the explanatory claim has a constitutive base is that it 
explains our intuition that non-linguistic creatures can hallucinate. His thought is that we should reject the 
constitution claim since it implausibly ascribes beliefs to non-linguistic creatures, whilst we should retain the 
explanatory claim to explain certain of their behaviours, e.g. if a cat paws at the air, we might say that it is in a 
mental state that produces indiscriminable cognitive effects as some possible ‘Good’ experience. 
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Fish is now placed to explain hallucination’s remarkable features. For it can now be argued 
that, since a hallucination’s cognitive effects just are its remarkable features, and since such 
effects explain everything substantive about it that needs to be explained, it is unnecessary to 
seek a reductive antecedent explanation of the remarkable features themselves. And in 
Langsam’s example, the thought is that the subject’s ‘Good’ experience (redness
1) and 
hallucinatory experience (redness2) are (i) reflectively indiscriminable only if she believes that 
redness1 and redness2 are of phenomenal type F, (ii) scene-immediate only if she believes that 
redness2 seems to present the colour red in the same scene-immediate way as redness1, (iii) 
subjectively equivalent only if she believes that redness2 has the same subjective phenomenal 
character as redness1, (iv) rationally equivalent only if redness2 rationally occasions the same 
beliefs as redness1, and, (v) behaviourally equivalent only if redness2 rationally occasions the 
same actions as redness1. Reflective indiscriminability can be employed to secure scene-immediacy 
and subjective equivalence since the reason why the subject believes that redness1 and redness2 are 
of phenomenal type F is that they seem to immediately present red-ness and are subjectively 
equivalent. In turn, scene-immediacy can be employed to secure rational and behavioural 
equivalence since the reason why redness2 rationally occasions certain of the subject’s beliefs 
and behaviours is that it seems to immediately present something red to her consciousness. 
Fish’s phenomenal disjunctivism thus seems to positively explain everything substantive about 
the nature of its ‘Bad’ disjunct.  
 
That hallucinatory experiences have cognitive effects is unilluminative: Of course the subject 
who believes that she sees something red in absentia any candidate worldly object will be in a 
mental state that produces indiscriminable cognitive effects as some possible ‘Good’ 
experience of something that is red in those doxastic circumstances. The question is why her 
mental state should produce such effects at all. Consider Fish’s explanation of hallucinatory 
scene-immediacy: 
 
(Me):  Why did you believe that you had a scene-immediate hallucination as of a 
mango? 
(Fish): That’s obvious! It produced an indiscriminable cognitive effect (viz. the 
belief that something scene-immediately looked like a mango) as some possible 
‘Good’ experience of a mango. 
(Me):   But what was it about your hallucination that produced that effect?  
 (Fish): That’s irrelevant: it just did.  
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That is no answer at all. I wanted to know how Fish’s hallucination secured scene-immediacy. 
Fish replied that his hallucination produced an indiscriminable belief as that of some possible 
‘Good’ experience. Pressing further, I asked why his hallucination produced that effect. But 
because, according to Fish, scene-immediacy just is one such effect, no substantive answer was 
forthcoming. 
 
The source of the difficulty is that, as Johnston says, “by treating [the] explanans [i.e. 
hallucination’s remarkable features) as analytically equivalent to the explanandum [i.e. 
hallucination’s cognitive effects]” Fish’s story “leaves no room for a perfectly good 
explanation” (2004: 125). A hallucination’s remarkable features are analysed as its 
indiscriminable cognitive effects; but such effects just are its remarkable features; so, its 
indiscriminable cognitive effects cannot then be sensibly invoked to explain its remarkable 
features.59 Fish’s attempt to tell a positive story of reflective indiscriminability that can be 
employed to secure a hallucination’s remaining remarkable features has gotten the phenomenal 
disjunctivist nowhere in absentia some independent story of  its cognitive effects. Jettisoning 
the constitutive claim has condemned this stripe of phenomenal disjunctivist to telling an 
objectionably circular story of hallucination. 
 
It is unclear what options remain. Fish cannot ground a hallucination’s remarkable features in 
its objective phenomenal character since he thinks that hallucinations are phenomenally 
characterless mental states. Neither will it do for him to insist that if his theory of hallucination 
is correct, then the correct theory of hallucination cannot explain remarkable features when 
the very problem is that his theory fails to explain them in the first place. I submit that Fish’s 
attempt to positively explain the indiscriminability property that ‘Good’ and hallucinatory 
experiences share in terms of indiscriminability of cognitive effects collapses back into a 
problematic disjunctive quietism that leaves a hallucination’s remarkable features, and hence, 
the fundamental nature of phenomenal disjunctivism’s ‘Bad’ disjunct unexplained.  
 
                                                     
59 Suppose instead, that Fish denies that hallucinatory experiences are higher order mental events than the act of 
seeing and claims that both acts are somehow second-order, e.g. seeing now involves seeming to the subject to be 
seeing. The objection recurs. For the subject’s mango hallucination is now analysed as falsely seeming to her that 
she sees a mango. But we can still ask why it falsely seems that she is seeing a mango. The obvious explanation that 
she is hallucinating a mango is unavailable to Fish since the explanans (i.e. hallucination) is erroneously equivocated 
with the explanandum (i.e. why it falsely seems that she sees something). 
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2.2.3 Summary 
 
I have argued that the phenomenal disjunctivist is committed to telling a positive story of ‘Bad’ 
experience. One such story, as told by Langsam, claimed that a ‘Bad’ experience’s objective 
phenomenal character essentially consists in no more than the negative epistemic property of 
being first-person reflectively indiscriminable from some possible ‘Good’ experience, where 
this shared indiscriminability property then secured remaining remarkable features. But this 
stripe of phenomenal disjunctivism was shown to be just too deflationary to secure remaining 
remarkable features. This led to Fish’s story, which construed reflective indiscriminability as 
essentially consisting in indiscriminability of cognitive effects. But this stripe of phenomenal 
disjunctivism was shown to lapse back into an objectionable quietism since indiscriminable 
cognitive effects are analytically equivalent to those remarkable features that require 
independent explanation. This leaves a gap in the disjunctivist market for an alternative stripe 
of positive phenomenal disjunctivism that can perform this explanatory work. Before introducing 
that, I want to sketch the final constraint on a successful naïve realist solution to the p.m.e. 
 
2.3 Unidisjunctivism 
 
Though the phenomenal disjunctivist is committed to telling a positive story of ‘Bad’ 
experience, I have not yet explained that story’s shape. In particular, I have not yet explained 
whether or not my positive story is what I will call a unidisjunctivism that treats all ‘Bad’ 
experiences as falling under the umbrella of a single theoretical framework (i.e. a framework 
that provides the same fundamental explanation of dreaming, hallucination, and illusion, 
where certain of its non-essential axioms may be modified, or even abandoned, depending 
upon the particular ‘Bad’ experience being explained) or a multi-disjunctivism that treats 
different ‘Bad’ experiences – either at least one of dreams, hallucination, or illusion or tokens 
of the same ‘Bad’ sub-class – as having fundamentally distinct non-overlapping explanans. 
Here, I sketch three reasons for preferring unidisjunctivism (bold analogy: Just as the physicist, 
working along the right lines, aims to discover a ‘Theory of Everything’ that has the 
explanatory power to unify general relativity and quantum mechanics, so the phenomenal 
disjunctivist, working along the right lines, aims to discover a ‘Theory of ‘Bad’ Experience’ 
that has the explanatory power to unify dream, illusory, and hallucinatory experience). 
 
First, I want to dispel the worry that a truly unified theory of experience ought to provide a 
unified explanation of both ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experience since they share remarkable features 
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(e.g. one such story is that ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experiences share a certain sort of 
representational content); hence unidisjunctivism becomes irrelevant, and Basic Phenomenal 
Disjunctivism must fall.  
 
This objection problematically presupposes a mutually agreed conception of a unified theory 
of experience that I do not accept. Though ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experiences have the same 
remarkable features, I claim that their relationally determined objective phenomenal 
characters warrant treating them as phenomenally type-distinct mental states that have 
distinct non-overlapping explanans. An analogy may persuade: That a migraine and brain 
tumour can cause reflectively indiscriminable pain experiences does not entail that they must 
have the same fundamental physical explanation since the former is rarely caused by abnormal 
cell growth; likewise, that ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experiences share remarkable features does not 
entail that they must have the same metaphysical explanation since only the former’s objective 
phenomenal character is relationally determined by the world. My objector’s error, then, is 
the presupposition that experiences with the same remarkable features must share a 
fundamental ingredient when I am already conceptually committed to rejecting this 
conception of a unified theory of experience. 
 
That dispelled, here are three reasons for preferring unidisjunctivism. 
 
1. Unidisjunctivism is Elegant 
 
Elegant theories, in any domain, are generally considered to have the virtues of being concise, 
simple, and explanatory satisfying. But consider Smith’s multi-disjunctivism which claims that 
…  
 
“When Macbeth hallucinated a dagger […] he was aware of a dagger, located at 
some point in space before him, [a merely] intentional object.”(2005: 234) 
 
Whereas illusory experience is said to essentially consist in a radically different tactile 
phenomenology called the Anstoss which is,  
 
“[…] manifest to us simply as a force: a force that resists the counter-force of our 
animal striving.” (2005: 160) […] in illusory cases of the Anstoss, what varies, and 
so what underlies our mistaken judgements, is our appreciation of the force with 
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which we ourselves act on the alien force. (2005: 166) 
 
Smith’s multi-disjunctivism thus treats the objective phenomenal characters of (i) hallucinatory 
experiences as essentially consisting in direct awareness of non-existent intentional objects (hence 
Macbeth’s dagger-hallucination lacked any intrinsic ontological nature), and, (iii) illusory 
experiences as essentially consisting in the subject’s mistaken judgement about the nature of the 
external force that she actively resists (e.g. when tired, we might misjudge the intensity of the 
force exerted on our arm when attempting to lift a barbell). Here then, we have a multi-
disjunctivism that posits two radically distinct theories of hallucination and illusion, and hence, 
assigns hallucinatory and illusory experiences mutually exclusive ‘Bad’ disjuncts. 
 
Unidisjunctivism’s commitment to just one theory of ‘Bad’ experience is surely simpler, more 
concise, and explanatorily satisfying than a multi-disjunctivism which must posit at least two 
independent theories.60 Here is a familiar analogy: Copernicus’s Heliocentrism reduced the 
numerous and complicated epicyclical orbits posited by Ptolemy’s Geocentrism whilst still 
adequately explaining planetary motion; likewise, unidisjunctivism reduces the number of the 
phenomenal disjunctivist’s metaphysical commitments whilst, as I will argue in remaining 
chapters, adequately explaining the objective phenomenal characters of all paradigmatic ‘Bad’ 
experiences. I am not absurdly denying that elegant theories can be wrong (e.g. the ancient 
idea that everything material is constituted by the four elements of earth, fire, wind, and water 
has long been discredited): Rather, I am suggesting that, ceteris paribus, a theory of ‘Bad’ 
experience that does not have multiple metaphysical commitments is more concise and 
explanatory satisfying, and that unidisjunctivism has the right conceptual shape to fulfil that 
brief. 
 
2. Unidisjunctivism can handle Hard to Classify Cases 
 
Some ‘Bad’ experiences resist neat categorization: in particular, it is doubtful, as Macpherson 
(2013: 11) points out that, certain ‘Bad’ experiences can be straightforwardly categorized as 
dreams or illusions or hallucinations. One such case is the Herman-Hering grid.61 
                                                     
60 Hellie’s more complex multi-disjunctivism according to which “this hallucination of an apple consists in 
acquaintance with a sense-datum [whilst] that indiscriminable hallucination of an apple consists in the 
representation of a certain apple-relevant proposition” (2013: 2-3) magnifies this worry since token ‘Bad’ 
experiences from within the same class are given radically different explanans. 
61 Others possibly include afterimages (i.e. images which are seen after exposure to the original stimulus has 
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Herman-Hering Grid 
 
 
 
Normal sighted subjects typically report seeing dark ‘spots’ that alternately appear and 
disappear at the grid’s intersections. Though psychological scientists usually (e.g. De Lafuente 
and Ruiz 2004; Schiller & Carvey 2005) characterize the grid as an optical illusion in which the 
subject misleadingly sees the white intersections as dark spots, some philosophers (e.g. Brewer 
2008: 11; Phillips 2005: 18) have suggested that it is an instance of partial hallucination owing 
to the grid’s interaction with the subject’s visual system. Now, if both multi-disjunctivism and 
unidisjunctivism have the right conceptual shape to explain standard ‘Bad’ experiences (e.g. 
there is widespread agreement that the Müller-Lyer is an optical illusion), then ceteris paribus, 
one plausible way to choose between them is to see which one best explains these hard to 
classify cases. 
 
Consider Smith’s multi-disjunctivism which must, since the Anstoss is irrelevant, treat the 
grid’s ‘spots’ as hallucinated non-existent intentional objects. But that cannot capture the 
intuition that there is something illusory about the experience since the ‘spots’ cannot be seen 
in absentia the grid: conversely, a multi-disjunctivism that treats the ‘spots’ as illusory cannot 
capture the intuition that there is something hallucinatory about the experience since the ‘spots’ 
are standardly said to be particular objects, and no such objects exist. Perhaps the multi-
disjunctivist might attempt to capture both intuitions by treating the grid as a hallucinatory-
illusory ‘hybrid’ ‘Bad’ experience, i.e. a ‘Bad’ experience that is categorized as being part-
hallucination and part-illusion. This is to treat the experience’s objective phenomenal 
                                                                                                                                                                
ceased) and dream incorporation (i.e. as when some worldly event is incorporated into a dream via some 
interpretation befitting its content). Though afterimages are usually characterized as hallucinations (e.g. 
Macpherson 2013: 11; Smith 2005: 193) and dream incorporations as part of a non-lucid dream, one might think 
that there is something illusory about both phenomena since they require the existence of something worldly to 
occur. 
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character as essentially consisting in two phenomenal kinds – F (which explains the illusory 
intuition) and G (which explains the hallucinatory intuition). It will then be claimed that the 
grid resists neat categorization because it is neither a hallucinatory nor illusory experience but 
a fusion of both. 
 
This move is unconvincing on two counts: First, since the ‘spots’ are now claimed to be 
simultaneously non world-acquainting (hallucinatory) and world-acquainting (illusory), the 
experience now has a contradictory objective phenomenal character; and second, even if this 
move is coherent, conjoining two radically different phenomenal kinds in order to explain 
opposing intuitions is an inelegant explanation. My objection thus poses a trilemma for multi-
disjunctivism’s story of hard to classify cases: For it is either (i) explanatory incomplete (if it 
ignores the opposing intuition), or (ii) metaphysically extravagant (if it seeks to simultaneously 
capture opposing intuitions by positing two radically different ingredients within the same 
objective phenomenal character), or (iii) inelegant (if it two radically different ingredients are 
required to explain one experience). 
 
Unidisjunctivism has the right theoretical shape to explain hard to classify ‘Bad’ experiences 
since the fundamental explanation will be the same whether or not it is a dream or 
hallucination or illusion. Suppose I treat the Herman-Hering grid as a partial hallucination: If 
subsequent investigation determines that the ‘spots’ are illusory, then I will have made a 
taxonomical error rather than the multi-disjunctivist’s more serious one of being unable to 
adequately explain its objective phenomenal character – that I will have to modify, or even 
abandon, certain non-essential axioms does not prevent the fundamental explanation from 
remaining the same. Moreover, I do not risk metaphysical extravagance by positing hybrid 
‘Bad’ experiences or explanatory inelegance. 
 
3. Unidisjunctivism Saves Naïve Realism  
 
Incomplete disjunctivist theories of ‘Bad’ experience are commonplace. For instance, some 
(e.g. Allen 2014) are concerned with hallucination but neglect dreams and illusions; others 
(e.g. Brewer 2011; Fish 2009; Smith 2005) are concerned with hallucination and illusion but 
neglect dreams; whereas others (e.g. Dennett 1976; Ichikawa 2009) claim to explain dreams 
but neglect hallucination and illusion. This explanatory incompleteness risks resurrecting 
Spreading since an opponent can argue that the unexplained variety of ‘Bad’ experience 
‘spreads’ its non-naïve ingredient over to all ‘Good’ experience – after all, the p.m.e requires 
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just one variety to recur. For instance, Smith’s opponent can concede that hallucinations and 
illusions phenomenally differ from ‘Good’ experience whilst denying that this is true of 
dreams which, by familiar appeal to their reflective indiscriminability, will once again be 
exploited to topple naïve realism.  
 
One tack is to tell a different story of the prima facie neglected variety of ‘Bad’ experience. 
Thus someone with a positive story of hallucination and dreaming might then, perhaps on 
account of its world-acquainting nature, tell a different positive story of illusory experience. 
But that, as we have seen, risks inelegance and runs into a trilemma when seeking to explain 
hard to classify cases. Another tack is that the preferred story of one variety of ‘Bad’ 
experience can potentially explain others. Thus someone with a positive story of hallucination 
and illusion might then extend it to dreams – a thought hinted at by Allen who observes that 
any such story is also “likely to be [an] attractive” (2014: 4) story of dreams. But this 
attractiveness is not obvious in absentia a more explicit commitment to unidisjunctivism. And 
that commitment is needed to prevent Spreading’s return.   
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
I have argued that the naïve realist can successfully answer the p.m.e by adopting three theses. 
The first thesis, which sprung from the claim that objective phenomenal characters are 
relationally determined, was, 
 
Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism: For all subjects s:  
 
(i) If s has a Good experience EG, then EG’s objective phenomenal character is of 
type F, where F is naïve realist. 
 
(ii) If s has a Bad experience EB, then EB’s objective phenomenal character is of 
type G, where G is not naïve realist. 
 
The second thesis, which sprung from the requirement to adequately explain a ‘Bad’ 
experience’s remarkable features, was, 
 
Positive Phenomenal Disjunctivism: For any Bad experience EB, EB’s objective 
phenomenal character is of phenomenal type F, where F positively explains EB’s 
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remarkable phenomenal and intentional features.  
 
The third, which sprung from considerations of elegance, explaining hard to classify cases, and 
saving naïve realism, was,  
 
Unidisjunctivism: For any Bad experience EB (where EB is either a dream or 
hallucination or illusion), EB’s objective phenomenal character is of one 
fundamental phenomenal type F, where F does not type the corresponding Good 
experience. 
 
It is now time to meet the version of Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism that, or so I will argue, is 
well-equipped to positively explain, and tell a unified story of, ‘Bad’ experience. 
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3 
Imaginative Disjunctivism 
 
This chapter introduces (§3.1, §3.1.1) a version of Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism that I call 
Imaginative Disjunctivism (I.D) according to which the objective phenomenal characters of ‘Bad’ 
experiences are sensory, or perception-like, imaginings that convincingly simulate the 
objective phenomenal characters of metaphysically possible ‘Good’ experiences. My aim here 
is to paint a ‘broad brush’ picture of the essential nature of ‘Bad’ experience that will be 
refined when explaining dreaming, hallucination, and illusion in remaining chapters. This 
chapter is thus to be understood as offering the first proper sighting of the positive version of 
Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism that, or so I will argue in remaining chapters, robustly meets the 
previous chapter’s three constraints on a successful naïve realist solution to the p.m.e.  
 
Having sketched (I.D), I consider two objections to its story of perception-like imagination. 
The first (§3.2) is The Argument from Force and Vivacity according to which ‘Bad’ experiences 
cannot be perception-like imaginings since such imaginings cannot phenomenally capture the 
indiscriminability property that ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experiences share. The second (§3.2.1) is 
The Argument from The Will according to which ‘Bad’ experiences cannot be perception-like 
imaginings since such imaginings fail to meet a necessary condition on imagining simpliciter, 
viz., subjection to the will. The Argument from Force and Vivacity is rejected on the grounds that 
there are no obvious compelling conceptual or empirical reasons for denying that there exists a 
class of imaginings which can be reflectively indiscriminable from metaphysically possible 
‘Good’ experiences. The Argument from The Will is rejected on the grounds that ‘Bad’ 
experiences and at least some perception-like imaginings are subject to the will in a relevantly 
similar sense, viz., physically or indirectly. 
 
Having defended (I.D)’s story of perception-like imagination, I consider two objections that 
any Positive Phenomenal Disjunctivism must answer. The first (§3.3) is The Argument from Local 
Supervenience according to which ‘Bad’ experiences cannot essentially be perception-like 
imaginings since intuition dictates that two intrinsic physical duplicates, one having a 
hallucination and the other having a ‘Good’ experience, must be having phenomenally type-
identical experiences. The second (§3.3.1) is The Argument from Explanatory Screening Off 
according to which any positive explanation of ‘Bad’ experience has the undesirable 
consequence of ‘screening off’ a ‘Good’ experience’s relationally individuated naïve properties 
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from constitutively explaining its objective phenomenal character, thus rendering naïve 
realism irrelevant. The Argument from Local Supervenience is rejected on the grounds that there is 
nothing intuitively or empirically implausible about the thought that two intrinsic physical 
duplicates can be in phenomenally type-distinct mental states, viz., one perceptual, one a 
perception-like imagining. The Argument from Explanatory Screening Off is rejected on the 
grounds that since a necessary condition on the occurrence of ‘Good’ experience is the presence 
of a candidate worldly object, and since a necessary condition on the occurrence of ‘Bad’ 
experience is the absence of a candidate worldly object, those perception-like imaginings that 
phenomenally type ‘Bad’ experiences cannot ‘spread’ their way over to corresponding ‘Good’ 
cases and screen off naïve properties from playing their distinctive explanatory role. 
 
3.1. Imaginative Disjunctivism – A Primer 
 
Imaginative Disjunctivism’s key claim is that a ‘Bad’ experience’s objective, contra its subjective, 
perceptual phenomenal character, essentially consists in a phenomenally type-distinct 
perception-like, or sensory-like, imagining that simulates some metaphysically possible ‘Good’ 
perceptual experience’s objective phenomenal character, where this simulation explains the 
pervasive phenomenal intuition that the experience really is perceptual. This bold claim can be 
illuminated by considering Currie and Ravenscroft’s thought that sensory imaginings, 
   
“[…] involve the capacity to have […] states that are not perceptions […], but 
which are in various ways like those states – like them in ways that enable the states 
possessed through imagination to mimic and, relative to certain purposes, to 
substitute for perceptions [...].” (2002:11, my emphasis) 
 
And Martin’s thought that there are, 
 
“[…] distinctive episodes of imagining or imaging which correspond to our use of 
the distinct senses: so we talk of visualizing corresponding to seeing, or listening 
in one’s head parallel to audition […]62” (2002: 403, my emphasis) 
 
                                                     
62 For related formulations, see e.g. Budd (2012); Noordhof (2002: 427); and Wollheim (1973). 
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Let’s call those imaginings that can “mimic”, “substitute” for, or “correspond” to, a perceptual 
experience’s objective phenomenal character p-imaginings. Such talk is capturable by what I 
call the Simulation Thesis (first-pass formulation): 
 
Simulation Thesis: For every Good experience EG had by a subject s, there is some p-
imagining IP that.convincingly simulates EG’s objective phenomenal character.  
 
Experiences belonging to Imaginative Disjunctivism’s ‘Bad’ disjunct are thus understood as 
mental events that are of the same type as those in which the subject imagines that an object, 
o, looks, feels, tastes, or smells63 F, where these non-naïve imaginings do not phenomenally 
type those naïve realist experiences which belong to the ‘Good’ disjunct.64 A convincing or 
successful p-imagining is to be understood as one that the subject cannot reflectively 
discriminate from the corresponding ‘Good’ experience. I thus allow (it would be wrong not 
to) that there are p-imaginings which are often reflectively discriminable from the 
corresponding ‘Good’ experience, e.g. as when you deliberately imagine seeing a banana, and 
the object of your imagining is phenomenologically presented as occupying a subjective space 
‘inside your head’ rather than a determinate spatio-temporal location in mind-independent 
reality. 
 
Before developing the Simulation Thesis, it is worth noting that my conception of simulation is 
not to be understood as involving computer simulation, but instead, as involving what Heal 
(1986) calls replication simulation. When the Cern-physicist utilises a computer program to 
model, or simulate, the expected behaviour of the Higgs boson particle in the Large Hadron 
Collider, that simulation is driven by some pre-programmed theory which predicts, and 
potentially explains, its expected behaviour in that particular environment. But it is not the 
primary role of p-imaginings to predict and/or explain the subject’s beliefs and behaviours in 
some particular environment: rather, it is that of convincingly replicating in what ‘Good’ 
experiences essentially consist, (viz., naïve properties), where this replication can then ground 
certain of her beliefs and behaviours. 
 
                                                     
63 In line with the mirroring of perceptual experience, there may well be cross-modal imaginings in which the 
subject imagines that e.g. o looks F and simultaneously feels G. 
64 I defend this claim in (§3.2). All future references to p-imaginings presuppose that they are successful unless 
otherwise indicated. 
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The first-pass formulation of the Simulation Thesis can now be developed in terms of Goldman’s 
conception of generic simulation which is intended to apply to all non-mental and mental 
processes. Goldman’s suggestion is that a process, P, simulates some other process, P´, iff …   
 
“P […] replicates […] P´ in some significant respects […] and in its (significant) 
[replication] of P´, P fulfils one of its purposes or functions.” (2008: 37) 
 
Let (i) ‘P’ be a subject’s p-imagining, (ii) ‘P´’ be some metaphysically possible ‘Good’ 
experience, (iii) that “significant” feature which the subject’s p-imagining “duplicates” be a 
‘Good’ experience’s naïve property, and (iv) a ‘Good’ experience’s “purpose”, insofar as it has 
one, be that of having certain remarkable features. We then get the following stipulative 
definition (where ‘EB’ is any ‘Bad’ experience): 
 
Simulation Thesis: A subject’s p-imagining IP is a successful simulation of some 
metaphysically possible ‘Good’ perceptual experience, EG, iff 
  
(i) IP convincingly replicates EG’s objective phenomenal character (Premise); and,  
 
(ii) in its (significant) replication of EG’s objective phenomenal character, IP 
positively explains EB’s remarkable phenomenal and intentional features. 
(Implication of (i)) 
 
Condition (i) will be met if the subject’s p-imagining convincingly replicates some 
metaphysically possible ‘Good’ experience’s objective phenomenal character, e.g. if her 
experience seems to have the naïve property being-a-case-of-visual-awareness-of-a-white-picket-
fence, but where this phenomenally apparent naïve property is instantiated by a p-imagining and 
not any worldly item. Condition (ii) is a plausible implication of condition (i): For if a ‘Good’ 
experience’s remarkable features metaphysically spring from its naïve properties (§2.2.1), 
then it is plausible that a convincing replication of those properties by some p-imagining is 
sufficient to positively secure a ‘Bad’ experience’s remarkable features.  
 
Imaginative Disjunctivism thus takes, 
 
Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism: For all subjects s:  
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(i) If s has a Good experience EG, then EG’s objective phenomenal character is of 
type F, where F is naïve realist. 
 
(ii) If s has a Bad experience EB, then EB’s objective phenomenal character is of 
type G, where G is not naïve realist. 
 
as its starting point, and then seeks to positively explain ‘Bad’ experience in terms of p-
imaginings. Hence,  
 
Imaginative Disjunctivism: For all subjects s:  
 
(i) If s has a Good experience EG, then EG’s objective phenomenal character is of 
type F, where F is naïve realist. (Naïve realism); or,  
 
(ii) If s has a Bad experience EB, then EB’s objective phenomenal character is of 
type G, where G is p-imagined. (Positive instance of Basic Phenomenal 
Disjunctivism) 
 
This then, is the version of Positive Phenomenal Disjunctivism that, or so I will argue, constitutes a 
successful naïve realist answer to the p.m.e. 
 
3.1.1 Three Refinements 
 
Three refinements will help clarify (I.D). I take each in order of (ascending) importance.  
 
1. P-Imaginings are (probably) constitutively Non-Conceptual 
 
I said (§1.1.1) that ‘Good’ experience is constitutively non-conceptual. But we might think 
that p-imaginings are constitutively conceptual since imaginings inherit their “content from the 
[subject’s] thought” (Wollheim 1973: 52).65 It might thus be suspected that p-imaginings are 
ill-equipped to play the simulative role that I am demanding of them. More precisely, since the 
condition of cognitive conservation claims that a mental state F can convincingly simulate another 
mental state G iff F and G have the same type of content (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002: 92), and 
since my conception of ‘Good’ experience (G) as being constitutively non-conceptual is plainly 
                                                     
65 Compare Sartre’s claim that “I shall never find anything in [the imagining] but what I put there.” (1972: 7) 
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at odds with the intuition that p-imaginings (F) are constitutively conceptual, p-imaginings 
cannot convincingly simulate the objective phenomenal characters of metaphysically possible 
‘Good’ experiences. 
 
That all species of the mental genus imagining must be constitutively conceptual is implausible. 
I take my cue from Crane’s (1992: 19) non-controversial assumption that beliefs are 
constitutively conceptual since their possession requires the subject to possess certain 
inferential dispositions, e.g. someone who believes that that dog is grey (a is F) and that that 
same dog is three-legged (a is G) will be disposed to infer that that dog is grey and three-legged (a is F 
and G). These inferential powers depend upon her ability to grasp the structure that is inherent 
in her belief that dog is grey and three-legged – an ability that is constituted by her possessing 
those concepts – dog, grey, and three-legged – which characterize the content of her belief. 
Possessing beliefs thus requires possessing certain inferential dispositions, which in turn, 
requires possessing concepts. But perceptual experiences are not inferentially related to each 
other nor require that subject must have certain others for them to occur. There is no such 
thing as reasoning that that dog has three legs on the basis of first seeing that it looks grey since we 
either have (i) a single visual experience in which we see both of those properties at once, or, 
(ii) two distinct visual experiences that enable us to infer the belief that that dog is grey and three-
legged. Nor does seeing that that dog is grey then necessitate seeing that it has three legs (or 
indeed, any other particular sort of experience) since we might e.g. fail to see its three-
leggedness. So, we have a prima facie case for thinking that concept possession is probably 
unnecessary to characterize the content of perceptual experience. 
 
P-imaginings are likewise inferentially unrelated to one another and do not necessitate the 
occurrence of certain others, e.g. someone who p-imagines seeing a grey dog and then p-
imagines seeing a three-legged dog is not then inferentially disposed to p-imagine seeing a grey dog 
with three-legs or to have any other particular sort of p-imagining at all. Now, if Crane’s claims 
that perceptual experiences (i) are not inferentially structured like beliefs, and, (ii) do not 
necessitate the occurrence of any others, suggest that perceptual experience is constitutively 
non-conceptual, then ex hypothesi, the occurrence of (i) and (ii) in p-imaginings suggest that p-
imaginings are constitutively non-conceptual. Of course, subjects usually recognize what they 
p-imagine, but that conceptual recognition must be kept distinct from the nature of p-
imaginings themselves.66 
                                                     
66 I recognize that this is a controversial claim which considerations of space preclude delving further into: Thus, 
my modest aim is to show that if Crane’s argument implies that perceptual experience is constitutively non-
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One important advantage of my account is that it avoids the worry (e.g. Evans 1982: 124; 
Peacocke 2001: 614) that someone who construes ‘Bad’ experience as being constitutively 
conceptual must implausibly deny a wealth of empirical evidence which shows that non-
linguistic animals and pre-linguistic infants can have ‘Bad’ experiences.67 Perhaps it will be said 
that empirical evidence can only ever be behavioural and not demonstrative. Thus, whilst the 
minor paw movements of a sleeping dog might constitute behavioural evidence that it seems to 
be dreaming, such movements cannot demonstrate that it is dreaming. But bluntly resisting 
empirical evidence in order to save one’s favoured theory is explanatorily unsatisfying; 
whereas my claim that non-linguistic animals and pre-linguistic infants who exhibit certain 
behaviours are having constitutively non-conceptual p-imaginings is both empirically (since 
nothing empirical dictates that ‘Bad’ experience is constitutively conceptual) and conceptually 
(since conceptual argument does not dictate that ‘Bad’ experience must be constitutively 
conceptual) consistent. 
 
2. P-Imaginings are (probably) Quasi-Pictorial 
 
It might be thought that treating p-imaginings as being constitutively non-conceptual commits 
me to pictorialism, i.e. the thought that p-imaginings just are mental pictures which are arrayed 
for viewing before the ‘mind’s eye’, or more specifically, internal analogue representations of 
scenes (e.g. Block 1983; Descartes 1641: Med., 3; §3). The reasoning goes: It is plausible that 
constitutively non-conceptual mental states have analogue content68, i.e. content that has “a 
wealth of detail, and a degree of specificity” (Dretske 1999: 138) or is more fine-grained than 
the subject’s conceptual repertoire (e.g. I do not possess determinate colour concepts for 
every shade that I can see); a picture necessarily has analogue content since every point upon 
its surface is such that some qualitative property is instantiated there; so, ex hypothesi, 
constitutively non-conceptual p-imaginings are pictorial.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                
conceptual, then since it extends to p-imagining, we likewise have a prima facie case for thinking that p-imaginings 
are constitutively non-conceptual – certainly, it is theoretically simpler to treat p-imaginings and perceptual 
experiences as having the same type of content (whatever that ultimately turns out to be). 
67 For instance, animals typically display hallucinatory-like behaviour after being treated with hallucinogens (e.g. 
Ellison 1991; Siegel et al., 1976) and usually respond to visual illusions (e.g. Heydt & Peterhans 1989; Nieder & 
Wagner 1999). It is also well-known that animals and pre-linguistic infants have r.e.m sleep, which is positively 
correlated with dreaming. 
68 Though not vice-versa since there might be analogue content that is conceptually capturable. 
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Clearly, there are not literal mental pictures ‘in the head.’ For the No Seeum objection (e.g. 
Ryle, 1949: 226; Sterelny 1986: 562) reminds us that, despite phenomenal intuition and our 
ordinary ways of talking, such pictures do not exist anywhere inside the brain – certainly, 
there are no spatially bounded objects that possess paradigmatic visual properties such as colour 
which can be seen with a ‘mind’s eye.’69 Closely related is the Paraphernalia objection (e.g. 
Dennett 1969) which points out that the seeing of mental pictures necessarily requires a 
‘mind’s eye’ (and perhaps other paraphernalia such as internal hands to manipulate them with) 
which is not to be found anywhere inside the brain.  
 
I dispense with objectionable non-existent literal mental pictures and their associated non-
existent paraphernalia by treating p-imaginings as functioning as if they are mental pictures. 
Call this view Quasi-Pictorialism (e.g. Cohen 1996; Kosslyn et al. 2004; Rollins 2001). 
Kosslyn’s (1980: 5-9; 1994: 12-20) influential version treats imagined objects as being 
functionally analogous to displays on a computer screen: Just as 2-D pictures on a computer 
screen are generated when non-pictorial information that is stored in memory is translated 
into a mathematical map (bitmap) of the screen that specifies the colour of each pixel on the 
screen itself, so 2-D imagined objects are generated when non-pictorial information that is 
stored in the subject’s long-term memory is translated into a functional picture in a special 
memory area called the ‘Visual Buffer’ where they become first-person accessible.70 Applied to 
(I.D), Kosslyn’s model predicts that, in ‘Bad’ experience, cells in the visual buffer are 
activated which represent single spatial points on the surface of the p-imagined object, e.g. 
when someone hallucinates a mango, certain cells in her buffer ‘switch on’ which represent 
single spatial points on the surface of the imagined object. Consistent with this, mental 
rotation (e.g. Cooper 1976; Shepard & Metzler, 1971) and scanning (e.g. Borst et al. 2006; 
Kosslyn, Ball & Reiser 1978) experiments seem to show that subjects mentally ‘scan’ 
something pictorial whilst imagining. I thus have a conceptually and empirically consistent 
model that can explain the intuition that we often “call up a picture […] by the use of mental 
images” (Aristotle 350 B.C. E: Bk 3, §3) which does not posit non-existent literal mental 
pictures ‘inside the head.’71 
                                                     
69 Anyway, this (e.g. Tye 1991: 20) arguably entails an infinite regress: For if a ‘mind’s eye’ is required to see a 
mental picture, then, this episode of seeing must be a case of seeing with the ‘mind’s eye.’ But seeing with the 
‘mind’s eye’ is an episode of imagining; hence, we must form an image of the original mental picture, and so on 
ad infinitum. 
70 Alternative quasi-pictorial models have been proposed by e.g. Julstrom & Baron (1985); Pinker (1988); and 
Glasgow (1993).  
71 This is highly controversial, but I am only seeking to dispel the worry that I am committed to positing non-
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3. Any P-Imagining Simulates the Objective Phenomenal Character of Some Metaphysically Possible 
‘Good’ Experience 
 
This is because the converse claim cannot explain the indiscriminability property that ‘Good’ 
and ‘Bad’ experiences share. Suppose that an actual ‘Bad’ experience is a p-imagining which 
simulates the objective phenomenal character of some metaphysically possible ‘Bad’ 
experience. Because that trivially treats ‘Bad’ experiences as being reflectively indiscriminable 
from themselves, we have no explanation of the remarkable phenomenal feature of reflective 
indiscriminability. Suppose I have a hallucination as of a mango in front of me, and that I explain 
this in terms of a p-imagining which simulates the objective phenomenal character of some 
metaphysically possible ‘Bad’ experience as of a mango in front of me. Because that possible 
‘Bad’ experience is also said to be a p-imagining as of a mango, I have said nothing about why it 
is reflectively indiscriminable from the corresponding ‘Good’ experience of a mango in front 
of me. Since this is tantamount to disjunctive quietism which I have already rejected (§2.2.1, 
§2.2.2). I treat p-imagined ‘Bad’ experiences as simulations of metaphysically possible ‘Good’ 
experiences.  
 
3.1.2 Summary 
 
I have now introduced a version of Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism – Imaginative Disjunctivism – 
that seeks to positively explain the objective phenomenal characters of ‘Bad’ experiences in 
terms of perception-like imaginings. I then claimed that these p-imaginings (i) are (probably) 
constitutively.non-conceptual, (ii) are (probably) quasi-pictorial, and (iii) simulate the 
objective phenomenal characters of metaphysically possible ‘Good’ experiences. (I.D) must 
now be defended against four influential objections. I begin with two that claim to topple (I.D) 
qua theory of p-imagining. 
 
3.2 The Argument from Force and Vivacity 
                                                                                                                                                                
existent literal mental pictures ‘inside the head.’ Rival theories include Descriptionalism (e.g. Pylyshyn 2003a) 
who claim that imaginings are complex language-like descriptions (standardly, propositional representations); 
‘Hybrid’ accounts (e.g. Chambers 1993) which claim that imaginings are a fusion of pictorial and descriptional 
properties; and ‘Enactive accounts (e.g. Noë 2009) which claim that imagining involves actively seeking out some 
particular information. Some (e.g. Anderson 1979) even think that this debate cannot be empirically resolved. 
For my purposes, there is no harm in treating the fundamental format of p-imaginings as quasi-pictorial. 
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(I.D) is likely to strike the reader as being deeply counterintuitive. Certainly, dreams and 
hallucinations are intuitively described, and standardly characterized in both philosophy (e.g. 
Kant 1949: 275; Russell 1948: 214; Plato 360 B.C.E: 158b-d) and psychology (e.g. Revonsuo 
2000: 878; Windt 2013: 2), as being perceptual experiences. And in the case of illusions, 
subjects typically take themselves to be perceiving, and not imagining e.g. ‘unequal’ Müller-
Lyer lines or ‘flipping’ duck-rabbits. Call this pervasive phenomenal intuition the Perceptual 
Assumption: 
 
Perceptual Assumption: For any standard Bad experience EB had by a subject s, EB 
has (i) a subjective perceptual phenomenal character, and, (ii) an objective 
perceptual phenomenal character. 
 
The Perceptual Assumption is standardly motivated by a Humean inspired Argument from Force and 
Vivacity which runs thus: ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experiences are reflectively indiscriminable; hence, 
adequately explaining reflective indiscriminability requires that p-imaginings can convincingly 
simulate the objective phenomenal characters of metaphysically possible ‘Good’ perceptual 
experiences. But p-imaginings and ‘Good’ perceptual experiences are reflectively discriminable 
since the former lacks the phenomenal force and vivacity of the latter; hence, adequately 
explaining reflective indiscriminability requires that the objective phenomenal characters of ‘Bad’ 
experiences are also intrinsically perceptual. 
 
Someone persuaded by this argument is presumably persuaded by Hume’s famous claim that, 
 
“The difference betwixt [IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS] consists in the degrees of force 
and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our 
thought or consciousness. […] That idea of red, which we form in the dark, and that 
impression, which strikes our eyes in sunshine, differ only in degree.”72 (1739/40 BK 
1, Part 1: §1, my emphasis) 
 
One intuitive way to understand Hume’s thought that an impression “which strikes our eyes in 
sunshine” is phenomenally more potent, or stronger, than any imagining of it which “we form 
in the dark” is in terms of intentional properties such as the degree of brightness and saturation of 
                                                     
72 Compare Berkeley’s Philonus: “The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct […] But the ideas 
perceived by sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear” (1713: 3-30). 
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what is imagined. This is mistaken since we can obviously imagine seeing strikingly bright 
Aurora Borealis and then be disappointed when, on a cloudy night, we see a faint glow. 
Another interpretation is that perceptual experiences somehow occupy more – if indeed, that 
notion is intelligible – of our consciousness (analogy: Just as severe pain can ‘crowd out’ 
perceptual awareness of the world, so perceptual experiences can ‘crowd out’ imaginings). 
This is also mistaken since we can intently attend to some imagining whilst being distracted 
from reality as evidenced by the common experience of e.g. failing to notice someone enter 
the room whilst engaged in an imaginative reverie.  
 
A more plausible notion of force and vivacity that props up the Perceptual Assumption, I suggest, is 
a perceptual experience’s world-presentingness, i.e. its seeming to present mind-independent 
objects and properties.73 Hume seems to have suggested this criterion when he wrote that, 
 
“All the colours of poetry, however splendid, can never paint natural objects in 
such a manner as to make the descriptions be taken for a real landskip. The most lively 
thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation.” (1748: §2, my emphasis) 
 
To illustrate, before I visited Thingvellir National Park, I believed certain propositions about it 
such as its rugged landscape is partly formed by the overground emergence of the North American and 
Eurasian tectonic plates. As I walked around, my belief did not somehow become more obvious 
(I had read about its geological features); but, upon seeing the landscape, I certainly gained a 
sense of world-presentingness lacked by any “splendid” description. In contrast, it is said that 
imaginings cannot “indicate the [external] presence of objects and properties” (Farkas 2013: 
105) since they are phenomenally presented as occupying an internal subjective space ‘within 
the head.’74 This phenomenological difference, I take it, underlies the Humean claim that even 
the most vivid imagining of seeing Thingvellir’s rugged landscape “can never […] be taken” for 
the real thing.75 
                                                     
73 Everson (1988) suggests that, for Hume, ‘force’ and ‘vivacity’ are functional terms: An impression is said to be 
more forceful and vivid than an imagining if it affects the mind more strongly. I reject this interpretation (§4.1.1, 
§4.2.1, §5.1.1) on the grounds that p-imaginings can affect the mind less strongly (since they are not really 
believed) than ‘Good’ experiences.whilst nevertheless being reflectively indiscriminable from them. 
74 In Kantian terminology, we can say that this is because imaginings are internally generated by the subject’s 
spontaneity (i.e. her conceptual faculties), whereas those worldly items that impinge upon her perceptual 
machinery are a product of her receptivity (i.e. her mind’s ability to passively receive impressions). 
75 Of course, Hume also thought (1739/40 BK 1, Part 1: §1) that simple ideas (and hence the complex ideas that 
are composed of them) are causally derived from simple impressions that exactly resemble those simple ideas. So, 
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Understanding Humean force and vivacity in terms of world-presentingness suggests that the 
original argument is really this: ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experiences are reflectively indiscriminable; but 
p-imaginings and ‘Good’ perceptual experiences are reflectively discriminable since the former 
lacks the world-presentingness of the latter. The Imaginative Disjunctivist has not provided any 
obvious reason for thinking that p-imaginings are a special class of imaginings that can ground a 
‘Bad’ experience’s world-presentingness; hence, adequately explaining reflective indiscriminability 
requires construing the objective phenomenal characters of ‘Bad’ experiences as being 
intrinsically perceptual.  
 
The Imaginative Disjunctivist cannot exploit the response that world-presentingness is neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition for reflectively discriminating between imaginings and 
perceptual experiences. It cannot be a necessary condition since Hume conceded that there 
exists a class of imaginings occurring during “sleep, in a fever, [or] in madness” (1739/40 BK 
1, Part 1: §1) that can be mistaken for ‘Good’ experiences76: Neither can it be a sufficient 
condition since Hume also conceded that “faint and low” (ibid) ‘Good’ experiences can be 
mistaken for imaginings. By the Humean’s own lights then there exist a class of imaginings 
which can be reflectively indiscriminable from ‘Good’ experiences, just as (I.D) insists. 
 
This response is unhelpful since it presupposes that ‘Bad’ experiences are p-imaginings, when 
what (I.D) needs, in order to be conceptually and empirically intelligible, is at least one 
convincing real-world case in which the subject has mistaken imagined experiences for 
perceptual experiences in virtue of their world-presenting phenomenology.77 As a way into this 
claim, it is helpful to first consider the well-documented phenomenon of Imagination Inflation 
in which subjects plausibly mistake imaginings for genuine experiential memories (e.g. Garry 
                                                                                                                                                                
it might be claimed that imaginings lack the phenomenal potency of perceptual experiences since they are decayed 
copies of some original impression. This tack is unconvincing since there is no logical reason why an imagining 
cannot be causally derived from a perceptual experience and yet be more forceful and vivid (however force and 
vivacity is understood). 
76 A concession that Hume thought does not undermine his criterion of force and vivacity since imaginings and 
perceptions are “in general so very different.” (ibid)   
77 The converse claim cannot help (I.D) since it is possible that perceptual experiences can be mistaken for 
imaginings, (e.g. as seems to have occurred in Perky’s (1910) famous experiment in which twenty four subjects 
mistook projected images of everyday objects onto a screen for their imaginings) without imaginings ever being 
mistaken for perceptual experiences. 
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& Polaschek 2000; Mazzoni & Memon 2003). Famously, Loftus & Pickrell (1995) found that 5 
out of 24 subjects falsely remembered being lost in a shopping mall as a child after being 
presented with a story to that effect. Later, Wade et al. (2002) adapted the ‘Lost in the Mall’ 
methodology by replacing false stories with doctored photographs. It was found that, of 20 
subjects who had not taken a hot air balloon ride as a child, 10 recalled something about the 
event after being shown a doctored photograph of themselves in a hot air balloon – their 
reports were often rich in detail with one subject recalling “mum […] down on the ground 
taking a photo” and another recalling seeing “the road and people and a big paddock.” Such 
cases suggest that imagined experiences can be reflectively indiscriminable from genuine 
experiential memories. 
 
If Imagination Inflation shows that imagined perceptual experiences can be mistaken for genuine 
experiential memories, then there is no principled reason for denying that they can also be 
mistaken for real perceptual experiences. Hence, 
 
For all subjects s: If s has a Bad experience EB, where EB has a subjective 
perceptual phenomenal character, then it is metaphysically possible that EB’s 
objective phenomenal character is typed by a p-imagining. (Implication of 
Imagination Inflation, negation of the Perceptual Assumption)   
 
This mismatch between subjective and objective phenomenal character plausibly occurs in 
some subjects with visual anosognosia78 or Anton-Babinski syndrome, i.e. a neurological disorder 
in which cortically blind subjects deny their visual impairment. For instance, Kartsounis et al. 
(2009: 937) describes one such adult subject, ‘AST’, who claimed to see animals, people, and 
even expressed surprise to discover that a new village had been built outside her window. 
Since those areas of ‘AST’’s brain responsible for organizing visual input had been significantly 
damaged by radiation treatment, and since her visual imagery was largely intact, it was thought 
that she had confused imagined experiences of seeing with perceptual experiences of seeing. In 
other words, ‘AST’ denied her objective blindness since she was able to generate a number of 
imaginings that she mistook for bona fide visual experiences, just as (I.D) insists. 
 
The mistake which underlies visual anosognosia is easily understood if the subject’s imagined 
experiences are world-presenting. The world-presenting phenomenology of ‘Good’ experiences 
                                                     
78 Reports of anosognosias in other sensory modalities are rare, though Anton (1898) described two subjects who 
both denied their objective deafness. 
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suggests that someone with objective blindness who thinks she has them must likewise be in a 
mental state that has a world-presenting phenomenology. Now, ‘AST’’s claim that she had 
‘Good’ experiences of everyday objects and scenes when she could not suggests that her ‘Bad’ 
mental state was indeed phenomenally world-presenting – for otherwise, its non-world 
presentingness would be a property in virtue of which she could reflectively discriminate it from 
‘Good’ experience, and the problem is that she could not. This means that if ‘AST’ was really 
imagining having ‘Good’ experiences, then we have a real world case in which imagined 
perceptual experiences can convincingly simulate the objective phenomenal characters of 
metaphysically possible ‘Good’ experiences, just as (I.D) insists. 
 
It might be objected that hinging (I.D) upon abnormal cases is a tenuous strategy. But it is 
usually only through such cases that we can see how there exist a class of imaginings which can 
be mistaken for ‘Good’ experiences. For most garden-variety imaginings – e.g. emotional 
imaginings such as an imaginative experience of the intense fear that might really be 
experienced in a plane crash or cognitive imaginings such as conceptually imagining your 
opponent’s next possible move in a chess-game – indeed lack the Humean force and vivacity of, 
and so, are reflectively discriminable from, ‘Good’ experiences. And my modest aim here has 
only been to show that (I.D) is a conceptually and empirically consistent hypothesis. 
 
A final objection is that if ‘Bad’ experiences are p-imaginings, and if p-imaginings can have a 
world-presenting phenomenology in virtue of which they are reflectively indiscriminable from 
metaphysically possible ‘Good’ experiences, then this shared world-presentingness is strong 
evidence that ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experiences are phenomenally typed by something non-naïve; 
hence, the p.m.e recurs. The answer to this, I think, is straightforward: namely, (I.D)’s 
insistence that a ‘Good’ experience’s objective phenomenal character is relationally determined 
by worldly object-property couples ensures that it is naïve realist. In other words, (I.D)’s 
thought that only ‘Good’ experiences are intrinsically world-involving and world-acquainting 
suffices to ensure that, even though p-imagined ‘Bad’ experiences can be reflectively 
indiscriminable vis-à-vis their world-presenting phenomenology, they are nevertheless  
phenomenally type-distinct mental states. 
 
3.2.1 The Argument from the Will 
 
Undeterred, my objector might now deploy the Argument from the Will which denies that ‘Bad’ 
experiences are p-imaginings since they fail to meet a necessary condition on imagination 
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simpliciter: namely, that imaginings, unlike ‘Bad’ experiences, are “within our own power” 
(Aristotle 350 B.C.E: §3) or subject to the will. This objection is clearly articulated by White, 
who says that,  
 
“While my imagining may, on any particular occasion, be something beyond my 
control, imagining is always something that I do […] dreams […] illusion, and 
hallucination [are] all cases where the subject has minimal or no control over the 
[experience].” 79 (1990: 91, my emphasis) 
 
On the face of it, White’s argument is straightforward. First, since it is the disputed claim, let’s 
assume, 
 
(1) Imaginative Disjunctivism: For all subjects s:  
 
(i) If s has a Good experience EG, then EG’s objective phenomenal character is of 
type F, where F is naïve realist; or,  
 
(ii) If s has a Bad experience EB, then EB’s objective phenomenal character is of 
type G, where G is p-imagined. 
 
Next, White’s remark that an “imagining is always something that I do” suggests that we should 
also accept, 
 
(2) For all subjects s: Necessarily, if s imagines P, P is subject to s’s will. (Premise) 
 
And since p-imaginings are obviously a species of the mental genus imagination, premise (2) is 
said to entail, 
 
(3) For all subjects s: Necessarily, if s p-imagines P, P is subject to s’s will. 
(Deductive implication of (2)) 
 
Now, White’s claim “the subject has minimal or no control” over her ‘Bad’ experiences implies, 
                                                     
79 White’s argument is primarily intended to establish that imagination does not entail imagery – I have adapted it 
here since, unlike others (e.g. Sartre 1948: 18; Wittgenstein 1967: §627, §633), it is explicitly concerned with 
dreams, illusions, and hallucinations. 
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(4) For all subjects s: Necessarily, if s has a Bad experience EB (where EB is either a 
dream or illusion or hallucination), EB is not subject to s’s will. (Premise) 
 
Clearly, if p-imaginings are necessarily subject to the will (Premise (3)), and if ‘Bad’ 
experiences are not subject to the will (Premise (4)), then the objective phenomenal characters 
of ‘Bad’ experiences cannot be typed by p-imaginings. Hence, 
 
(5) For any Bad experience EB had by a subject s: EB’s objective phenomenal 
character is not of phenomenal type F, where F is p-imagined. ((3) & (4), 
negation of (1)) 
 
I begin with premise (2) which is motivated by the intuitive assumption that imagining 
simpliciter is necessarily a mental act. Unlike the scene that is simply presented when you wake 
up, imagining necessarily involves your agency. As it stands, this formulation is too simple since 
the control that we have over our imaginings is not always absolute. For instance, we have (i) 
failed imaginings (e.g. you might, despite considerable mental effort, be unable to imagine 
someone’s face), (ii) partial imaginings (e.g. when you imagine someone’s face you might then 
mentally struggle to imagine its determinate details), (iii) momentary imaginings (e.g. as when 
you cannot imagine someone’s face for more than a fleeting moment), and, (iv) compulsive 
imaginings (e.g. as when you compulsively imagine plummeting out of the sky whilst on an 
aeroplane). That (i)-(iv) exemplify imaginings that are occasionally “beyond [our] control” 
suggests a more charitable reading of premise (2) according to which it is intelligible to always 
mentally try to control, or direct the will, at our imaginings even when we cannot.80 Premise (2) 
thus becomes,  
 
(2) For all subjects s: Necessarily, if s imagines P, P is always, in principle, directly 
(i.e. mentally) subject to s’s will.  
 
Correspondingly, premise (3) becomes, 
 
(3) For all subjects s: Necessarily, if s p-imagines P, P is always, in principle, directly 
subject to s’s will. (Deductive implication of (2)) 
 
                                                     
80 Compare Ichikawa’s remark that subjects “can try” (2009: 107) to control their imaginings. 
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Premise (2)’s charitable reformulation thus allows that those imaginings which instance (i)-(iv) 
are subject to the will since they are still mental actions: specifically, the thought is that (i) 
failed, partial, and momentary imaginings are subject to the will since we could attempt to sustain 
them in consciousness, and (ii) compulsive imaginings are subject to the will since we could 
attempt to influence their course or terminate them. It is useful to distinguish between three 
points at which imaginings can be subject to the will: namely, their inception, course, and 
termination. Though ordinary garden-variety imaginings are usually subject to the will at all 
three points, instances of (i)-(v) will resist it at one or more points. Still, such imaginings do 
not falsify premise (2) since it is always intelligible to mentally direct our will at them (even 
though this may require a substantive mental effort). 
 
Premise (4) is motivated by the intuition that ‘Bad’, like ‘Good’, experiences are passively 
received or are simply presented to consciousness. For instance, the non-lucid dreamer simply 
accepts her dream events as appropriate, e.g. the philosopher-by-day is unlikely to be puzzled 
whilst dreaming that she is a super-hero (in fact, she may be momentarily puzzled upon waking 
to discover that she has not saved the populace from being brain-envatted). Now this passivity is 
not always total as evidenced by the phenomenon of r.e.m sleep-behaviour disorder in which 
subjects are said to ‘act out’ their dreams in reality, and then we have lucid dreamers who 
sometimes report being able to successfully influence theirrdream events. Still, dreams seem 
significantly less subject to the will than imaginings since it is usually futile to even try to 
mentally influence our dream events. 
 
Hallucinations and illusions differ. For we can usually physically control our location, where to 
look, and where to tune our attention: it is just that, having done all that, we cannot then 
modify what is presented. Look at the ‘Rotating Rays’ illusion:  
 
 
        Image reproduced from http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/~akitaoka/index-e.html 
 
Normally sighted subjects usually report that the outer rays are rotating ‘clockwise’ whilst the 
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inner rays are rotating ‘counter-clockwise’ – the illusion being, of course, that the rays are 
objectively stationary. If this describes how things look to you, then you can stop seeing the 
rotating rays by performing voluntarytphysical actions such as closing your eyes or looking 
elsewhere: But what you cannot do, once you have decided to look at the rays, is to 
phenomenally influence their rotating look by mentally directing your will at them – as 
Ichikawa says, “The instruction, ‘stop having [the visual experience of rotating rays]’ is a 
confused one” (2009: 107). 
 
‘Ambiguous’ illusions seem less straightforward. Look again at the ‘Duck-Rabbit.’ 
 
 
 
It might be thought that subjects who are aware of the figure’s opposing interpretations can 
simply choose to see it as a duck or as a rabbit. I am not convinced by this since we might be 
trying to see the figure as a duck and either be (i) surprised.when it suddenly ‘flips’ and is seen 
as a rabbit (or vice-versa), or (ii) perplexed.that we can only see it as a rabbit (or vice-versa), or 
(iii) annoyed that its.frequent ‘flipping’ interrupts what we are trying to see it as (or vice-versa). 
The ‘Duck-Rabbit’ illusion thus seems.significantly less subject to the will than imaginings 
since we cannot usually phenomenally influence what the figure is seen as by mentally trying to 
see it as a duck or as a rabbit. 
 
These remarks suggest that my objector really has in mind,  
 
(4) For all subjects s: Necessarily, if s has a Bad experience EB (where EB is either a 
dream or illusion or hallucination), EB can only ever be indirectly (i.e. 
physically) subject to s’s will.  
 
The real force of the argument from the will thus consists in the thought that p-imaginings cannot 
type the objective phenomenal characters of ‘Bad’ experiences since they fail to meet a 
necessary condition on imagining simpliciter, viz., direct subjection to the will in principle.  
 
Premise (2) is neither empirically nor conceptually watertight. Empirically, it is not obvious that 
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we can mentally try to control all of our imaginings. Compulsive imaginings are an obvious 
example. Dostoevsky’s notorious observation that someone who attempts to mentally suppress 
thinking about a white bear will then very likely imagine “the cursed thing […] every minute” 
(1997: 49) has been well-demonstrated (e.g. Wegner et al. 1987). In another extreme case, 
subjects who were instructed to avoid making colour associations associated with stimulus 
words often reported such associations even when threatened with shock (McGranahan 1940). 
And it is a familiar fact that compulsive imaginings partly characterize certain psychiatric 
disorders (e.g. witness the genocide survivor with post-traumatic stress disorder who 
compulsively imagines violent scenes). That subjects understand how to banish compulsive 
imaginings does not mean that they can, in any significant sense, attempt such banishment. Given 
the high likelihood of failure, any such attempt seems irrational at best and nonsensical at 
worst. 
 
It is noteworthy that the compulsive imaginer is often imagining some possible perceptual 
experience, i.e. there are compulsive p-imaginings. Someone who refuses to board the 
aeroplane may well be compulsively imagining seeing it plummet out of the sky; someone who 
compulsively.imagines colours even when threatened with shock is very likely to be imagining 
seeing those qualities; and someone suffering from limerence is very likely to be 
compulsively.imagining seeing the object of her desire. Since at least some compulsive 
imaginings involve imagining having certain perceptual experiences, it cannot be a necessary 
condition on p-imaginings that they are directly subject to the will. Destabilizing premise (2) in 
this way thus destabilizes premise (3). 
 
Tellingly, compulsive imaginings can be indirectly interrupted, or even banished, by 
performing voluntary physical actions. The observation (e.g. Spivey et al. 2000; Johansson et al. 
2006) that subjects engaging in imaginative exercises generally produce saccadic eye-
movements which mimic those they would make were they viewing the actual scene predicts 
that the disruption of such movements should causally disrupt the concomitant imagining. A 
prediction that is empirically supported by the observation (e.g. Andrade et al. 1997; Kavanagh 
et al. 2001) that subjects typically find it more difficult to sustain compulsive imaginings whilst 
performing voluntary visuospatial tasks that disrupt those involuntary eye-movements which 
partly sustain their existence. Beyond the visual cases, it is well-known that subjects can 
disrupt those unwanted imaginings which partly characterize panic attacks by activating the 
‘Dive Reflex’ i.e. the activation of the parasympathetic nervous system by immersing oneself 
in cold water. These empirical observations plausibly show that compulsive imaginings are 
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indirectly subject to the will; and since the compulsive imaginer is usually p-imagining, we 
now find that at least some p-imaginings are indirectly subject to the will.81  
 
Lest it be replied that the empirical jury remains open, it is not conceptually obvious that all 
imaginings must be directly subject to the will. My alternative orders species of the mental 
genus imagining along a continuum according to their different degrees of subjection to the 
will. At the ‘Direct Pole’ can be found those ordinary garden-variety imaginings whose course, 
inception, and termination subjects can mentally control. At the ‘Indirect Pole’ can be found 
those compulsive and p-imaginings which, like ‘Bad’ experiences, subjects can only physically 
control – failed, partial, and momentary imaginings can be found between the poles. Placing 
some p-imaginings at the ‘Indirect’ pole is not implausible since those that are directly subject 
to the will would not be convincing simulations of ‘Good’ experiences, and there is reason 
(§3.2) to think that they can. That my picture is conceptually coherent means that the sharp 
qualitative distinction between premises (2) and (4) is not conceptually watertight either. 
 
A final objection is that if p-imaginings and ‘Good’ experiences share the property of indirect 
subjection to the will, then indirect subjection to the will is strong evidence that ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ 
experiences are phenomenally typed by the same non-naïve realist ingredient, and the p.m.e 
recurs. The answer to this objection, I think, is again straightforward: namely, (I.D)’s thought 
that ‘Good’, unlike ‘Bad’, experiences are intrinsically world-involving and world-acquainting 
suffices to ensure that even though both directly resist the will, they are nevertheless 
phenomenally type-distinct mental states. 
 
3.2.1.2 A Note on Belief Independence 
 
The thought that p-imaginings are not directly subject to the will can explain the familiar 
puzzle of belief-independence, i.e. what is occurring when the subject doxastically resists her 
‘Bad’ experience even though its misleading phenomenal appearance persists, e.g. knowing 
that the ‘rotating’ rays are stationary cannot stop their rotating look. For if the objective 
                                                     
81 Conversely, Thomas (2014: 140) argues that at least some perceptual experiences, like ordinary garden-variety 
imaginings, are directly subject to the will – I do not consider this strategy owing to a paucity of empirical 
evidence. A promising strategy, that space prevents considering, is to argue that imaginings which directly resist 
the will plausibly explain certain experiential phenomena such as amodal perception (i.e. the idea that perceptual 
experience can represent the occluded parts of objects) (e.g. Nanay 2010) or cognitive penetration (i.e. the idea 
that cognitive states can affect objective phenomenal characters) (e.g. Macpherson 2012). 
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phenomenal characters of ‘Bad’ experiences essentially consist in p-imaginings, and if these p-
imaginings are not directly subject to the will, then clearly, mentally directing the will towards 
the ‘rotating’ rays (and other ‘Bad’ experiences) cannot change the illusory experience’s 
subjective phenomenal character.  
 
3.2.2 Summary 
 
I have now defended (I.D)’s story of p-imagining against two influential objections. Against the 
Argument from Force and Vivacity, I argued that the Perceptual Assumption can be sensibly denied 
since there is no principled conceptual or empirical reason for thinking that all imaginings 
must lack the Humean force and vivacity of ‘Good’ experiences. Against, the Argument from the 
Will, I argued that since p-imaginings and ‘Bad’ experiences resist the will in a relevantly 
similar way (viz., indirectly), it remains empirically and conceptually consistent that ‘Bad’ 
experiences are p-imaginings. I then exploited the notion of indirect subjection to the will to 
explain the puzzle of belief-independence. I turn now to two final objections that seek to 
topple (I.D) qua theory of phenomenal disjunctivism.  
 
3.3 The Argument from Local Supervenience 
 
For those lacking the intuition that reflectively indiscriminable ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experiences 
share perceptual objective phenomenal character, Hellie (2007: 271) deploys a version of The 
Argument from Local Supervenience (e.g. Foster 2000: 25; Robinson 1994: 151; Smith 2005: 198-
9) which seeks to resurrect Spreading by exploiting what he claims are two pre-theoretical 
intuitions about the causal relationship between electrochemical brain activity (e.g. particular 
patterns of neuronal and synaptic firings) and phenomenal character.82 The first intuition – 
described as “intuitive bedrock” (Hawthorne 2004: 352) and “self-evident” (Horgan & Tienson 
2002: n.23) – that Hellie invites us to accept is,  
 
(1) Phenomenal Internalism: “… the phenomenal character of an experience is 
necessitated […] by the physiological features of the brain of the subject 
undergoing the experience.” (2007: 271) 
 
This encapsulates the thought that phenomenal properties such as seeing purple or hearing gunfire 
                                                     
82 Since Hellie treats subjective and objective phenomenal character as being reductively identical, I will simply 
speak of phenomenal character in this section. 
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are intrinsic properties of experiencing subjects, i.e. properties that constitutively depend 
upon physical processes and events occurring within the experiencing subject. This means that 
it is metaphysically impossible for intrinsic physical duplicates to have experiences that differ in 
phenomenal character. Phenomenal Internalism can thus be re-stated as, 
 
(1) Phenomenal Internalism: For any two experiencing subjects S1 and S2: 
Necessarily, if S1 and S2 are intrinsic physical duplicates, their experiences 
are of phenomenal type F. (Premise) 
 
Hellie drives Phenomenal Internalism by appeal to the ‘armchair’ intuition that, in an 
experiencing subject, there exists some complete causal-physical condition that is minimally 
sufficient for the instantiation of an experience with that type of phenomenal character, and 
specifically, a perceptual phenomenal character. This is why we find Robinson claiming that a 
“certain brain state” is nomologically sufficient for “seeing a table against a wall” (1994: 151) 
and Smith insisting that “activity [in] the optic nerve” suffices for seeing “something green in a 
genuinely sensory manner” (2005: 203). As Hellie and friends tell it then, a perceptual 
experience’s phenomenal character locally supervenes upon electrochemical properties of the 
subject’s brain, and so, is not relationally sensitive to its external distal cause(s). 
 
The second intuition that Hellie invites us to accept is, 
 
(2)  Modal Claim: “… for any possible experience (at least any experience in a 
subject with a brain) a duplicate of the experiencing brain could be 
undergoing neither veridical nor illusory experience.” (ibid) 
 
Or more precisely, 
 
(2)  Modal Claim: For any perceptual experience EP had by a subject S (where S 
has a brain), it is metaphysically possible that an intrinsic physical duplicate of 
S’s brain could be having a hallucinatory experience EH.
83 (Premise) 
 
Here, we are offered a thought-experiment which appeals to the intuition that, for any subject 
enjoying perceptual experiences in the actual world, it is metaphysically possible that there 
                                                     
83 Though Hellie’s argument and the Argument from Explanatory Screening Off exploit hallucinations, my answer to 
both applies to all ‘Bad’ experiences. 
105 
 
exists an intrinsic physical duplicate of her brain that, when suitably stimulated (say, by a 
powerful artificial intelligence that feeds it electrical impulses as depicted in ‘The Matrix’) 
could hallucinate. 
 
Conjoining Phenomenal Internalism and the Modal Claim clearly spells trouble for (I.D): For if a 
perceptual experience’s phenomenal character locally supervenes upon the subject’s internal 
physical constitution, and if her brain duplicate is hallucinating, then it too must be having a 
phenomenally type-identical experience – indeed, it is said to be intuitively obvious that “a 
physical duplicate of oneself would also be a phenomenal duplicate of oneself” (Horgan, Tienson 
& Graham 2004: 302) and that my brain duplicate would “would have to undergo the same 
conscious experience I undergo” (Kriegel 2009: 79). In this way, Hellie resurrects, 
 
(3) Spreading*: For any two experiencing subjects S1 and S2 (where S1 is a subject 
in the actual world having a perceptual experience EP and S2 an envatted-brain 
having an hallucinatory experience EH): Necessarily, if S1 and S2 are intrinsic 
physical duplicates, EP and EH are of phenomenal type F, where F is 
perceptual.84 ((1) & (2), Instance of Spreading, negation of Imaginative 
Disjunctivism) 
 
Hallucinations thus turns out to be ‘Bad’ perceptual experiences, and so, not p-imaginings.  
 
I have no objections to the Modal Claim. But Hellie’s attempt to establish Phenomenal Internalism 
from the armchair is not a dialectically effective, or as he claims, “a straightforward way” 
(2007: 271) to establish Spreading* since it begs the question (e.g. Allen 2014: 12; Fish 2009: 
121) against the Naïve Realist’s thought that worldly object-property couples or non-causal 
conditions “can form part of the [experience’s] causal nexus” (Martin 2006: 16) i.e. the thought 
that a ‘Good’ experience’s phenomenal character does not narrowly supervene upon the 
internal configuration of the subject, but rather, widely supervenes upon those worldly object-
property couples with which she is directly acquainted. Thus, when you see a mango, your 
‘Good’ experience’s phenomenal character widely supervenes upon your neurophysical state, 
the mango, and all of the phenomenal properties that you are directly aware of can belong to 
                                                     
84 The argument standardly proceeds by reasoning that, since the experience had by the hallucinating brain lacks 
any naïve properties (the Modal Claim thus plays the role of Base in the original p.m.e), and since hallucinatory and 
‘Good’ experiences are phenomenally type-identical mental states, naïve realism is false. I do not consider this 
extra move since, as we will see, it is sufficient to block Spreading* by blocking Phenomenal Internalism. 
106 
 
the mango itself. 
 
Here I am in agreement with Martin, who thinks that, 
 
“[…] when one is veridically perceiving the objects of perception are constituents 
of the experiential episode. The given event could not have occurred without 
these entities existing and being constituents of it; in turn, one could not have had 
such a kind of event without there being relevant candidate objects of perception to be 
apprehended.” (2004: 56, my emphasis) 
 
Our thought is that a perceptual experience’s phenomenal character constitutively depends 
upon the “entities” or external distal causes that are involved in its production; hence there is 
no reason to suppose.that a ‘Good’ experience’s phenomenal character must locally supervene 
upon the internal configuration of the subject. What makes your visual experience of a mango 
perceptual is the actual presence of the mango within your immediate environment; remove 
that, and you enter a different type of mental state. 
 
Hellie’s problem then, is that no independent argument has been provided for the background 
assumption upon which Phenomenal Internalism rests. This is, 
 
(1.a) Same-Cause Same Phenomenal Character Thesis: Necessarily, if experiences E1 
and E2 are produced by the same proximate neural cause, then E1 and E2 are 
of phenomenal type F. (Background assumption) 
 
Let E1 be my present ‘Good’ experience and E2 be my brain duplicate’s hallucination. Naïve 
realism’s disjunctivist stratagem (§2.1) entails that, since E1’s phenomenal character constitutively 
depends upon the.presence of worldly objects within my immediate environment, and since 
there are no such objects to relationally determine E2’s phenomenal character, my brain 
duplicate cannot be having the same phenomenal type of experience that I am now having, 
viz., perceptual. As E2’s phenomenal character cannot be intrinsically perceptual, it cannot be 
straightforwardly denied that my brain duplicate is p-imagining.85 
 
The view that I am espousing is thus, 
 
                                                     
85 The lingering worry that phenomenal internalism remains ‘intuitively obvious’ is addressed below. 
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Phenomenal Externalism: For any two experiencing S1 and S2 (where S1 and S2 are 
intrinsic physical duplicates): If the external distal cause of S1’s experience E1 is 
worldly-object, oW, and if the external distal cause of S2’s experience E2 is not 
oW, then it is metaphysically possible that E1 and E2 are tokens of different 
phenomenal types. (Negation of Phenomenal Internalism, metaphysical 
commitment of Naïve Realism and Imaginative Disjunctivism) 
 
Hellie and friends will surely complain that the claim non-causal conditions are necessary for 
the occurrence of perceptual experience is a flagrant violation of intuition. But this complaint 
is only effective if Phenomenal Externalism is obviously counterintuitive. And it is not (e.g. 
Mehta 2013; Tye forthcoming). Consider Nonvert on Earth where the sky is blue and Invert 
on inverted-Earth where the sky is yellow, where Nonvert and Invert are exact molecular 
duplicates, i.e. type-identical with respect to their internal physical constitution. Since 
Nonvert and Invert are intrinsic physical duplicates, their brain states are identical as they look 
skywards. In this scenario, it is not obviously counterintuitive that Nonvert and Invert are 
having phenomenally type-distinct experiences of the sky because their brain states are 
appropriately caused by different external colours. Similarly, it is not obviously 
counterintuitive that I am having a perceptual experience and my hallucinating brain duplicate 
is p-imagining because our brain states are appropriately caused by different things. 
 
This is no mere stand-off between internalist and externalist intuitions: For if Phenomenal 
Internalism is really “not open to serious question” (Smith 2005: 203), then the 
counterintuitiveness of naïve realism’s externalist conception of phenomenal character ought 
to be immediately self-evident, and it is not. There is nothing obviously counterintuitive about 
(I.D)’s supposition that two intrinsic physical duplicates, one having ‘Good’ perceptual 
experiences and one hallucinating, are in phenomenally type-distinct mental states because 
only the former’s experiences are relationally determined and intrinsically constituted by 
worldly items.  
 
In fact, it strikes me that an armchair argument more plausibly motivates Phenomenal 
Externalism. Consider this case: I am now alert, cognitively well-functioning, and looking at a 
paperweight on my desk in good light. When I confine myself to introspective reflection and 
ignore anything empirical that I know about the causal relationship between brain states and 
phenomenal character, intuition dictates that my experience’s phenomenally apparent 
properties such as translucent-ness and spherical-ness seem to be instantiated in front of me by a 
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particular worldly object and not ‘inside my head’ by neural activity. If this is not sufficiently 
convincing, then I invite you to similarly reflect upon your present visual experience’s 
phenomenally apparent properties whilst focusing on some object and see if you can 
changeethem simply by looking at something else (I’ll wager the ten coins that you don’t know 
about in my pocket that you can). And this naïve realist intuition entails Phenomenal Externalism 
because my intrinsic physical duplicate could be related to different physical (if not in my 
immediate environment) or mental (if hallucinating) items.   
 
At this stage, Hellie and friends might argue that Phenomenal Internalism best explains some 
well-established empirical correlations between particular phenomenal properties and certain 
brain states. For instance, in humans, there is a strong positive correlation (e.g. Bartels & Zeki 
2000; Lueck et al. 1989) between neural activity in the ventral occipitotemporal cortex (visual 
area V4) and colour perception, with significant damage to this area causing a condition called 
cerebral achromatopsia in which the world is experienced as varying shades of grey. Similarly, 
there is a strong positive correlation (e.g. Kourtzi & Kanwisher 2001; Spiridon et al. 2006) 
between neural activity in the lateral occipital complex (an area within the ‘ventral stream’) 
and shape perception, with significant damage to this area causing a condition called visual form 
agnosia in which subjects cannot recognize, and discriminate between, bounded shapes. These 
neural correlates of colour and shape experience suggest that there are fairly well-defined 
functional areas within the brain that are nomologically necessary for the occurrence of our 
colour and shape experiences. 
 
That there are neural correlates of shape and colour experiences suggests that it is empirically 
plausible that neuroscientists will eventually discover even more detailed correlations between 
neurophysical states and perceptual phenomenal properties: specifically, the empirically 
plausible thought is that the instantiation of any phenomenal property within a particular 
perceptual experience is nomologically necessitated by a certain type of neurophysical state, 
i.e. a certain type of neurophysical state is sufficient for the perceptual experience of a 
particular phenomenal property. Call this the Sufficiency of Neural Correlation Thesis: 
 
Sufficiency of Neural Correlation Thesis: For every perceptual phenomenal property 
P (where P is experienced by a subject S with a brain), there is some type of 
neurophysical state, N, such that N is nomologically sufficient for the 
instantiation of P. (Metaphysical commitment of Phenomenal Internalism) 
 
109 
 
For instance, it might be said (to keep things simple) that there is some particular neuronal 
firing pattern within V4 that is nomologically sufficient for the existence of the phenomenal 
property purple-ness within my perceptual experience’s phenomenal character. My 
hallucinating brain-duplicate must thus be having.a phenomenally type-identical experience of 
purple-ness, and so, not p-imagining. 
 
The Sufficiency of Neural Correlation Thesis can be resisted by exploiting Robinson’s (1994: 70) 
distinction between a generative and selective story of the role that neural activity plays in 
perceptual experience. On the phenomenal internalist’s generative account, neural activity is 
singly sufficient to generate perceptual phenomenal character (hence her intuition that 
envatted-brains can have ‘Bad’ perceptual experiences); whereas on the selective account that I 
favour, neural activity does not generate perceptual phenomenal character, but rather, enables 
“the subject to experience particular external objects” (Campbell 2002: 118)86, the perceptible 
properties of which then relationally determine and intrinsically constitute just that 
phenomenal character. 
 
The claim now is that some particular neuronal firing pattern within V4 correlates with the 
existence of the phenomenal property purple-ness within my experience’s phenomenal 
character because that pattern enables me to ‘latch’ onto, or detect, a worldly instance of 
purple-ness which just is the purple-ness of which I am phenomenally aware. We might see the 
brain as functioning somewhat like a weather radar: Just as a weather radar is attuned to select 
and detect meteorological phenomena (e.g. specific areas of the screen ‘light up’ in 
characteristic ways when thunderstorm activity is detected), so the brain is attuned to select 
and detect perceptible properties of worldly objects, with neurons in specific areas ‘lighting 
up’ in characteristic ways when those properties are experientially detected. 
 
Construing the neuronal processes involved in perception as being selective allows (I.D) to 
adequately explain the neural correlates of consciousness. For the thought now is that the 
purple-ness of which I am directly aware is not an intrinsic property that is generated by 
particular neuronal firing pattern within V4: instead, it is that this neuronal activity selects and 
detects a worldly instance of purple-ness within my immediate environment; hence, significant 
damage to V4 will naturally impair the brain’s ability to process incoming information about 
colour. This selective account is thus a natural extension of my earlier claim (§1.1.2) that a 
subject’s perceptual abilities partly determine the naïve properties that figure in her 
                                                     
86 Similar remarks can be found in e.g. Gibson (1966: 267); Matthen (2005: 13); and Zeki (1993: 241). 
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experience’s phenomenal character. 
 
The selective account can intelligibly resist Spreading*: For if a ‘Good’ perceptual experience 
can only occur relative to a non-causal background condition (i.e. the presence of some 
candidate worldly object in the subject’s immediate environment), and if that condition does 
not occur in hallucination, it cannot be straightforwardly denied that hallucinations are p-
imaginings. Although the best empirical explanation of the neural correlates of consciousness is 
strictly neutral between the Phenomenal Internalist’s generative account and my selective 
account, I submit that it is ultimately intuition which tips the balance in favourrof the latter. 
 
3.3.1 The Argument from Explanatory Screening Off 
 
Hellie and friends have one weapon left in the form of the Argument from Explanatory Screening 
Off (e.g. Martin 2004: 46; Sollberger 2008: 12-16) which objects that (I.D)’s positive 
characterization of hallucination has the undesirable consequence of ‘screening off’ a ‘Good’ 
experience’s naïve properties from constitutively explaining its phenomenal character, and 
hence, explaining its remarkable features. Their argument begins from the prima facie 
intuitively plausible claim that the occurrence of a hallucination and its assumed p-imagined 
phenomenal character is nomologically necessitated by electrochemical properties of the 
subject’s brain. Hence, 
 
 (1) Local Supervenience of Hallucination Thesis: For any hallucinatory experience EH 
had by a subject S, there is some type of neurophysical state, N, in S, such 
that N is minimally sufficient for the occurrence of EH, and the instantiation 
of EH’s p-imagined phenomenal character. (Assumption) 
 
Driving premise (1) is the argument that, since hallucinating subjects take themselves to be 
having perceptual experiences (Perceptual Assumption), and since hallucinatory experiences are 
neither intrinsically world-involving nor world-acquainting mental states (Standard 
Hallucination Thesis), the only condition that is necessary for the occurrence of a hallucinatory 
experience with a p-imagined phenomenal character is that a particular neurophysical state 
occurs within the subject. 
 
Their next move is, 
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(2) Converse Modal Claim: For any two subjects S1 and S2 (where S1 is having a 
hallucinatory experience EH and S2 a Good experience EG): It is 
metaphysically possible that the neurophysical state, N, that is minimally 
sufficient for the occurrence of EH, and the instantiation of EH’s p-imagined 
phenomenal character, can occur in S2. (Premise)  
 
For instance, if a certain type of neurophysical state is realized within the envatted-brain is 
minimally sufficient for the occurrence of its p-imagined hallucination as of a mango, then it is 
metaphysically possible that that same state is somehow realized within me when I am having a 
‘Good’ experience of a mango.  
 
Conjoining the Local Supervenience of Hallucination Thesis and the Converse Modal Claim spells 
trouble for (I.D). For if the p-imagined phenomenal character of the envatted brain’s 
hallucinatory experience is a locally supervenient property, and if that state occurs within me 
when I am having a ‘Good’ experience, then I too must, or so the story goes, be having a 
phenomenally type-identical experience, viz. p-imagined. In other words, the Local 
Supervenience of Hallucination Thesis and the Converse Modal Claim are conjoined to resurrect, 
 
(3) Spreading*: For any two experiencing subjects S1 and S2 (where S1 is having a 
p-imagined hallucinatory experience EH and S2 a Good experience EG): 
Necessarily, if S1 and S2 are in the same type of neurophysical state, N (where 
N is minimally sufficient for the for the occurrence of EH, and the 
instantiation of its p-imagined phenomenal character), EH and EG are of 
phenomenal type F, where F is p-imagined. (Instance of Spreading, 
Metaphysical implication of (1) & (2)) 
 
A ‘Good’ experience’s naïve properties are now rendered epiphenomenal: For if a subjects p-
imaginings are sufficient to explain why her hallucinatory experience as of a mango has that 
phenomenal character, and in turn, certain remarkable features; then, if the phenomenal 
character of my ‘Good’ experience of a mango has those p-imaginings, they too must be 
sufficient to explain why it has that phenomenal character, and in turn, certain remarkable 
features. In this way, Hellie and friends arrive at: 
 
(4)  Principle of Explanatory Screening Off: For any two experiencing subjects S1 and 
S2, where S1 is having a hallucinatory experience EH and S2 is having a Good 
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experience EG: If EH and EG are phenomenally typed by p-imaginings IP1, IP2 
… IPN, then IP1, IP2 … IPN screen off any of EG’s naïve properties PN1, PN2 … 
PNN from constitutively explaining its phenomenal character, and hence, its 
remarkable features.87 (Metaphysical implication of (3)) 
 
I reject the Local Supervenience of Hallucination Thesis on the grounds that an additional condition 
is necessary for the occurrence of a hallucinatory experience: namely, the absence of any 
candidate worldly object within the hallucinator’s immediate environment to relationally 
determine and intrinsically constitute its phenomenal character88 – I am thus in agreement 
with Allen who claims that hallucinatory experience “depends both on the subject’s 
neurophysiological state and the absence of the object” (2014: 14, my emphasis). Our thought 
is that just as a ‘Good’ experience’s phenomenal character widely supervenes upon the internal 
configuration of the subject and the presence of some candidate worldly object within her 
immediate environment, so conversely, a hallucinatory experience’s phenomenal character 
widely supervenes upon the internal configuration of the subject and the absence of some 
candidate worldly object within her immediate environment, e.g. the occurrence of my 
mango-hallucination is nomologically necessitated by my being in a certain type of 
neurophysical state and theaabsence of a mango as opposed to, say, an apple within my 
immediate environment. 
 
Our suggestion can intelligibly resist Spreading*: For if a p-imagined hallucinatory experience 
can only occur relative to a non-causal background condition (i.e. the absence of some 
candidate worldly object in the subject’s immediate environment), and if that condition does 
not occur in ‘Good’ experience (since the candidate worldly object is present), then those p-
imaginings which type its phenomenal character cannot ‘spread’ themselves over to ‘Good’ 
                                                     
87 Though this conclusion does not flatly negate naïve realism, we can reasonably doubt that ‘Good’ experience, if 
naïve properties are explanatorily redundant, is intrinsically world-involving and world-acquainting. 
88 The Negative Disjunctivist denies this, and thus allows that the same kind of experience which occurs during 
hallucination also occurs during ‘Good’ experience, where what occurs during hallucination does not screen off 
naïve properties from playing their distinctive explanatory role. For Martin (2004: 68) this is because there is no 
more to hallucination than the negative epistemic property of being reflectively indiscriminable from some causally 
matching ‘Good’ experience, and so, reflective indiscriminability’s explanatory power is entirely inherited from the 
property of being that ‘Good’ experience. For Fish (2009: 94) this is because hallucinations lack objective 
phenomenal character, with hallucinating subjects forming the false belief that it is like something to hallucinate. 
This tack is unappealing since, as I have argued, it comes at the unacceptable cost of being unable to explain the 
remarkable features of hallucinations.  
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experience, and hence, screen off naïve properties from playing their distinctive explanatory 
role. 
 
“Not so quick”, Hellie and friends will reply, “Your supposition that [objective] phenomenal 
characters are relationally sensitive to the absence or presence of worldly objects 
problematically.entails ‘spooky’ action at a distance”; hence Foster’s insistence that 
experiences contain “no physical record” (2000: 28)  of their external distal causes and 
Robinson demanding to know how a “table, when present, [can] inhibit the production of [a p-
imagining] by some sort of action at a distance” (1994: 154)..It is, they say, plainly 
counterintuitive to suppose that a spatially remote cause (viz., a candidate absent object) can 
somehow ‘leap frog’ past a proximate neural cause to relationally determine a hallucinatory 
experience’s phenomenal type. Lurking behind this objection is the following causal principle: 
 
(CP) For any experience E had by a subject S at time t: If E’s distal cause cD does 
not causally effect S’s neurophysical state, N, at t, then cD cannot 
relationally.determine E’s phenomenal type. 
 
Suppose that I have a hallucinatory experience (EH) as of a mango in front of me at time T1 and 
a ‘Good’ experience (EG) of a mango in front of me at time T2, and that I am in the same 
neurophysical.state at T1 and T2. The objection is that my supposition that the presence or 
absence of a mango within my immediate environment did not causally affect my 
neurophysical state at either T1 or T2 is flatly inconsistent with my supposition that EH and EG 
differ in phenomenal type. For my supposition that a mango’s absence makes EH a p-imagining 
and its presence makes EG a ‘Good’ experience unacceptably entails that an experience’s 
spatially remote.cause can ‘bypass’ its proximate neural cause to relationally determine its 
phenomenal type. As ‘spooky’ action at a distance has no serious place in explaining the nature 
of mental states89, it is concluded that Spreading* stands. 
 
Though I have argued that denying (CP)’s consequent is neither obviously counterintuitive 
nor.empirically consistent (§3.3), this objection does push me towards further clarifying how 
the same neurophysical state can occur within me when I am having a hallucinatory experience 
as of a mango in front of me (EH) and when having the corresponding ‘Good’ experience (EG) 
without EH and EG being phenomenally type-identical mental states. Lockard (2008: 107) 
provides an illuminative analogy. Imagine a country which uses genuine photographs of the 
                                                     
89 Burge (2005) forcefully argues this point. 
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king as its currency, where every such photograph is worth one ‘Pictodollar.’ Now, consider 
two situations: first, someone takes a photograph of the king, and thus has one Pictodollar 
(Pictodollar #1); and second, that the king is absent but the camera’s shutter fires just as rays 
of light strike its lens in exactly the same pattern as before, where this physical activity 
produces a photographic image that has exactly the same physical properties as Pictodollar #1 
– call this physical duplicate ‘Pseudodollar.’ In this scenario, Pictodollar #1 and Pseudodollar 
are produced by the same proximate causes (since the same patterns of light entered the 
camera, which operated in the same way on both occasions) but do not share any monetary 
properties (trivially, since Pseudodollar has no such properties).    
 
This scenario does not obviously involve action at a distance. In the first situation, the king’s 
presence before the camera was not a causal prerequisite of the camera’s ability to produce a 
piece of paper with certain physical properties (e.g. a certain pattern of colour upon its 
surface) since a piece of paper with the same physical properties was produced by the same 
proximate cause when the king was absent. But, and this is the important point, the king’s 
presence before the camera is a non-causal constitutive condition on the production of 
Pictodollar #1, i.e. the monetary properties of pieces of paper within this community 
constitutively depend upon this purely distal condition. 
 
I claim that a ‘Good’ experience’s phenomenal type is analogous to Pictodollar #1 in the 
sense.that, just as Pictodollar #1’s monetary properties constitutively depend upon the 
presence of the king before the camera, so a ‘Good’ experience’s phenomenal type 
constitutively.depends upon the presence of a candidate worldly object within the subject’s 
immediate environment: Conversely, just as Pseudodollar’s not having monetary properties 
constitutively depends upon the absence of the king before the camera, so a ‘Bad’ experience’s 
phenomenal type constitutively depends upon the absence of a candidate worldly object within 
the subject’s immediate environment. Pictodollar #1 and Psuedodollar were produced by the 
same proximate causes, and I likewise allow that the same neurophysical state occurred within 
me during my mango-hallucination (EH) and corresponding ‘Good’ experience (EG). But just 
as the intrinsic physical similarities between Pictodollar #1 and Psuedodollar do not entail that 
they are of the.same monetary type, so the neurophysical similarities between EH and EG do not 
entail that they are of the same phenomenal type, i.e. have the same objective phenomenal 
character. That is, EH and EG can have the same proximate cause but differ in phenomenal type 
since their objective phenomenal characters constitutively depend upon different non-causal 
conditions. 
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The residual question remains of why it is plausible that the absence of a mango within my 
immediate environment plausibly.makes my hallucination a p-imagining rather than an 
experience of another phenomenal type. The answer is surely that p-imagining (and indeed, 
imagining simpliciter) is a mode of consciousness by which objects appear to us as absent or 
non-existent; hence Hobbes characterized the imagination as “nothing else but sense decaying, 
or weakened, by.the absence of the object” (1654: §25.7) and Sartre spoke of objects that are 
“given to intuition as absent” (1948: 18). I do not mean that what is p-imagined is spatially 
absent: clearly, we often see spatially remote objects such as astronomical bodies and distant 
ships on the horizon; conversely, we cease to see spatially proximate objects when we close 
our eyes. The point is that what is p-imagined has no determinate spatio-temporal location at 
all (even if that is.how things seem): when I close my eyes and imagine seeing the present 
scene, the objects of.my p-imagining have no intrinsic spatial relatedness to either myself or 
that of other worldly objects unlike those that I see when I re-open my eyes. 
 
The state of play is now this: since a.hallucinatory experience widely supervenes upon the 
absence of any candidate worldly object, and since a ‘Good’ experience widely supervenes 
upon the presence of a candidate worldly object, the type of mental state that occurs when 
hallucinating cannot occur when having the corresponding ‘Good’ experience; hence a ‘Good’ 
experience’s naïve properties can constitutively explain its phenomenal character. Because 
there is no general reason to assume that the conditions upon which the cause of an 
experience’s phenomenal character depends must be proximate neural conditions, we need 
not be troubled that my picture entails ‘spooky’ action at a distance. Finally, since 
hallucinatory experiences and p-imaginings are modes of consciousness of absent objects, it 
remains plausible that.hallucinatory experiences are typed by p-imaginings. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have claimed that the objective phenomenal characters of ‘Bad’ experiences 
are typed by perception-like imaginings that can convincingly simulate the objective 
phenomenal characters of metaphysically possible ‘Good’ experiences, where these p-
imaginings are (probably) constitutively non-conceptual and quasi-pictorial. I then defended 
my story of p-imagining against two objections: First, I answered The Argument from Force and 
Vivacity by arguing that there is no obvious conceptual or empirical reason for denying that p-
imaginings can have a world-presenting phenomenology in virtue of which they are reflectively 
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indiscriminable from ‘Good’ experiences; and second, I answered The Argument from the Will by 
arguing that direct, or mental, subjection to the will is not a necessary condition on p-
imagining. I then defended my story of phenomenal disjunctivism against two.objections: 
First, I answered The Argument from Local Supervenience by arguing that there are no obvious 
conceptual or empirical reasons for denying that ‘Good’ and hallucinatory experiences are 
phenomenally type-distinct mental states since the former widely supervenes upon the 
presence of worldly items; and second, I answered The Argument from Explanatory Screening Off 
by arguing that since ‘Good’ and hallucinatory experiences have different jointly necessary and 
sufficient conditions for their occurrence, those p-imaginings which phenomenally type the 
latter cannot then screen off the former’s naïve properties from playing their distinctive 
explanatory role. 
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4 
Imaginative Disjunctivism and Dreaming 
 
In this chapter, I explain and defend the claim that the objective phenomenal characters of 
dreams are p-imaginings which are presented to consciousness (usually90) during sleep. I begin 
by showing how (I.D) can answer the p.m.e qua dreaming (§4.1) and explain the remarkable 
features of dreams (§4.1.1). Two rival theories are then discussed and rejected. The first 
(§4.2) is the received view (e.g. Russell 1948: 214; Sebastián 2014) according to which dreams 
are ‘Bad’ belief-causing perceptual experiences that (usually) occur during sleep. I reject the 
received view by first (§4.2.1) sketching five considerations that collectively tell against the claim 
that dreams are perceptual experiences; and second (§4.2.2), by arguing that dream beliefs 
cannot be real beliefs since they have radically different properties from waking beliefs91 – I 
then suggest that dreamers have belief-like imaginings, i.e. the imaginative analogues of real 
beliefs (e.g. Currie & Ravenscroft 2002: 12; Ichikawa 2009: 111). This claim is then defended 
(§4.2.3) against.the worry that only real beliefs can explain our emotional responses to dreams 
(e.g. Beuno 2009: 199; McGinn 2004: 112). 
 
The second rival theory is the dream fabrication view (§4.3, §4.3.1) according to which dreams 
are nothing more than false memories of real experiences that were not presented to 
consciousness during sleep (e.g. Dennett 1976; Stoneham 2013). I reject the dream fabrication 
view by arguing first (§4.3.2) that (I.D).is.not, contra Dennett’s insistence, forced to ascribe 
implausible precognitive powers to dreamers in order to explain anecdotal reports of dream 
incorporation; and second (§4.3.3), that (I.D) has a more convincing explanation of two 
phenomenological characteristics of reported lucid dreams, viz., their first-person and temporally 
extended phenomenology. I conclude that as (I.D) has wider explanatory scope than both the 
received view and the dream fabrication view, it remains the preferred theory of dreaming. 
 
4.1 Imaginative Disjunctivism and the Problem of Dreaming 
                                                     
90 I discuss lucid dreams in §4.3.3. Until then, I will simply speak of dreaming, understood as incorporating non-
lucid and lucid dreams. 
91 The objection that treating dreams and ‘Good’ experiences as being phenomenally type-identical mental states 
(viz., perceptual) banishes naïve realism gets no grip since friends of the received view are unlikely to be Naïve 
Realist’s in the first place – indeed, they are likely to exploit this claimed type-identity to raise familiar sceptical 
worries. I thus take this assumption for granted and argue instead that it cannot convincingly explain various 
features of dreams. 
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(I.D)’s first, and most straightforward, task is to answer Hellie’s p.m.e qua dreaming without 
spreading p-imaginings over to all ‘Good’ experience. First, since it is what the existence of 
dreams are said to threaten, we can assume: 
 
(1) Naïve Realism: For all subjects s: If s has a non-misleading experience ENM, 
then (i) ENM’s subjective and objective phenomenal character is intrinsically 
constituted by the same naïve properties PN1, PN2 … PNN, and, (ii) s stands in a 
direct sui generis acquaintance relation r to a worldly object, ow’s, perceptible 
properties PP1, PP2 … PPN, where PP1, PP2 … PPN, directly metaphysically 
ground ENM’s naïve properties PN1, PN2 … PNN.
  
 
And since, or so I claim, the objective phenomenal characters of dreams essentially consist in 
p-imaginings, we can also assume: 
 
(2) Base*: For all subjects s: If a subject s has a dream experience ED, then ED’s 
objective phenomenal character is typed by p-imaginings IP1, IP2 … IPN. 
(Positive instance of Base) 
 
My objector now points out that the phenomenal appearances of dreams lack any property (or 
properties) in virtue of which dreamers can reflectively discriminate them from the 
phenomenal appearances of metaphysically possible ‘Good’ experiences, or vice-versa, e.g. 
consider Plato’s remark that the phenomenal appearances in both cases “precisely correspond” 
(360BC: 158b-d), or the common experience of waking and thinking “How could I have been 
fooled into thinking that?” – Answer: Because I could not reflectively discriminate my dream 
from that of some corresponding ‘Good’ experience). Hence, 
 
 (3) Reflective Indiscriminability*: For all subjects s: It is phenomenally 
possible that s cannot reflectively discriminate between (i) a Good 
experience EG’s phenomenal appearance from some metaphysically possible 
dream experience ED’s phenomenal appearance, and, (ii) a dream experience 
ED’s phenomenal appearance from some metaphysically possible Good 
experience EG’s phenomenal appearance. (Instance of Reflective 
Indiscriminability) 
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In a familiar move, my objector now argues that, since reflectively indiscriminable experiences 
are tokens of the same phenomenal type, and since it is non-controversial that dreams and 
‘Good’ experiences are reflectively indiscriminable, Spreading vis-à-vis dreaming is true. 
Hence,  
 
(4) Spreading*: For all subjects s: If s cannot reflectively discriminate (i) a Good 
experience EG’s phenomenal appearance from some possible dream 
experience ED’s phenomenal appearance, or, (ii) a dream experience ED’s 
phenomenal appearance from some possible Good experience EG’s 
phenomenal appearance, then EG and ED are of phenomenal type F. 
(Abductive implication of (3), instance of Spreading) 
 
And since Base* tells us that dreams are phenomenally typed by p-imaginings, it is concluded 
that ‘Good’ experiences must also be phenomenally typed by p-imaginings. 
 
As expected, (I.D) blocks the prima facie abductive move from Reflective Indiscriminability* 
to Spreading* by replacing the latter with, 
 
(5) Imaginative Disjunctivism*: For all subjects s:  
 
(i) If s has a Good experience EG, then EG’s objective phenomenal character is of 
type F, where F is naïve realist; or,  
 
(ii) If s has a dream experience ED, then ED’s objective phenomenal character is of 
type G, where G is p-imagined. (Instance of Imaginative Disjunctivism) 
 
Naïve realism, if it is to be toppled, is not to be toppled by the non-naïve realist spectre of 
dreams.  
 
4.1.1 Imaginative Disjunctivism and The Remarkable Features of Dreams 
 
(I.D)’s second task is to satisfactorily meet Sturgeon’s Adequacy Condition on dreaming, which 
is,  
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Adequacy Condition*: A theory t of experience is explanatorily adequate iff t 
explains why a Good experience EG and dream experience ED are (i) reflectively 
indiscriminable (EG ≡  RI ED) (ii) scene-immediate (EG ≡ SI ED) (iii) subjectively 
equivalent (EG ≡ SE ED) (iv) rationally equivalent (EG ≡ RE ED), and, (iv) behaviourally 
equivalent (EG ≡ BE ED). (Instance of Adequacy Condition) 
 
At this early stage, I am not claiming that (I.D) can explain features (i)-(v) better than its 
rivals92, only that, if dreams are p-imaginings, then (I.D) can consistently explain their 
remarkable features. 
 
Beginning with dream scene-immediacy, I claim that when, 
 
(1)  A subject s has a dream experience ED which is phenomenally scene-
immediate. 
 
It is because, 
 
(2)  ED’s objective phenomenal character is typed by p-imaginings IP1, IP2 … IPN, 
where IP1, IP2 … IPN are phenomenally scene-immediate. 
 
Here is a simple argument: p-imaginings, as I have argued (§3.2), convincingly simulate the 
objective phenomenal characters of metaphysically possible ‘Good’ experiences; the objective 
phenomenal characters of ‘Good’ experiences are phenomenally scene-immediate, i.e. 
subjects are immediately presented with naïve properties; so, if dreams are phenomenally 
typed by p-imaginings, then they too must be phenomenally scene-immediate. Though I think 
this is essentially correct, something must be said about from where the scene-immediacy of p-
imaginings springs. I suggest that it jointly springs from their attention-dependence (i.e. the fact 
that what is p-imagined constitutively depends upon the subject’s attention (e.g. Thomas, 
2014: 151) and world-presenting phenomenology. 
 
Try this simple test. Focus upon this page and try to imagine seeing a banana. Now, look at 
something else whilst attempting to sustain your imagining. I suspect that you will fail (at least, 
                                                     
92 Friends of the received view can simply say that since ‘Good’ perceptual experiences have remarkable features, 
perceptual dream experiences obviously have remarkable features. This theoretically simple story is undercut, or 
so I will argue (§4.2.1, §4.2.2) by the received view’s wider implausibility. 
121 
 
what happens when I attempt this is that the object of my imagining vanishes). Or try to focus 
on just one aspect of the ‘banana’ in something like the way that you can attentionally isolate 
this sentence on the page. I suspect that what happens now is that the original ‘banana’ is 
replaced by a new imagining of part of a banana. In neither case did the object of your 
imagining survive these mental shifts of attention.93 And its attention-dependent nature 
conceptually entails that it was presented to consciousness in some scene-immediate way since 
it is nonsensical to speak of imaginatively attending to that which has no immediate mental 
presence. 
 
Thus far we have a scene-immediacy but not the world-presenting scene-immediacy 
characteristic of dreams. This surely springs from the fact that, or so I have argued (§3.2), p-
imaginings have all the Humean force and vivacity or world-presentingness of ‘Good’ 
experiences. Conjoin this with the thought that it is the attention-dependent nature of p-
imaginings which secures a scene-immediacy, and it is unsurprising that, if dreams are p-
imaginings94, they too have a world-presenting scene-immediacy. 
 
I claim that this world-presenting scene-immediacy can secure dream reflective indiscriminability. 
That is, I claim that when, 
 
(1) A subject s has a dream experience ED which is reflectively indiscriminable 
from a Good experience EG.  
 
It is because, 
 
(2) ED’s objective phenomenal character is typed by p-imaginings IP1, IP2 … IPN, 
where IP1, IP2 … IPN convincingly simulate EG’s world-presenting scene-
immediate objective phenomenal character.95 
                                                     
93 This is plausibly why unwanted imaginings can be banished by performing voluntary physical actions that 
interrupt the subject’s mental attention (§3.2.1). 
94 Construing dreams as being attention-dependent p-imaginings nicely explains why (i) you cannot, within the 
dream, simultaneously have an experience of e.g. dragon slaying and thinking about tomorrow’s more mundane 
tasks (the dream demands too much of your mental attention), and, (ii) waking up destroys the dream (the 
external world now demands your mental attention). 
95 Hence another reason for the failure of Langsam-style disjunctivism to explain ‘Bad’ remarkable features: For it 
is not that reflective indiscriminability secures remaining remarkable features; rather, it is that a certain type of 
scene-immediacy (viz., world-presenting) is employed to secure reflective indiscriminability. And there is no 
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Suppose I dream that hungry p-zombies are charging towards me. If my dream is p-imagined, 
and if p-imaginings have a world-presenting scene-immediacy, it is unsurprising that I cannot – 
during my dream and when later recalling it – reflectively discriminate it from some 
corresponding ‘Good’ experience that likewise has a world-presenting scene-immediacy. 
 
Onto subjective equivalence, I claim that when, 
 
(1) A subject s has a dream experience ED which has a subjective perceptual 
phenomenal character. 
 
It is because, 
 
(2) ED’s objective phenomenal character is typed by p-imaginings IP1, IP2 … IPN, 
where IP1, IP2 … IPN have a subjective perceptual phenomenal character. 
 
My claim is simply this: Definitionally, p-imaginings have a subjective perceptual phenomenal 
character; so if dreams are p-imaginings, then they too must have subjective perceptual 
phenomenal characters. Thus, if my p-zombie dream really is p-imagined, then since my p-
imagining is a successful simulation of the corresponding ‘Good’ experience, it is unsurprising 
that it has a subjective perceptual phenomenal character – and even those who deny that (2) is 
(1)’s truth-maker do not deny that dreams have a subjective perceptual phenomenal character 
(indeed, this is what someone who denies that dreams are intrinsically perceptual must 
explain). 
 
Concerning rational equivalence, I want to distinguish between a strong and weak version. A 
proponent of the former claims that when, 
 
(1) A subject s has a dream experience ED which rationally occasions a belief that 
p.  
 
It is because, 
 
(2) ED’s objective phenomenal character is of phenomenal type F, where ED is a 
                                                                                                                                                                
objectionable Fish-y circularity here since p-imaginings are not remarkable features themselves. 
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particular token of F that rationally occasions s’s belief that p. 
 
The idea is that (2) is (1)’s truth-maker since the objective phenomenal characters of dreams 
are typed by something – standardly, a perceptual experience or perhaps a belief-causing 
imagining (e.g. McGinn, 2004: Ch.6) – that rationally occasions a real belief. I believe that p-
zombies are quarantined to philosophical fiction whilst awake; but when I dream that hungry 
p-zombies are chasing me, whatever ingredient fundamentally types my dream rationally 
occasions my real belief that hungry p-zombies are chasing me, or so the story standardly goes.   
 
Instead, I favour a weak rational equivalence which claims that when,   
 
(1) A subject s has a dream experience ED which seems to rationally occasion a 
belief that p. 
 
It is because, 
 
(2) ED’s objective phenomenal character is typed by p-imaginings IP1, IP2 … IPN, 
where IP1, IP2 … IPN rationally occasion s’s belief-like imagining that p. 
 
I claim that (2) is (1)’s truth-maker since p-imagined dreams can rationally occasion 
propositional or belief-like imaginings96 (i-beliefs), where the subject’s inability to reflectively 
discriminate her p-imagined dreams from their ‘Good’ counterparts that would rationally 
occasion the same real beliefs then grounds the erroneous intuition that dreams are strongly 
rationally equivalent to ‘Good’ experiences. When I dream that hungry p-zombies are chasing 
me, I am imagining seeing hungry p-zombies, and this p-imagining rationally occasions my i-
belief that I am in danger. But because I cannot reflectively discriminate my dream from the 
corresponding ‘Good’ experience that would rationally occasion the real belief that I am in 
danger, I mistakenly think that I really believed my dream97, or so my alternativepstory goes. 
 
                                                     
96 Introducing i-beliefs thus renders me what Liao & Doggett call a “cognitive splitter” (2014: 3); whereas 
“cognitive lumpers” (e.g. Langland-Hassan 2012) insist that imaginings produce real beliefs. I do not deny the 
latter claim (§6.1.1, §6.1.2), only that it is not a good model for dreams. 
97 The claim that there are situations in which subjects mistakenly think that they have real beliefs is surely no 
stranger than the claim that there are situations in which subjects mistakenly think that they are having perceptual 
experiences, given that real beliefs and perceptual experiences are mental states. 
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The main advantage of weak rational equivalence will emerge in (§4.2.1). Until then, I simply 
draw attention to the fact that whilst real beliefs have an action-guiding character, dreamers 
are rarely compelled to act out their dreams.98 I do not really leap out of bed and sprint from 
my bedroom when I dream that hungry p-zombies are chasing me, as I most likely would if I 
really believed that I am in danger of being devoured; hence, we have a prima facie case for 
denying strong rational equivalence.  
 
Onto behavioural equivalence. Again, it is fruitful to distinguish between a strong and weak 
version. A proponent of the former claims that when, 
 
(1)  A subject s has a dream experience ED which rationally occasions her action 
a. 
 
It is because, 
 
(2)  ED’s objective phenomenal character is of type F, where ED is a particular 
token of F that rationally occasions s’s action a. 
 
The idea is that (2) is (1)’s truth-maker since dreams are typed by something – standardly, a 
belief-causing perceptual experience that conjoins with the subject’s real desires, or perhaps an 
imagining that has motivational properties (e.g.Velleman 2000) – that rationally occasion 
actions. When I dream that hungry p-zombies are chasing me, whatever ingredient 
fundamentally types my dream rationally occasions my fleeing in reality, or so the story 
standardly goes. 
 
Now, dreams and ‘Good’ experiences are not usually strongly behaviourally equivalent since 
most subjects do not act out their dreams. For this reason, I favour a weak behavioural 
equivalence which claims that when,   
 
(1) A subject s has a dream experience ED which rationally occasions an imagined 
action. 
 
It is because, 
                                                     
98 Clearly, there is a physiological explanation of the dreamer’s near-paralysis; but here, I want to make sense of 
the dreamer’s mental state. 
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(2) S’s i-belief that p conjoins with an existing desire99 to rationally occasion an 
imagined action a. 
 
I claim that (2) is (1)’s truth-maker since a dreamer’s i-belief conjoins with some real desire to 
rationallyyoccasion an imagined action that is a part of her dream. When my p-imagined p-
zombie dream rationally occasions my i-belief that I am in danger, this i-belief conjoins with my 
desire not to become.p-zombie lunch and I imagine fleeing within my dream. I do not flee in 
reality since one condition that is usually necessary for action is absent, viz., the presence of 
real beliefs – I am thus clearly in agreement with Carruthers who thinks that “real desires will 
normally lead to real actions only when interacting with real beliefs” (2006: 99). 
 
An immediate worry is that I am overcomplicating matters by introducing imagined actions. 
But the dreamer’s predicament differs from that which occurs during partial hallucination or 
illusion since, or so I claim, she is attentionally immersed in a “virtual, spatiotemporally 
organized world-model” (Revonsuo et al. 2015: 4) within which she interacts with various 
objects and characters. Consider how when playing the video-game ‘Skyrim’ I become 
partially immersed in a 3-D virtual reality within which my character explores labyrinthine 
ruins and slays dragons: Dreaming seems to be something like this, except that my immersion 
into the dream world is greater and I am the character that interacts with.various things. 
Because p-imaginings simulate perceptual experiences and not actions, I thus need.to explain 
this sense of acting within the dream world. I am suggesting that the conjunction of i-beliefs 
and real desires can do the trick. 
 
A more pressing worry is this: Desires, Currie claims, “can be shown to be unreasonable, or at 
least unjustified, if they fail to connect in various ways with the facts” (2002: 211), i.e. desires 
are rationally answerable to facts about what is objectively the case; but dream desires are not 
likewise rationally answerable to facts about what is objectively the case; so, dreamers cannot 
have real desires. Instead, it might be said that dreamers have desire-like imaginings, i.e. desire-
like states that are the imaginative analoguesoof real desires. For instance, I once returned 
home to discover that an egg had apparently been thrown at my kitchen window and 
reasonably desired that the perpetrator be suitably punished. My subsequent discovery that a 
bird was responsible undercut the apparent reasonableness of my desire since no human 
                                                     
99 I allow that the dreamer’s emotional state is, in many cases, a contributory factor; but here, I only want to offer 
a minimal condition on action within the p-imagined dream world.    
126 
 
perpetrator existed. But the reasonableness of my desire to slaughter p-zombies in my dream is 
not undercut by their non-existence since it is only rationally answerable to facts about what 
they are doing within my dream, viz., malevolently chasing me. Because my dream desire 
is.not subject to the usual normative constraints that govern desires, it is concluded that I 
merely imaginatively want to slaughter p-zombies in my dream. 
 
This is not troubling since we often “have all sorts of genuine desires about things thataare not 
actual” (Kind, 2011: 245): I might desire that the Conservative Party had not won the last U.K 
General Election (knowing that I cannot change the past) or to (in light of the latter fact) join 
the Nasa Mars Mission (knowing that I am excluded). That these situations are non-actual does 
not undercut the reasonableness of my desires. And if these desires are too prosaic to be 
especially puzzledaabout them, then there is no puzzle about ascribing real desires to 
dreamers. We can do without desire-like imaginings, at least for dreams.  
   
Still, something must be said about strong behavioural equivalence. Let’s grant that subjects 
occasionally.act out the corresponding dream experience in reality. Now such subjects usually 
report experiencing particularly strong (usually negative100) emotions such as apprehension and 
terror (e.g. Pillmann 2009; Uguccioni et al. 2013) that are appropriate to the dream. Oudiette 
et al describe a subject who had … 
 
“[…] dreamlike mentations resembling horror films [...]. She saw dead heads 
falling, people hanged in her room […] and children from her school slaughtered 
by a madman. When she had these types of dreamlike mentations, she screamed 
(waking up her neighborhood), ran to the bathroom, and locked the door.” 
(2009: 1627)  
 
Drawing on this, I claim that subjects ‘act out’ their dreams when the dream generates a 
particularly.strong emotion101 that, together with the dreamer’s i-beliefs and desires, rationally 
occasion some action in reality. In the example above, the thought is that the subject’s dreams 
of death and violent scenes naturally caused her to experience a heightened degree of fear; this 
emotion, together with some i-belief (e.g. that I am in danger) and the strong desire to escape, 
then rationally occasioned her running into the perceived relative safety of the bathroom, or so 
                                                     
100 Intriguingly, Revonsuo (2000) suggests that this is because the evolutionary function of dreams is to simulate 
threatening events in order to better prepare us for encountering similar scenarios in waking life. 
101 I defend this claim in §4.2.3. 
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my alternative story goes. 
 
My story of the remarkable features of dreams can now be summarized thus: It is the 
attention-dependent nature of p-imaginings, together with their world-presenting 
phenomenology, that secures dream scene-immediacy, and, in turn, this secures reflective 
indiscriminability. Dream subjective equivalence simply consists in the fact that p-imaginings have a 
subjective perceptual phenomenal character. Dream rational equivalence was understood weakly, 
where the dreamer’s i-beliefs, together with reflective indiscriminability, secures the erroneous 
intuition of strong rational equivalence. Dream behavioural equivalence comes in two varieties: 
first, a weak version whereby the conjunction of the dreamer’s i-beliefs and real desires 
rationally occasion imagined dream actions; and second, a strong version whereby the p-
imagined dream evokes a particularly strong emotion that conjoins with the dreamer’s i-beliefs 
and desires to rationally occasion some action in reality. 
 
4.1.2 Summary 
 
I have now explained how (I.D) can (i) answer the p.m.e vis-à-vis dreaming, and, (ii) explain 
the remarkable features of dreams. In what follows, I develop (I.D)’s overall theory of 
dreaming by ‘testing’ it against its main rivals, and so take the first steps towards telling a 
unified story of ‘Bad’ experience. I begin with the received view. 
 
4.2 The Received View 
 
Nothing I have said thus far will convince friends of the received view (r.v) who think that 
dreams are ‘Bad’ perceptual experiences which are presented to the subject’s consciousness 
(usually) during sleep. For instance, Aristotle wrote that,  
 
“[…] the dream is a sort of presentation, and, more particularly, one which 
occurs in sleep.” (On Dreams 350 B.C.E: Part 3) 
 
These mental presentations, Armstrong claims, intuitively involve, 
 
“[…] the having of perceptual experiences. These perceptual experiences involve 
belief.” (2002: 303) 
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Three distinct theses which encapsulate (r.v)’s core commitments can be extracted from these 
brief remarks. First, Aristotle’s claim that a dream “is a […] presentation” suggests what I will 
call (r.v)’s Presentation Thesis:  
 
Presentation Thesis: For all subjects s: If s is dreaming at time t, then dream 
experiences ED1, ED2 … EDN are being presented to s’s consciousness at t. 
(Metaphysical commitment of the Received View) 
 
Certainly, there is a strong intuition that, when we recall a dream, it phenomenologically seems 
that we are recalling some type of experience that occurred during sleep. This intuition is 
grounded in the following prima facie plausible principle: 
 
 (P) For all subjects s: If it seems to have been like something for s at time t, then 
ceteris paribus, it was like something for s at t. 
 
For instance, if you recall feeling hungover at the early-morning philosophy conference, then 
you probably were (there being a well-established positive causal correlation between wine-
drinking at conference dinners and early-morning hangovers) feeling hungover at that time. 
Now, someone persuaded by (P) might extend it to dreams on the grounds that dream 
recollections likewise strongly seem to be recollections of real experiences. Hence,   
 
(P*) For all subjects s: If it seems to have been like something for s to dream at t, 
then it was like something for s to dream at t.102 (Abductive implication of 
(P)) 
 
I am now recalling a recent dream in which I was chased by a malevolent entity, and this 
memory strongly seems to me to be of some type of experience that occurred during sleep. 
Now, since I have no obvious reason for denying that my ordinary experiential memories are 
caused by real waking experiences, and since dream memories are not obviously special cases, 
the natural conclusion is that I really did have some type of experience during sleep. 
 
                                                     
102 Though the present-tense version ‘If it is like something for s to dream at t, then it is like something for s to 
dream at t’ seems unassailable, it is difficult to fully articulate since dreamers cannot report that they are now 
dreaming; hence the Presentation Thesis is primarily supported by dream reports – Malcolm (1962) famously 
exploited this fact to deny that dreaming is like anything at all.  
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The Presentation Thesis is also the standard explanation of the strong positive correlation that has 
been observed between all stages of sleep and dream reports (e.g. Dement & Kleitman 1957: 
341; Nielson 2000): specifically, awakenings from (i) r.e.m sleep (a sleep-phase that is 
characterized by rapid eye movements) about 80% of the time, (ii) non-r.e.m sleep stage 1 
(the stage that occurs once.we close our eyes and decide to sleep) elicit dream reports about 
80-90% of the time, and (iii) non-r.e.m sleep stages 2 (‘light’ sleep) and 3 (‘deep’ sleep) elicit 
dream reports about 50-70% of the time. And lucid dreamers, of course, report first-person 
awareness of dreaming. Hence, we have a prima facie conceptual and empirical case for 
accepting the Presentation Thesis.  
 
Second, Armstrong’s remark that dream presentations seem to involve the “having of 
perceptual experiences” suggests what I will call (r.v)’s Perceptual Dream Experience Thesis:   
 
Perceptual Dream Experience Thesis: For any dream experience ED had by a subject s, 
ED (i) phenomenally seems to s to have a subjective perceptual phenomenal 
character, and, (ii) has an objective perceptual phenomenal character. (Instance of 
the Perceptual Assumption, metaphysical commitment of the Received View) 
 
The reasoning here is that since the subjective phenomenal characters of ‘Good’ perceptual 
experiences do not mislead with respect to their objective phenomenal characters, and since 
there is no obvious reason for thinking that a dream’s subjective perceptual phenomenal 
character does mislead with respecttto its objective phenomenal character, dreams likewise 
have objective perceptual phenomenal characters. So where (r.v) treats the objective and 
subjective phenomenal characters of dreams as being type-identical (a dream subjectively 
seems to be a perceptual experience because it is a perceptual experience), I treat them as 
being type-distinct (a dream subjectively seems to be a perceptual experience because it is a 
successful p-imagining). 
 
Third, Armstrong’s remark that perceptual dream presentations “involve belief” suggests what 
I will call (r.v)’s Belief Thesis: 
 
Belief Thesis: For any dream experience ED had by a subject s, ED can rationally 
occasion s’s beliefs B1, B2 … Bn. (Implication of the Perceptual Experience Thesis, 
doxastic commitment of the Received View) 
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The thought here is that dreamers have real beliefs since they base them upon perceptual 
experiences, just as they do in waking life. Conjoining the Presentation, Perceptual Dream 
Experience and Belief theses thus yields: 
 
Received View: For all subjects s: If s is dreaming at time t, then;  
 
(i) Dream experiences ED1, ED2 … EDN are being presented to s’s consciousness at 
t; and,  
 
(ii) ED1, ED2 … EDN’s subjective and objective phenomenal characters are of type 
F, where F is perceptual; and,  
 
 (iii) ED1, ED2 … EDN can rationally occasion s’s beliefs B1, B2 … Bn.  
 
This then, is (I.D)’s first rival theory of dreaming. 
 
4.2.1 Five Strikes against Perceptual Dream Experiences 
 
In what follows, I sketch five considerations – three conceptual, one from psychology, and one 
from neuroscience – that collectively tell against (r.v)’s Perceptual Dream Experience Thesis. 
 
1. Black and White vs. Colourized Dream Reports 
 
Early dream reports presupposed that dreams were predominantly colourized. For instance, 
Aristotle (On Dreams 350B.C.E: Part 1, Part 3) included colours amongst the qualities that are 
presented in dreams, and Descartes (1641: second meditation) described a piece of wax that 
looked to change colour, and granted that that same appearance could be presented to him 
during sleep. But studies during the 1940’s and 50’s converged upon the thought that 
dreaming was predominantly a black and white phenomenon (e.g. De Martino 1953; 
Middleton 1942) – indeed, some even thought that colourized dreams were indicative of 
psychiatric problems (e.g. Tapia et al. 1958). The present consensus is once more, that 
dreaming is a predominantly colourized phenomenon (e.g. Kahn et al. 1962; Schwitzgebel 
2003).  
 
Friends of (r.v) might explain this discrepancy by suggesting that the rapid spread of black and 
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white media caused most of our dreams to become black and white, e.g. a cinemagoer who 
watched Hitchcock’s Psycho in 1960 might have then had a nightmare in which she is murdered 
by a blackaand white figure. But it would be very surprising, as Ichikawa (2009: 6) and 
Schwitzgebel (2002: 653) point out, to discover that the relatively small proportion of time 
people spent watching black and white media could drastically influence a fundamental 
phenomenological aspect of their dreams. Of course, someone who watched Casablanca 
numerous times in the 1940’s might have then dreamed about Bogart and Bergmann in black 
and white; but that is one dream, and my point is that it would be highly unusual if watching 
black and white films caused many different black and white dreams given that most of us 
experience real life in colour. 
 
The alternative suggestion is that, in at least one period, subjects were radically mistaken about 
a fundamental phenomenological aspect of their dreams. But then friends of (r.v) begin to lose 
their grip on the Perceptual Dream Experience Thesis: For introspection is said to reveal that 
dreams are intrinsically perceptual; but if introspection cannot be trusted to reveal whether or 
not we dream in colour, then it is not obvious why we should trust it to reveal that we have 
perceptual experiences during sleep either. Friends of (r.v) are thus either committed to an 
improbable story about the causal influence of black and white media on our dreams or risk 
putting themselves out of oneiric business. 
 
(I.D) can happily accept that we are radically mistaken about whether or not we dream in 
colour: For if we mistakenly think that our dreams are perceptual experiences, then it is not 
unreasonable to suspect that we can be mistaken about other fundamental phenomenological 
aspects of our dreams. Now, I suspect that dreams are predominantly colourized, with dream 
reports in the 1940’s and 50’s being influenced by the black and white media with which 
subjects naturally compared their dreams: But alternatively, it might be that dreams are really 
predominantly black and white or even, like most scenes in novels, indeterminate in colour 
(e.g. Schwitzgebel 2002: 656). 
 
2. Dreams Do Not Interrupt Sleep  
 
I fall asleep and am later woken by Scrabble, the terrier, pawing my face. The natural 
explanation is that Scrabble’s pawing caused haptic experiences that, in turn, woke me up. But 
suppose I dream that Scrabble is pawing my face. According to (r.v)’s Perceptual Dream 
Experience Thesis, I have a phenomenally type-identical haptic experience; hence, my dream 
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experience should likewise wake me up. But my slumber is undisturbed. Friends of (r.v) must 
thus explain why perceptual dream experiences lack this causal power that is possessed by 
their waking counterparts.103 
 
One suggestion is that what caused me to wake up were not haptic experiences but certain 
physical forces such as pressure against my skin; and since endogenously generated dream 
experiences obviously do not causally impinge against my skin, I remained asleep. But that just 
moves the problem around: For now it must be explained why the same worldly event can 
cause a perceptual experience that interrupts me whilst awake and yet fails to do so whilst I am 
asleep. I am thinking about whether or not Brown is in Barcelona when the doorbell rings and 
causes an auditory experience that interrupts my train of thought:.But when I am asleep that 
same event is said to wake me as a result of sound waves striking my eardrum. This is an 
inelegant solution given (r.v)’s insistence that ‘Good’ experiences and dreams are 
phenomenally type-identical mental states. Perhaps it can be made elegant by claiming that I 
was likewise interrupted by sound waves striking my eardrum whilst awake. But that still 
moves the problem around: For now it must be explained why I usually have a series of 
continuous ‘Good’ experiences whilst awake except for when my attention is interrupted by 
physical forces striking my body. Friends of (r.v) surely cannot adopt Stoneham’s (2008) 
denial that I have perceptual experiences at all given their insistence that such things 
intrinsically constitute dreams. (R.v)’s denial that perceptual experiences can interrupt sleep 
thus either results in a series of increasingly desperate ad hoc moves designed to save the 
Perceptual Dream Experience Thesis or risks putting itself out of oneiric business. 
 
Another suggestion is that perceptual dream experiences do not interrupt sleep since they are 
special cases. But they cannot be special cases in virtue of being dreamed since this is what 
requires explanation. Perhaps friends of (r.v) think it is because certain physical equipment 
that is necessary for the occurrence.of ‘Good’ experience goes ‘off-line’ when we dream (e.g. 
neural activity in the primary visual and somatosensory cortexes significantly diminishes during 
sleep); and since dreams do not constitutively depend upon the same equipment (indeed, 
lesion studies suggest that an intact temporo-parietal-occipital junction is required for 
dreaming (e.g. Solms 1997; 2000)), I remained asleep. But that still moves the problem 
around: For now it must be explained why critical perceptual equipment ‘switches off’ and a 
brain area that supports various cognitive functions related to imagining (e.g. Kosslyn 1994) 
‘switches on’ when I have phenomenally type-identical dreams. Friends of (r.v) obviously 
                                                     
103 Ichikawa (2009: 108) presses this point from a different angle, viz., its empirical implausibility. 
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cannot say (as I would) that this is because dreams are p-imagined. The claim that perceptual 
dream experiences are special cases again either results in a series of increasingly desperate ad 
hoc moves designed to save the Perceptual Dream Experience Thesis or risks putting itself out of 
oneiric business. 
 
(I.D) naturally steps into the breach. For when I dream that Scrabble is pawing my face, I have 
a convincing simulation of the corresponding ‘Good’ haptic experience; and since that 
simulation characteristically lacks the causal power of its waking counterpart, I remained 
asleep. Consider an analogy with a flight simulator: when a pilot rehearses how to safely land 
in the event of a rapid decompression, she leaves the simulator unharmed since a simulated 
decompression lacks the causal powers of the real event. Likewise, my p-imagined dream in 
which Scrabble is pawing my face is a simulation that lacks the causal powers of the 
corresponding ‘Good’ experience, and so, it is unsurprising.that I remain asleep. 
 
3. Daydreams Occasionally Segue into Dreams 
 
I am deliberately daydreaming about the holiday that I intend to take next month when 
my.daydream segues into a dream. According to (r.v)’s Perceptual Dream Experience Thesis, my 
dream is a perceptual experience even though it naturally evolved from my p-imagined 
daydream. Friends of (r.v) must thus explain why there is a smooth experiential transition 
between my.deliberate daydream and dream when the two experiences are said to be 
phenomenally type-distinct mental states. 
 
One suggestion is that deliberate daydreams are also perceptual experiences; hence, a smooth 
experiential transition is to be expected between my deliberate daydream and dream. This is 
not promising since subjects usually understand that they are intentionally p-imagining whilst 
deliberately.daydreaming, e.g. I understood that I was intentionally imagining seeing a beach 
and the Aegean Sea. But if this intuition is mistaken, then friends of (r.v) begin to lose their 
grip on the Perceptual.Dream Experience Thesis: For introspection is said to reveal that dreams are 
perceptual experiences; but if introspection cannot be trusted to reveal that deliberate 
daydreams are perceptual experiences, then it is not obvious why we should trust it to reveal 
that dreams are perceptual experiences either. 
 
Another suggestion is that if there can be experientially smooth transitions between perceptual 
experiences and p-imaginings, then conversely, there can be experientially.smooth transitions 
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between p-imagined daydreams and dreams. But it is unclear what example friends of (r.v) can 
offer here: For instance, it cannot be that I begin to imagine seeing a chainsaw wielding villain 
whilst watching a.horror film since my perceptual experience of seeing and imagined 
experience of seeing are occurring concurrently, when what is needed is a case in which the 
subject’s p-imagining smoothly replaces the perceptual experience without her notice. Friends 
of (r.v) obviously cannot say (as I would) that we sometimes mentally transition from 
perceptually experiencing the world to p-imagined dreams since that immediately concedes 
defeat. 
 
(I.D) has a theoretically attractive explanation: namely, that a smooth experiential transition is 
to be expected between my deliberate daydream and dream since both mental states are typed 
by p-imaginings. When I am deliberately daydreaming about my forthcoming holiday, I.am 
imagining seeing a beach and the Aegean Sea; but as my p-imaginings become more elaborate 
and vivid, my daydream naturally evolves into a dream. The situation is thus one of mentally 
transitioning from unsuccessfully p-imagining (since I can originally reflectively discriminate 
my daydream from my concurrent ‘Good’ experience) to successfully p-imagining (since I can 
no longer.reflectively discriminate the p-imagined dream world from ‘Good’ experience).  
 
4. Children’s Dream Development Positively Correlates with the Development of the Visual-Spatial 
Imagination 
 
Dreaming seems to be a gradual cognitive development that positively correlates with the 
gradual development of the visual-spatial imagination, i.e. the ability to visualize spatial 
relationships between objects. Foulkes (1999) found that children’s dream reports were 
usually of static, simple scenes between ages 3-5 (e.g. “I was asleep and in the bathtub” (1999: 
159)) with more complex reports involving action-sequences and interactions between 
characters emerging around ages 5-8 (e.g. “Another boy, a made-up one, and I were on a 
mountain, hiking” (1999: 160). Finally, emotional preoccupations emerged from around age 9 
(e.g. “I had some sort of disease or something on my tonsils. […] I guess I was kind of worried 
about the disease” (1999: 170)). Of note is that children who scored highly on the Weschler 
Block Design Test (i.e. a visual-spatial task in which the subject lookssat pictures of red and 
white patterns and then attempts to recreate them with red and white blocks) were – even if 
they had relatively.poor verbal and memory skills – more likely to report the most complex 
dreams. These observations led Foulkes to conclude that “dreaming inherently implies some 
imaginal irreality, taken to be real” (1999: 118). 
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Friends of (r.v) must thus explain why children’s dream reports increase in complexity as their 
visual-spatial imagination develops and do not usually, in children age ≤ 5, describe things (e.g. 
moving objects,.social interactions) that commonly occur in waking life, given their insistence 
that dreams and ‘Good’ experiences are phenomenally type-identical mental states. Now, 
whatever explanation this might be, (I.D) has theoretical simplicity on side: For if dreams are 
p-imagined, then, since p-imagining necessarily utilizes the subjects visual-spatial skills (e.g. 
even a simple p-imagining of seeing, say, a static square requires that the subject can visualize 
the spatial relations between its constituent parts), it is to be expected that children with 
relatively well-developed visual-spatial.skills are naturally disposed to report more complex 
dreams.104 
 
5. Dreaming and P-Imagining Share Neurological Architecture 
 
Studies show that there are fairly well-defined functional areas within the brain that are 
correlatable with dreaming (e.g. Cathala et al. 1983; Kerr & Foulkes 1981). For instance, 
Murri et al (1985) observed 19 patients with unilateral lesions in different brain areas and 
found that those with a damaged occipito-temporo-parietal junction reported rarely, and 
sometimes never, dreaming; a finding that was later confirmed by Solms (2000) in his studies 
of 321 patients with various brain lesions. But damage to this area also impairs waking visual 
and spatial mental imagery (e.g. Levine et al. 1985; Milner & Goodale 1995). Furthermore, 
damage to the primary visual cortex (i.e. the part of the neocortex that receives visual input 
from the retina) causes visual impairment but does not affect the subject’s ability to dream 
(e.g. de Gelder et al. 2014; Nir & Tononi 2010: 5). Dreaming and p-imagining thus seem to 
share important neurological architecture. 
 
Friends of (r.v) must thus explain why damage to a brain area that is heavily involved in p-
imagining impairs dreaming but why damage to a brain area that is necessary for seeing does 
not likewise affect the.visual character of dreams, given their insistence that dreams and 
                                                     
104 This line of reasoning might be developed by considering dreaming in autistic children since they usually score 
relatively highly on visual-spatial tests (e.g. Mitchell & Ropar 2004) but typically experience difficulties imagining 
counterfactual scenarios. In which case, autistic children might have early and relatively complex dreams but will 
ultimately be left with fragmentary dreams since they lack the imaginative ability to ‘stitch’ simple scenes 
together into a more complex narrative that seems to be of some possible perceptual experience. This is presently 
under researched, although Daoust et al. (2008) have found that autistic, in comparison to neurotypical, subjects 
usually report dreams that have fewer scenes, objects and characters, as well as dreaming less frequently. 
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‘Good’ experiences are phenomenally type-identical mental states. Now, whatever this 
explanation might be, (I.D), once more, has theoretical simplicity on side: For if dreams are p-
imagined, then damage to a brain area that is heavily involved in p-imagining naturally impairs 
the subject’s ability to dream; whereas damage to a brain area that is necessary for seeing will 
leave the quasi-visual character of her dreams intact.  
 
Though none of these individual considerations constitute a ‘knock down’ argument against 
(r.v)’s Perceptual Dream Experience Thesis, I collectively take them to make highly plausible the 
thought that dreams are p-imaginings. 
 
4.2.2 The Argument from Real Dream Belief 
 
Let’s suppose that the Perceptual Dream Experience Thesis is true. Then friends of (r.v) still have 
the problemdof explaining why dream beliefs have radically different properties from waking 
beliefs. Suppose I dream that I time travel to 1985 and instruct my younger self not to pursue a 
philosophy PhD. According to the Belief Thesis, I really believe that I have time travelled to the 
past (P) whilst dreaming. Meanwhile, something must happen to my long-standing waking 
belief that I cannot time travel to the past (not-P): specifically, I must either (i) temporarily acquire 
an additional logically inconsistent belief during my dream that is consciously rejected upon 
waking (i.e. I simultaneously believe P and not-P whilst dreaming, and rationally reject P upon 
waking), or, (ii) temporarily abandon my long-standing waking belief (i.e. I cease to believe 
not-P for the duration of my dream). 
 
Option (i) is undesirable since, as Ichikawa (2009: 9) points out, we do not usually 
introspectively reject our newly acquired inconsistent beliefs on waking. I do not wake up and 
become consciously reacquainted with my long-standing belief not-P, infer that this belief 
contradicts my temporarily acquired belief P, and then consciously reject P since I simply cease 
to believe P once my dream ends. Thisiis not to deny that subjects can have contradictory 
beliefs (e.g. the Dialetheist who thinks that the sentence ‘I am lying’ is true and false is perhaps 
one such case): rather, I am objecting that friends of (r.v) have not explained why real dream 
beliefs are special cases that are radically dissimilar from other situations in which we might 
have contradictory beliefs. 
 
Option (ii) is also undesirable since cognitively sound subjects do not usually abandon their 
long-standing beliefs without what they think is good reason. The situation in which I would 
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abandon my long-standing belief not-P is likely to be one in which physicists have discovered 
compelling empirical evidence for thinking that backwards time travel is more than just a 
theoretical possibility exploited by mischievous philosophers and science fiction scenarios. But 
when I dream that I time-travel to 1985 and meet my younger self, it is said that I happily 
abandon my long-standing waking belief and uncritically accept a new one as being true – of 
course, I may dream that compelling evidence for backwards time travel has been discovered 
which rationally warrants the belief that I can time travel to the past; but that does not negate the 
fact that I may unreflectively accept backwards time travel as a normal component of my 
dream (indeed, uncritical acceptance of dream events is a striking feature of most dreams). 
This is not to deny that subjects can abandon their long-standing beliefs (e.g. consider 
someone who suffers a traumatic brain injury and subsequently loses long-standing beliefs 
about her identity): rather, I am objecting that friends of (r.v) have not explained why real 
dream beliefs are special cases that are not subject to the usual patterns of belief revision. 
 
Friends of (r.v) now face the following undesirable dilemma: If it is claimed that dreamers 
temporarily acquire inconsistent beliefs, then dreams must be radically dissimilar from other 
situations in which they might hold inconsistent beliefs; whereas if it is claimed that dreamers 
temporarily abandon their long-standing waking beliefs, then dream beliefs must be exempt 
from the usual justificatory norms that govern the abandonment and acquisition of beliefs. 
Either way, dream beliefs have radically different properties from their waking counterparts, 
and we have no explanation of why this is the case.  
 
This dilemma cannot be resolved by insisting that dreams are a special class of perceptual 
experiences that lack the doxastic force of their waking counterparts, i.e. to insist that 
dreamers do not temporarily acquire or abandon real beliefs since (r.v)’s Perceptual Dream 
Experience Thesis does not imply its Belief Thesis. Suppose that <in reality I experience p> 
implies <in reality I believe that p> whereas <in my dream I experience p> does not likewise 
imply <in reality I believe that p>. Friends of (r.v) must now explain why perceptual dream 
experiences fail to rationally occasion beliefs that would be held by anyone rational. If 
backwards time-travel became a reality and I am thwarted from killing my younger self by a 
guardian of the external timeline105, then that experience would rationally occasion my belief 
that I cannot change the past. But when I dream that I am thwarted from killing my younger self, 
it is now said that my structurally identical perceptual dream experience does not 
rationallyooccasion the belief that I cannot change the past; hence Sosa’s charge that I am “guilty 
                                                     
105  Surely, David Lewis himself. 
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of massive of irrationality” (2009: 8).  Perhaps dreamers really are epistemically irresponsible 
agents (e.g. McGinn 2004: 113); but that still fails to explain what feature(s) of 
perceptualeexperience rationally occasions our beliefs whilst awake and renders us 
epistemically irresponsible whilst asleep – it surely cannot be that ‘Good’ belief-causing 
experiences are intrinsically world-involving given (r.v)’s insistence that dreams and ‘Good’ 
experiences are phenomenally type-identical mental states. 
 
As foreshadowed (§4.1.1), (I.D) denies that dreamers temporarily acquire or abandon real 
beliefs sincetthey have i-beliefs that naturally spring from their p-imagined dreams. This should 
not be confused with Sosa’s view which denies (r.v)’s Belief Thesis on the grounds that dream 
beliefs are relativized to the dream world. He writes: 
 
“No physical proposition about the layout of the world around me is true in 
actuality just because it is true in my dream. […] even if in my dream I believe that 
a lion is after me, and even if in my dream I intend to keep running, in actuality I 
have no such belief or intention.” (2009: 3-4) 
 
Sosa’s suggestion is that <in my dream I believe that p> does not entail <in reality I believe 
that p> since dream beliefs are quarantined to the dream. The in my dream operator is thus said 
to function like the in the fiction operator that is employed to explain fictional truths: Just as 
the proposition that Marty McFly time travelled from 1985 to 1955 is true in the fictional world of 
Back to the Future, so my dream belief that I can change the past is true in the fictional world of 
my time-travel dream. When I dream that I kill my younger self I do not, Sosa thinks, acquire 
a logically inconsistent belief or suddenly abandon my long-standing waking belief that I cannot 
change the past since my belief that I can change the past is not really held in mind-independent 
reality. 
 
I do not follow Sosa’s relativist strategy since it is unclear how to understand the relation 
between dream worlds and the actual world. Suppose that my dog barks whilst I am dreaming, 
and that this sound is incorporated into my dream as an alarm that alerts me to a malfunction 
in my time-machine. In this scenario, I must have had some degree of awareness of my dog 
barking in order to incorporate that sound into my dream. But then I am tasked with 
explaining how my consciousness can simultaneously straddle two worlds that are independent 
of one another, viz., my p-imagined dream world and the actual world. Or suppose that I 
wake up and experience relief that I am alive having dreamt that I successfully killed my 
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younger self. I am then tasked.with explaining why my imagined belief that I can change the past 
is quarantined to my dream whilst the emotion that springs from it is experienced in reality. 
Now if my p-imagined dream world and the actual world are independent from one another, 
then I am tasked with explaining why my imagined belief that I can change the past is 
quarantined to my dream in the first place. These explanatory demands make unnecessarily 
heavy work for (I.D) with any such answer risking ad hocness; hence it is theoretically 
preferable to say that dreamers hold i-beliefs in the actual world (of which the p-imagined 
dream world is a part).  
 
I previously said (§4.1) that dream beliefs are not real beliefs since they lack the motivational 
properties.of the former, and I have now strengthened that claim by showing that they are also 
exempt from the usual justificatory norms that govern the abandonment and acquisition of real 
beliefs. Since i-beliefs lack the motivational properties of real beliefs and are not rationally 
responsive to objective evidence, it is plausible that dreamers are disposed to form i-beliefs in 
response to their p-imagined dream experiences. These i-beliefs are not relativized to dream 
worlds since it is unclear how to understand the relation between dream worlds and the actual 
world – they are thus held in reality. 
 
4.2.3 The Argument from Emotion 
 
Friends of (r.v) might now object that only real beliefs can explain why subjects become 
emotionally involved with their dreams. For instance, Bueno argues that it is, 
 
“[…] difficult to reconcile the claim that no […] beliefs are involved in a dream 
with the fact that dreams do seem to move us, bother us, and in some cases 
frighten us. […] Without our believing […] that we are experiencing these things 
in our dreams, it’s hard to understand how we can form such response to 
dreams.”106 (2009: 199) 
 
The Argument from Emotion is that since dreamers have emotional responses to their dreams, and 
since these responses presuppose that dreamers have real beliefs, dreamers must have real 
beliefs. Suppose I have a particularly vivid dream in which I am overwhelmed by a tidal wave 
and wake up afraid – at least I think that I am afraid, and I have the concomitant physical signs 
                                                     
106 Compare McGinn’s claim that “The sure test that dreams are suffused with belief is their ability to generate 
emotions that are conditional on belief” (2004: 112). 
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such as a pounding heartbeat and sweating. Bueno’s worry is that my emotional response is 
very difficult to understand unless I really believed, whilst dreaming, that I was in danger. 
 
One response is to deny that dreamers have real emotions. This would be to construe the 
dreamer as being like Walton’s (1996: 196) Charles who is said to experience quasi-fear (i.e. 
fear produced by beliefs about what is make-believedly true) whilst watching a horror film 
about a malevolent slime oozing around the neighbourhood: specifically, it will be said that 
Charles and I experience quasi-fear as a result of imagining that we are afraid. But this does not 
seem quite right: For the reason that Charles is said to experience quasi-fear is that he is 
consciously anchored to mind-independent reality, and so knows that the slime is fictional; 
whereas it is the profound disconnection of.my consciousness from mind-independent reality 
that facilities my attentional immersion into “the imaginative illusion of the dream” (Sosa, 
2009: 8). I am not claiming that this immersion is complete107, only that it primarily explains 
why dreamers have real emotions and only emotionally reorient themselves once they 
mentally exit the simulation and realize that it was ‘just a dream.’ 
 
I am thus denying that our emotional responses to dreams are conditional upon possessing real 
beliefs. As Currie and Ravenscroft note, it is, 
 
“[…] very common for people to have […] of emotions in response to imagined 
situations; try imagining something terrible happening to your loved ones. The 
object of the experience is imaginary, yet the distress caused is real enough.”108 
(2002: 200) 
 
For instance, when walking my dog last winter she ran onto a frozen river and fell through the 
ice (fortunately, the water was shallow). On recounting the story, I imagined seeing Matilda 
drowning and experienced a.degree of distress. Or consider how imagining how hearing a 
particular tune can evoke a degree of happiness or how imagining tasting a fried centipede can 
evoke disgust. Consistent with this conceptual claim, studies show that imagined perceptual 
experiences usually cause emotional responses. For instance, Holmes & Matthew (2005) found 
that subjects who imagined dangerous events experienced increased anxiety relative to those 
who read descriptions of those same events; and more recently, Seuss & Rahman (2015) found 
that subjects had similar emotional responses to seeing photographs of happy or angry faces as 
                                                     
107 I argue that it is not in §4.3.2. 
108 See also, e.g. Goldie (2005: 133) and Matheson & Schroeder (2006: 4). 
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they did when imagining seeing those same faces. It is thus conceptually and empirically 
plausible that p-imaginings can generate emotional responses.109 
 
Friends of (r.v) can happily accept that p-imaginings generate real emotions in waking life since 
what they deny is that.dreams are p-imaginings. But once we accept that p-imaginings can 
evoke emotional responses in waking life, we cannot sensibly deny that p-imagined dreams can 
also evoke emotional responses – indeed, such responses are likely to be stronger given our 
attentional immersion in the dream world. Real beliefs are not required.110 
 
4.2.4 Summary 
 
I have argued that (r.v) is ultimately unworkable. Its Perceptual Dream Experience Thesis is 
unworkable since it cannot convincingly explain why (i) there exists a large scale discrepancy 
between reports of colour in dreams, (ii) perceptual dream experiences do not wake us up, 
(iii) deliberate daydreams occasionally segue into dreams, (iv) children’s dream development 
positively correlates with the development of their.visual-spatial skills without recourse to an 
unnecessarily complex theory, and (v) dreaming and p-imagining share, but dreaming and 
perceptual experience do not, important neurological architecture without recourse to an 
unnecessarily complex theory. Its Belief Thesis is.unworkable since it cannot convincingly 
explain why dream beliefs have radically different properties from waking beliefs. I submit that 
these collective explanatory difficulties, coupled with (I.D)’s ability to explain our emotional 
responses to dreams, are enough to put (r.v) out of oneiric business. I turn now to Dennett’s 
version of the dream fabrication view. 
 
4.3 The Dream Fabrication View (Dennett’s Version) 
 
According to Dennett, 
                                                     
109 How this occurs is controversial, e.g. perhaps emotionally responding to imagined scenarios confers an 
evolutionary advantage (e.g. Currie & Ravenscroft 2002: 198) or involves ‘reactivating’ autobiographical 
memories with an emotional component (e.g. Conway & Pleydell-Pearce 2000). For present purposes, it only 
matters that such responses do in fact occur. 
110 The reader might now ask: what role do i-beliefs play in our emotional responses to dreams? Answer: i-beliefs 
can modify our emotional responses to dreams but are not the primary sources of the responses themselves, e.g. 
when I dream that I am being overwhelmed by a tidal wave I am likely to experience fear whether or not i-believe 
that I am in danger – it is just that the presence of this i-belief is likely to increase my fear. I-beliefs are thus the 
secondary sources of our emotional responses to dreams. 
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“[...] dreams are never dreamed at all, but just spuriously “recalled” on waking.” 
(1976: 159, my emphasis) […] “If asked what it is like to dream one ought to say 
(because it would be the truth): “It is not like anything. I go to sleep and when I 
wake up I find I have a tale to tell, a ‘recollection’ as it were.” (Dennett, 1976: 
161) 
 
The basic idea is that dreams are no more than “tales” or false memories of experiences that 
occurred during sleep. By way of developing this thought, Dennett suggests that future dream 
researchers might conceivably isolate the following three processes: 
 
Presentation: “Dreams are presented [to the subject’s consciousness during sleep]” 
(1976: 154)  
 
Composition: “Dream composition utilizes the dreamer’s general and particular 
knowledge, her recent and distant experience, and is guided in familiar ways by 
her fears and desires […] this process exhibits intelligence.” (1976: 156)  
 
Memory-loading: “During [the composition] process there is a second, memory-
loading process so that these events can be recalled on waking […] Dreams are 
[…] recorded in memory.” (1976: 154)  
 
Dennett’s contention is that it is a conceptually and empirically consistent implication of our 
present knowledge about dreaming that composition and memory-loading are non-conscious 
processes (compare: we do not have on-going conscious experiences of certain internal 
physiological processes such as cell division and neuronal activity), and that the insertion of a non-
consciously composed dream into memory on waking is sufficient to explain our phenomenal 
intuition that it is like something to dream, i.e. the conjunction of composition and memory-loading 
are sufficient to explain presentation’s intuitive force.111 
 
This version of the dream fabrication view – the cassette view (c.t) – is indeed prima facie 
                                                     
111 Dennett (1976: 161) rightly notes that positing one less process is theoretically attractive: But I see no reason 
for separating composition and presentation, i.e. dreamers compose, and are simultaneously presented with, a p-
imagined dream. Still, even if I must posit three processes instead of two, (I.D) remains theoretically preferable 
given Dennett’s failure to convincingly explain the phenomenology of lucid dreams (§4.3.3). 
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conceptually and empirically consistent. On the conceptual side, Dennett (1976: 161) supplies 
an analogy with sleep-learning.112 Consider the less than diligent student who times an audio 
recording of Descartes’ ‘Meditations on First Philosophy’ to play as she sleeps in an attempt to 
quickly revise for tomorrow’s exam. On waking, she may sincerely report (because she 
believes this to be true): “It was unlike anything to learn about a chiliagon. I fell asleep and 
woke up understanding Descartes argument for the distinction between ideas and images.” 
Likewise, Dennett suggests that we ought to report (because this is the truth): “It was unlike 
anything to dream. I fell asleep and woke up remembering [because a non-consciously 
composed memory cassette was inserted into consciousness and played back upon waking] a 
dream in which I was being chased by hungry p-zombies.”  
 
On the empirical side, Dennett sketches an explanation of (i) the positive correlation between 
dream reports and r.e.m sleep, and (ii) why there are intra and-inter personal 
differences.between our dream recall abilities.113 Of (i), it is suggested that r.e.m’s are by-
products of a non-conscious composition process (Dennett, 1976: 60): his thought is 
presumably that r.e.m’s just are the ‘background noise’ that often accompanies non-conscious 
dream cassette compositionsin something like the way that low-level background noise is 
often.a by-product of ordinary cassette composition. Thus subjects roused from r.e.m sleep 
will often report being roused from dreaming since they have recently non-consciously 
composed a dream into memory that has been falsely remembered upon waking – a thought 
evidenced by Dennett’s (ibid) remark that “normally the dream one “recalls” on waking was 
composed just minutes earlier.”114  
                                                     
112 This analogy is not undermined by the fact that sleep-learning is empirically unsubstantiated since what matters 
is the subject’s belief that sleep-learning is unlike anything. 
113 Dream incorporation is discussed in §4.3.2 since Dennett thinks this poses a special problem for any view 
which cleaves to presentation. 
114 Though Dennett thinks that dreams are probably composed during r.e.m sleep, he also countenances (1976: 
160) that composition can be a temporally extended process that occurs over many waking hours or even innate in 
the sense that we are born with a ‘library’ of pre-composed dreams. Thus subjects roused from non-r.e.m sleep 
will often report being roused from dreaming since a dream that was non-consciously composed at some time in 
the past has only just then been falsely remembered on waking. 
Alternatively, I treat r.e.m’s as the background noise that often accompanies more complex p-imaginings: 
specifically, dreamers will often orient their gaze to ‘scan’ the p-imagined dream world just as they orient their 
gaze in response to environmental stimuli when awake: in contrast, less ‘scanning’ occurs during non-r.e.m sleep 
since dream reports elicited from those stages usually describe simple, less visual scenes (e.g. Nir & Tononi 2010: 
8). Thus subjects roused from non-r.e.m sleep will often report being roused from dreaming since their 
consciousness has just been disconnected from a p-imagined dream world. Nothing significant hinges upon this 
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Of (ii), it is suggested that the quality of the cassette recording can strongly influence our 
dream recall abilities115 (Dennett 1976: 156): Dennett’s thought is presumably that (i) a 
complete, or nearly complete, dream recording can facilitate a detailed dream report (e.g., “I 
dreamed that a frizzy-haired mad-scientist wearing a white coat brain-envatted me”), (ii) a 
partial dream recording can facilitate a partial dream report (e.g. “I dreamed that someone 
brain-envatted me but the details are vague” ), and (iii) no dream recording, or one that fails to 
be inserted into memory on waking, facilitates a denial of having dreamed. 
 
On Dennett’s view then, the following principle represents a conceptually and empirically 
consistent state of affairs: 
 
“It was not like anything [to dream], but it seems to me to have been like something 
[to have dreamed].” (1976: 164, my emphasis) 
 
Or, 
 
For all subjects s: It is objectively unlike anything for s to dream at t, but it seems 
to have been like something for s to dream at t. (Negation of Presentation) 
 
Clearly, if a non-conscious composition process prepares ‘dream cassettes’ for insertion into 
our memory.mechanisms on waking, then dreams cannot be p-imaginings that are presented to 
consciousness.as we slumber.  
 
4.3.1 The Dream Fabrication View (Stoneham’s Version) 
 
According to Stoneham, 
 
“[…] the basic human psychological capacity to make up stories to explain odd and 
unusual things kicks in to explain the experience of waking occasionally, then our 
fascination develops the dream culture and extends it.” (‘Interview: The 
                                                                                                                                                                
particular disagreement. 
115 Unsurprisingly, I think that dream recall abilities mainly spring from natural variations in, and psychological-
physical factors (e.g. our emotional state, certain drugs) that commonly affect, our imaginative abilities. Though 
again, this particular disagreement is not decisive. 
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Construction of Dreams’, with Unknown Magazine, 29th Nov., 2013, my 
emphasis) 
 
The basic idea is that dreams are no more than “stories” or narrative fabrications that are created 
by waking minds which are then mistaken for real experiences that occurred during sleep. 
Stoneham identifies two situations in which we conceivably fabricate dreams. One is during 
r.e.m sleep: specifically, it is suggested that r.e.m sleep, since electroencephalograph traces 
(EEG) for brain activity during this time and wakefulness show very similar patterns (a 
combination of alpha, beta, and desynchronous waves116), involves “periods of.partial 
awakenings” (ibid).during which we engage in imaginative activity. Thus subjects roused from 
r.e.m sleep will often report being roused from dreaming since they are recalling imaginative 
activity that occurred during some recent partial awakening(s), where memories of that 
activity are then mistaken for real experiences that occurred during sleep. 
 
The second, and more usual, situation in which Stoneham thinks dream fabrication occurs is 
during the discombobulatory experience of waking from sleep. Stoneham’s idea seems to.be 
this: when I initially wake up, I am not usually completely mentally oriented to time (e.g. I do 
not know the time until I look at my alarm clock), place (e.g. I may not initially realize that I 
am in bed), and perhaps even person (e.g. my initial ‘grogginess’ may preclude immediate 
knowledge of my name). Because this experience is profoundly disturbing, I naturally imagine 
a story that enables me to psychologically come to terms with my confused mental state: it is 
this story that, when I become mentally oriented in all three dimensions, I understandably 
mistake.for a real experience that occurred during sleep. Clearly, if a mnemonic quality has 
attached to those imaginings that “kick in” during the psychologically unsettling process of 
waking up that makes it seem as though I am recalling an experience that never occurred, then 
dreams cannot be p-imaginings that are presented to consciousness.as we slumber. 
 
A parallel can be drawn between Stoneham’s dreamer and the ‘dupe’s’ predicament in 
Dennett’s (1991: 11) party game of psychoanalysis who is told that whilst he is out of the 
room, one member of the party will relate a.recent.dream to the group. When the dupe 
returns, he is to reconstruct the dream by asking yes/no questions and use psychoanalysis to 
                                                     
116 I do not take this to be decisive for two reasons: First, it is unclear why imaginative activity that begins whilst 
partially awake should cease when we enter ‘deep’ non-r.e.m sleep; and second, there are subtle, yet significant, 
differences between EEG patterns during r.e.m’s and wakefulness which suggest that they are distinct states (e.g. 
Massimini et al. 2010).  
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identify the dreamer. Unbeknownst to the dupe, there is no dream to be told and his questions 
are answered according to three simple rules that are unrelated to their content: if the 
question.ends with a word whose letter is from the first half of the alphabet the answer is “Yes” 
and all other questions “No”, with the proviso that when following this rule would contradict 
the answer to an.earlier question. What usually unfolds is a “bizarre […] story of ludicrous 
misadventure” (ibid) that is unwittingly composed by the dupe himself. 
 
Though Stoneham’s dreamer is not consciously constructing a dream like the dupe, she can be 
understood as similarly attempting to “assuage [her] epistemic hunger” (Dennett 1991: 16) or 
satisfy her curiosity by implicitly asking questions that naturally reflect her emotional 
preoccupations, interests, and future expectations, where the imagined answers to these 
questions constitute, and direct, the storyline of the dream that is falsely remembered – 
indeed, this process could explain why we often report emotionally charged dreams, and the 
recurrence of certain themes and familiar characters (e.g. the hypochondriac who thinks that 
her headaches are symptoms of a malignant brain tumour may, on waking, often implicitly ask 
herself questions that reflect this waking concern and fabricate various dreams involving her 
feared illness and death). As I read him then, Stoneham’s proposal is that the stories we 
imaginatively concoct in an attempt to come to terms with the psychologically unsettling 
process of waking up – either during the r.e.m cycle or from non-r.e.m sleep – often express 
our ongoing concerns, and memories of this confabulatory activity are then understandably 
mistaken for real experiences that were presented to consciousness during sleep. 
 
Two versions of the dream fabrication view are now on offer: Dennett’s which asserts that 
dreams are (probably) non-consciously composed during the r.e.m cycle and uploaded into 
short-term memory on waking; and Stoneham’s which asserts that dreams are narrative 
fabrications generated by waking minds during r.e.m’s or as a means of making sense of their 
environment upon emerging from sleep. Either way, it is said that we.wake up with false 
memories of having dreamed, where such memories can explain our intuitive commitment to, 
 
Presentation Thesis: For all subjects s: If s is dreaming at time t, then dream 
experiences ED1, ED2 … EDN are being presented to s’s consciousness at t. 
 
One way to decide between (I.D) and the dream fabrication view is to see which theory best 
explains some unusual oneiric phenomena (so-called ‘test cases’). I begin with dream 
incorporation. 
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4.3.2 Dennett’s Argument from Precognitive Dreams 
 
Suppose that I fall asleep and dream that my time machine begins to malfunction en route to 
1985. I begin pressing various buttons in an attempt to prevent a temporal catastrophe, until 
finally a klaxon sounds signalling an imminent explosion – I then wake up to find this sound 
merging smoothly with the buzzing of my alarm clock. According to Dennett (1976: 158), 
since the Presentation Thesis entails that my dream occurred over some time, and since my 
alarm clock buzzed.only briefly, I am forced to assume pre-cognition: I must have somehow 
predicted that my alarm clock was about to buzz, and my dream prepared for this pre-
cognized event.117 Pre-cognitive dreams are obviously highly implausible; hence my claim that 
dreams are p-imaginings which are presented to consciousness during sleep is 
highly.implausible. 
 
Dennett (1976: 158) suggests that dream incorporation occurs when either (i) a dream is 
rapidly composed and presented.during the short interval between the occurrence of a 
worldly event and full wakefulness (thus when my alarm clock buzzed, I quickly composed a 
dream in which a klaxon signalled imminent doom, and this was presented just as I became 
aware of my alarm clock buzzing), or, (ii) the occurrence of a worldly event ‘triggers’ the 
retrieval of a precomposed dream cassette.from an innate.‘library’ of undreamed dreams with 
particular endings (thus the sound of my alarm clock caused a precomposed dream that ended 
with a klaxon signalling imminent doom to be inserted into short-term memory just as I 
became aware of my alarm clock buzzing). Alternatively, Stoneham might suggest.that, since 
I was already partially awake when my alarm clock buzzed, I was able to fluidly incorporate 
that event into the storyline of my fabricated dream. Either way, dream incorporation can be 
explained without positing.a presentation process which implausibly predicts a worldly event 
that has not yet occurred. 
 
I do not see why dreamers cannot have some degree of awareness of a future event that they 
anticipate will occur. Consider Dennett’s own anecdote:  
 
“In a recent dream of mine I searched long and far for a neighbor’s goat; when at 
last I found her she bleated baa-a-a — and I awoke to find her bleat merging 
                                                     
117 Stoneham does not discuss dream incorporation, although I see no reason why he would not also pose this 
objection.  
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perfectly with the buzz of an electric alarm clock that I had not used or heard for 
months.” (1976: 157) 
 
It strikes me that if Dennett had set his alarm clock to buzz at a certain time, then the timing 
and sound.might have been anticipated and symbolically incorporated into his dream as the 
sound of a bleating goat: in other words, his expectation of being awoken by the buzz of his 
alarm clock causally influenced.the content of his dream – had his alarm not buzzed, his 
dream goat may well still have bleated. And in my scenario, my expectation of being awoken 
by a buzzing alarm clock would allow me.to symbolically incorporate it into my dream as the 
sound of a warning klaxon – had my alarm clock.not buzzed, the dream klaxon may well still 
have sounded and I might have woken up relieved that I.am still alive. 
 
Or consider this actual case: My own alarm clock emits a 113 decibel tone, beams of light, 
and sends.vibrations to a pad under my pillow (I am a heavy sleeper); but it rarely rouses me 
nowadays as I quickly developed the ability to wake up moments before it was due to go off 
(as I suspect most people.who anticipate being woken by what is billed as the world’s loudest 
alarm clock would) – just in.time to press the snooze button and fall back to sleep. My ability 
is surely better explained by the simple desire not to be abruptly woken by a multi-pronged 
sensory assault rather than by any mysterious precognitive power. If my ability to wake up as 
a result of anticipating the sound of my alarm.clock does not require precognitive powers, 
then there is likewise nothing especially puzzling about the ability to incorporate its 
anticipated sound into a dream.  
 
This explanation can accommodate another well-known anecdote, namely that of Alfred 
Maury’s ‘Guillotine’ dream as described by Freud: 
 
“He mounted the scaffold; the executioner tied him to the plank, it tipped over, 
and the knife of the guillotine fell. He felt his head severed from his trunk, and 
awakened in terrible anxiety, only to find that the head-board of the bed had 
fallen, and had actually struck the cervical vertebrae just where the knife of the 
guillotine would have fallen.” (1900 Ch.1: Part 1) 
 
Although Maury presumably did not anticipate that he would be woken up by a headboard 
striking his neck before falling asleep, I suggest that he had some low-level awareness of its 
movement before it fell (dreamers surely retain some.awareness of their surroundings as 
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evidenced by e.g. their ability not to fall out of bed and to wake up just before powerful 
alarm clocks sound), and symbolically incorporated this movement into his dream as a 
guillotine from the French Revolution. Perhaps what occurred was this: Maury was already 
dreaming that he was being led towards the scaffold when the headboard began to wobble; his 
being led to the scaffold naturally caused him to perform some minor bodily actions (e.g. 
‘tossing and turning’) in response to his imminent decapitation, and this caused the headboard 
to fall and wake him up. 
 
One prima facie problematic anecdote remains: namely, that of someone who has a dream 
which culminates in her being shot, whereupon she wakes up and is told that a car has just 
backfired outside her open window (Dennett 1976: 157). This anecdote seems problematic 
since, unlike someone who might anticipate their alarm clock buzzing or has some low-level 
awareness of the headboard that is about to fall, the event of the car backfiring could have 
occurred at any time. But this anecdote is only problematic until we realize that it is invented 
by Dennett in order to support (c.t) rather than representing an actual dream report: For 
when we look at actual reports, it seems that we can indeed.explain them by appeal to the 
dreamer having had some anticipatory awareness of a future event, where such awareness 
occasionally influences the content of her dreams.118 As (I.D) can explain Dennett’s anecdotal 
reports of dream incorporation without ascribing implausible precognitive powers 
to.dreamers, the Presentation Thesis remains in play. 
 
4.3.3 The Argument from Lucid Dreaming 
 
I want to conclude by arguing that what ultimately favours (I.D)’s theory of dreaming is its 
ability to better explain.our phenomenal.commitment to the standard conception of lucid 
dreaming according to which subjects occasionally have first-person awareness or conscious 
recognition of the fact that they are presently dreaming. For instance, Aristotle thought that, 
 
                                                     
118 Various studies show that external stimuli can causally influence reported dream content. For instance, 
Nielsen (1993) found that subjects who wore a pressure cuff on their leg which was inflated during r.e.m sleep 
often reported dreams that incorporated the sensation of leg pressure (e.g. ‘tingling in the leg’); and recently, 
Schredl et al. (2009) found that sleeping subjects who were exposed to positive and negative odours often 
reported their incorporation into a dream. I suggest that these cases have the same type of explanation as 
Dennett’s actual anecdotes, viz., the subject has low-level awareness of events in her immediate environment and 
occasionally fluidly incorporates them into the storyline of her dream. 
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“[…] when one is asleep, there is something in consciousness which tells us that 
what presents itself is but a dream.” (350 B.C.E: Part 3, my emphasis) 
 
One such case is described by the physicist, Richard Fenyman:  
 
“One night, while I was having a dream, I realized I was observing myself in the 
dream. I had gotten all the way down, into the sleep itself! […] I discovered that I 
could turn around, and walk back through the train. […] I get back to the car 
with the special window, and I see three old guys playing violins but they turned 
back into girls! So I could modify the direction of my dream, but not perfectly.” 
(1985: 18) 
 
Fenyman’s conscious recognition that he had “gotten […] into the sleep itself” meant that he 
did not subsequently mistake “three old guys playing violins [turning] back into girls” for a 
‘Good’ experience, whereas the non-lucid dreamer would have uncritically accepted this 
bizarre event as a normal component of her dream. Call this phenomenal intuition the Standard 
Lucid Dreaming Thesis: 
 
Standard Lucid Dreaming Thesis: For any lucid dream had by a subject s at time t, s 
has first-person conscious awareness that she is dreaming at t. 
 
Anyone that denies lucid dreams are what they seem must convincingly explain our pre-
theoretical commitment to this conception (compare: (I.D) must convincingly explain our 
pre-theoretical commitment to the Perceptual Assumption)119 – lucid dreams are thus ‘test cases’ 
that, ceteris paribus, can be exploited to choose between (I.D)’s contention that dreams are p-
imaginings which are presented to consciousness and the dream fabrication view. 
 
Dennett and Stoneham seek to explain the subject’s sense of lucidity as an ordinary part of the 
dream content. First, Dennett: 
                                                     
119 La Berge et al. (1981) purportedly found that lucid dreamers can ‘signal’ that they are dreaming by performing 
a series of pre-arranged eye movements. Though such evidence would straightforwardly refute the dream 
fabrication view, there are a number of serious methodological concerns – chief among them being that La Berge 
himself seems to be a test subject, and that his organization (‘The Lucidity Institute’) is largely funded by those 
with a vested interest in confirming that lucid dreams are what they seem. I thus set this study aside and focus 
upon the phenomenology of lucid dreams. 
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“[Lucid dreams] can be accommodated easily [by c.t]: although the composition 
and recording processes are entirely unconscious, on occasion the composition 
process inserts traces of itself into the recording via the literary conceit of a dream 
within a dream.” (1976: 161, my emphasis) 
 
And now Stoneham: 
 
“If I am explaining dream reports, I am explaining why you had a dream where 
you thought you were being chased by a tiger. I can use the same mechanism as 
when you’re reporting a dream when you thought you were dreaming [that you 
were] being chased by a tiger. All that has happened is, there is this additional claim 
that you were dreaming and this has become part of the dream.” (‘Interview: The 
Construction of Dreams’, with Unknown Magazine, 29th Nov., 2013, my 
emphasis) 
 
Suppose that I wake up and report a lucid dream in which I was being chased by a tiger. 
Dennett’s thought is that I had non-consciously composed a dream in which I dreamed that I 
was being chased by a.tiger, which I mistook for a bona fide lucid dream when it was inserted 
into memory on waking: I did not really have awareness of dreaming (for there is none to be 
had), but rather a sense when I woke up that the non-consciously generated dream cassette had 
an element of lucidity. Stoneham’s thought is that I imagined that I was dreaming that I was being 
chased by a tiger during some period(s) of partial wakening120, and, on waking, mistook my 
memory of this imaginative activity for a bona fide lucid dream: I did not really have awareness 
of dreaming (for there is none to be had), but rather a sense when I woke up that my 
                                                     
120 In conversation, Stoneham has suggested that lucid dream reports might have their origins in micro-
awakenings (i.e. very short awakenings that typically last a few seconds or less, and are not consciously 
recognized as such or remembered) that have been found (e.g. Kato et al. 2004; Schwartz & Lefebvre 1973) to 
occur during the r.e.m cycle. The idea seems to be that a burst of imaginative activity occurs during some micro-
awakening(s), memories of which are mistaken for an experience that occurred whilst we were ‘awake in our 
sleep.’ Now, I cannot see how those imaginings which are said to occur during some micro-awakening(s) have 
time to even begin; and granting that, I cannot then see how we are able to recall these ‘flashes’ of lucidity that are 
not consciously registered as such (compare: we rarely recall micro-sleeps, i.e. temporary episodes of sleep that 
typically last just a few seconds). For present purposes, I only require the conceptual claim that subjects 
imaginatively concoct a dream within a dream during some partial wakening(s) (however such episodes are 
understood). 
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fabricated dream had an element of lucidity. Whatever the underlying mechanism, their core 
idea is the same: I had no conscious awareness of dreaming, but simply have a false memory of 
a dream in which I dreamed that I was dreaming. 
 
I think that there are two phenomenological characteristics of lucid dream reports that 
Dennett and Stoneham’s core idea cannot convincingly explain. I begin with the obvious one.  
 
1. First-Person Phenomenology 
 
It strikes me that there is a clear phenomenological distinction between a dream of being 
awake and the.sense of lucidity that characterizes lucid dreams since someone who dreams that 
she has a dream in which she is awake remains “ignorant of the fact that she is still dreaming” 
(Emmett 1977: 448). Consider the case of Yves Delage who described being woken by 
someone knocking on his door – it was the caretaker telling him to get up because his friend 
was ill. On getting up, he splashed his.face with cold water, and when that woke him up he 
realized that he had been dreaming. Delage reported that this same sequence repeated four 
times before he actually woke up – surprised to discover that he was still in bed (1919: 451). 
Now I cannot see how the sense of lucidity that characterizes lucid dreams can be 
phenomenologically extracted from non-lucid false awakenings: For someone who reports a 
lucid dream reports judging that ‘I am now dreaming’ (consider Fenyman’s description of 
“observing [himself] in the dream”), whereas Delage reported that he thought he had actually 
woken up and was experiencing events in reality – true, he judged that he had been dreaming 
at the end of each sequence (when the cold water ‘woke’ him up), but this is not the present-
tense judgement that he was dreaming as each sequence played out. 
 
Perhaps Dennett and Stoneham will reply that I am presupposing that the sense of lucidity 
which dreamers occasionally report can only be explained by positing on-going experiences 
that are presented to consciousness, when the whole point of phenomenologically grounding 
the subject’s sense of lucidity in.an “ordinary dream in which [she is] aware [that she is] 
dreaming” (Dennett 1979: 316) is to explain.her intuition that she was really lucid without 
recourse to the Presentation Thesis. But that still does not explain the phenomenological 
difference between the sense of lucidity that subjects occasionally.report and the pseudo-sense 
of lucidity that reportedly characterizes non-lucid false awakenings. Consider this actual dream 
report in which the subject’s false awakening catalyses a sense of lucidity: 
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“I wake and look through my open bedroom door into my study. There I see a 
stranger standing in the room. I am frightened, but then realize I am not awake 
after all, but am still dreaming. I see that the stranger has his back to me, and 
since I now know I’m dreaming, I decide who this person will be. I decide it will 
be my brother. When the man turns around it is indeed my brother. I say, “Come 
on, let’s fly. It’s easy.” So my brother and I fly down the stairs to the front door.” 
(Khan and Gover 2010: 192) 
 
This subject described mentally moving from a state in which she originally lacked insight into 
her predicament to one in which she was able to discount her dream events as real whilst they 
were occurring: First, it subjectively seemed to her that she had woken up to discover an 
intruder in her study (just as it subjectively seemed to Delage that he had woken up to assist his 
friend), and then she described discounting this frightening event as real and being able to 
direct the subsequent course of her dream (unlike Delage who reported that the false-
awakening began again). In this respect, she is not unlike the epistemically naïve subject who 
mentally moves from a state in which she believes that the Müller-Lyer lines are of 
equal.lengths to one in which she is able to discount that look whilst it continues to 
phenomenally persist.  
 
(I.D) has a conceptually attractive explanation of the reported first-person phenomenology of 
lucid dreams: all that has happened is that the dreamer has gained first-person awareness – 
perhaps triggered by a particularly incongruous non-lucid dream event or a false-awakening (as 
occurred in the example above) – of the p-imagined dream world, and indeed, she may even 
be able to mentally influence what occurs within that world (hence Fenyman’s decision to 
walk through the train). Certainly, there is no puzzle.about how to phenomenologically 
extract the subject’s reported sense of lucidity from a non-lucid false awakening, given their 
distinctive subjective phenomenology (e.g. “I am frightened, but then realize I am […] still 
dreaming” vs. “I wake and [unreflectively accept that] a stranger [is] standing in the.room.”) 
 
2. Temporally Extended Phenomenology  
 
Consider again Fenyman’s lucid dream report in which he described choosing to walk through 
a train and watching male violin player’s turn into girls, where these reported dream events 
had a temporally extended phenomenology, i.e. it subjectively seemed to Fenyman that his 
dream events occurred over some time. According to Dennett and Stoneham, Fenyman awoke 
154 
 
with a false memory of a lucid dream that never occurred. But that memory lacks a similar 
temporally extended phenomenology since it seems to rapidly ‘replay’ the dream in something 
like the way that a film can be rapidly replayed by fast-forwarding through its constituent 
scenes (consider, for instance, how my experiential memory of a ten mile drive that took 
around twenty minutes is temporally compressed into several seconds). Friends of the dream 
fabrication view must thus explain how a subject’s temporally compressed false memory of a 
lucid dream.can phenomenologically capture her sense of having been ‘awake in her.sleep’ for 
a considerably longer temporal duration.121 
 
Perhaps Dennett will ground the subject’s sense of having had a temporally extended lucid 
dream in the.temporally extended non-conscious composition process (it took Fenyman some 
time to non-consciously compose his dream in which he dreamed that he was lucid) – indeed, 
he might claim that this explains the close correlation between reported ‘dream time’ and the 
time that subjects have been observed to spend in r.e.m sleep before waking (e.g. Stickgold et 
al. 2001). But this tack is implausible on two counts. First, it is conceptually inconsistent to 
say that Fenyman had conscious awareness of one aspect of a process (viz., its temporal 
extension) that is definitionally non-conscious. Second, admitting that Fenyman had conscious 
awareness of the time taken to compose his dream then renders the denial that he had first-
person.awareness of the dream that was being composed ad hoc: if his sense of it having.taken 
some time to experience his apparent dream events sprang from the.temporally extended 
nature of the composition process, then it is not unreasonable to think that his sense of having 
lucidly entered “the sleep itself” sprang from his having first-person awareness of the dream 
that was being composed and simultaneously presented to consciousness. Grounding the 
subject’s sense of having had a lucid dream that occurred over some time in a non-conscious 
composition process thus either results in conceptual inconsistency or risks reintroducing the 
presentation process that (c.t) wants to avoid. 
 
Perhaps Stoneham will ground the subject’s sense of having had a temporally extended lucid 
dream in some temporally extended period(s) of partial wakening (perhaps it will be said that 
Fenyman imaginatively composed his dream in which he dreamed that he was lucid during 
some partial wakening(s) that occurred in the r.e.m cycle or during the mentally disorientating 
period that occurred when he woke up). But this tack faces the same problem as Dennett’s: if 
Fenyman’s sense of it having.taken some time to experience his apparent dream events sprang 
                                                     
121 This objection also extends to Dennett and Stoneham’s account of non-lucid dreams (though I do not press this 
here). 
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from his conscious awareness of the temporally extended nature of some.partial awakening(s), 
then it is not unreasonable to think that his.sense of lucidity sprang from his having first-person 
awareness of the dream that was being imaginatively composed and simultaneously presented 
to consciousness. Grounding the subject’s sense of having had a temporally extended lucid 
dream in some temporally extended partial wakening(s) still risks reintroducing the 
presentation process that Stoneham wants to avoid. 
 
(I.D) has a conceptually attractive explanation of the reported temporally extended 
phenomenology of lucid dreams: For if Fenyman’s p-imaginings were composed and 
simultaneously presented to consciousness over some time, then it is unsurprising that his 
apparent dream events seemed to occur over some time (they did). I am not claiming that the 
temporal match between subjective ‘dream time’ and external ‘clock’ time must be exact – 
that would be surprising, and it is certainly possible to dream that something takes many hours 
whilst occurring very quickly in reality or to dream that something occurs very quickly whilst 
occurring over a longer time in reality: it is just that such cases are not the norm as evidenced 
by e.g. the positive correlation between time in r.e.m sleep and reported ‘dream time’, and 
our surprise when they do occur – “I dreamed that the aeroplane journey took many hours and 
look! Just two minutes has elapsed.” The point is that positing a presentation process which 
broadly corresponds to external time goes some way towards diffusing the puzzle about how 
to phenomenologically extract the subject’s sense of having had a temporally extended lucid 
dream from a temporally compressed false memory. 
 
I want to conclude by relating (I.D)’s explanation of lucid dream reports to the recent 
discovery (Voss et al. 2014) that the EEG’s of subject’s who report lucid, in contrast to those 
who report non-lucid, dreams display around 40-Hz Gamma frequencies in the dorso-lateral-
prefrontal-cortex, i.e. a brain area that is heavily involved in higher cognitive processes such as 
attention and motor planning. Voss’s methodology seemed sound: Her team applied stimulation 
to the frontal and temporal lobes of 27 healthy.adult volunteers (all of whom denied having 
lucid dreams) on four successive nights; but neither experimenter nor volunteer knew which 
frequency was used, or whether a current was applied. Several seconds later, the volunteers 
were roused from sleep and asked to report any dreams. The main finding was that those who 
were ‘zapped’ at 40-Hz reported lucid dreams 77% of the time (and to a lesser extent at 25-
Hz) in comparison to those who received electrical stimulation at higher and lower frequencies 
or nil current. Now since this Gamma band is the same frequency that is associated with high-
level conscious processing, its predominance in those subjects who reported lucid dreaming is 
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empirically consistent with (I.D)’s hypothesis that conscious processing of p-imagined dream 
events is taking place, where this processing leads the subject to realize that she is indeed 
‘awake in her sleep.’  
 
4.3.4 Summary 
 
In Ch.2, I argued that a successful naïve realist answer to the p.m.e is constrained by three 
desiderata. Clearly, the dream fabrication view exemplifies an instance of Basic Phenomenal 
Disjunctivism (dreams cannot be phenomenally type-identical to ‘Good’ experiences since they 
are not experiences at all), and I can allow that it may even have some story to tell of the 
remarkable features of dreams (e.g. perhaps it will be said that dream reflective indiscriminability 
consists in the indiscriminability of false memories of experiences that have not occurred from 
memories of ‘Good’ experiences that have occurred). The problem I have raised here is that 
that story cannot even begin since the dream fabrication view cannot convincingly satisfy a 
specific instance of the unificatory constraint, viz., the ability to offer a unified theory of 
dreams. As (I.D)’s theory of dreaming convincingly satisfies all three desiderata, it remains the 
preferred theory of dreams.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
   
In this chapter, I have argued that the objective phenomenal characters of dreams are typed by 
perception-like imaginings that convincingly simulate the objective phenomenal characters of 
metaphysically possible ‘Good’ experiences, where this claim can block the p.m.e qua 
dreaming and explain the remarkable features of dreams. I then defended my account of 
dreaming against two competitors. I resisted the received view on three counts: first, that its 
Perceptual Dream Experience Thesis lacked the explanatory power of p-imaginings vis-à-vis a range 
of oneiric phenomena; second, that its Belief Thesis lacked the explanatory power of i-beliefs 
vis-à-vis the radically different properties of dream and waking beliefs; and third, that p-
imaginings can phenomenologically capture our emotional responses to dreams. I resisted the 
dream fabrication view on two counts: first, that (I.D)’s commitment to a presentation process 
does not implausibly entail that dreamers have mysterious precognitive powers; and second, 
that it lacked the ability to explain two phenomenological characteristics of reported lucid 
dreams, and so, has narrower explanatory scope than (I.D). 
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5 
Imaginative Disjunctivism and Hallucination 
 
In this chapter, I explain and defend the claim that the objective phenomenal characters of 
hallucinatory experiences are p-imaginings. I begin by showing how (I.D) can (i) answer the 
p.m.e qua hallucination (§5.1), and, (ii) explain the remarkable features of hallucinations 
(§5.1.1). I then develop this basic story by answering Johnston’s objection that “no satisfactory 
disjunctivist account [explains why] hallucination can provide subjects with original de re 
knowledge of quality but not original de re knowledge of particulars” (2004: 131): that.is, the 
objection that there is no form of disjunctivism currently available which can adequately 
explain why hallucination cannot (i) be a source of original.de re or singular thought about 
particulars (i.e. thoughts that are referentially about particular things), but can, (ii) be a source 
of original de re knowledge of qualities. Of (i), I argue that since a subject’s ability to p-imagine 
a particular thing is contingent upon her having had at least one (in a sense to be explained) 
‘Good’ experience of that.thing, it is unsurprising that hallucination cannot be a source of 
original de re thought about particulars (§5.2). Of (ii), I argue that since p-imaginings can (in a 
sense to be explained) be a source of original de re knowledge of quality, it is unsurprising that 
hallucination can be a source of original de re knowledge of quality (§5.2.1). 
 
I then (§5.3) sketch Johnston’s rival Sensible Profile theory of hallucination according to which 
reflectively indiscriminable ‘Good’ and hallucinatory experiences are phenomenally typed by 
the same structured arrangement of qualities and relations (viz., a Sensible Profile), where the 
latter’s qualitative and relational ingredients are not instantiated by any candidate worldly 
object. Though Johnston’s story is obviously similar to Conduct’s (§2.1.1) in its treatment of 
hallucinations as relational mental states, I consider it here since Conduct does not elaborate 
the nature of any possible experience-independent object that might phenomenally type 
hallucinatory experience, and it is worth seeing if there is indeed any such object that is shared 
with ‘Good’ experience which is consistent with the latter being intrinsically naïve realist. I 
argue that although Johnston’s story has a positive explanation of hallucination’s remarkable 
features and potentially extends to dreams and illusions (§5.3.1), it is not sufficiently 
disjunctivist to successfully avoid the Problem of Explanatory Screening Off (§5.3.2); that is, 
Johnston’s story is ultimately unsuccessful since it cannot block Spreading’s return, and so, does 
not meet the metaphysical constraint on a successful naïve realist solution to the p.m.e. As (I.D) 
is not likewise felled.by the Problem of Explanatory Screening Off, it remains the preferred theory 
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of hallucination. 
 
5.1 Imaginative Disjunctivism and the Problem of Hallucination 
 
(I.D)’s first, and most straightforward, task is to answer Hellie’s p.m.e qua hallucination without 
spreading p-imaginings over to all ‘Good’ experience. First, since it is what the existence of 
hallucinations are said to threaten, we can assume: 
 
(1) Naïve Realism: For all subjects s: If s has a non-misleading experience ENM, 
then (i) ENM’s subjective and objective phenomenal character is intrinsically 
constituted by the same naïve properties PN1, PN2, … PNN, and, (ii) s stands in a 
direct sui generis acquaintance relation r to a worldly object, ow’s, perceptible 
properties PP1, PP2 … PPN, where PP1, PP2 … PPN, directly ground ENM’s naïve 
properties PN1, PN2 … PNN.
  
 
And since, or so I claim, the objective phenomenal characters of hallucinations essentially 
consist in p-imaginings, we can also assume: 
 
(2) Base*: For all subjects s: If a subject s has a hallucinatory experience EH, then 
EH’s objective phenomenal character is typed by p-imaginings IP1, IP2 … IPN. 
(Positive instance of Base) 
 
My objector now points out that the phenomenal appearances of hallucinations lack any 
property (or properties) in virtue of which hallucinating subjects can reflectively discriminate 
them from the phenomenal appearances of metaphysically possible ‘Good’ experiences, or vice-
versa, e.g. consider Smith’s claim that, for any ‘Good’ experience of reading a book, there can 
be a hallucinatory experience that has “exactly the same subjective character” (2005: 194). 
Hence, 
 
 (3) Reflective Indiscriminability*: For all subjects s: It is phenomenally 
possible that s cannot reflectively discriminate between (i) a Good 
experience EG’s phenomenal appearance from some metaphysically possible 
hallucinatory experience EH’s phenomenal appearance, and, (ii) a 
hallucinatory experience EH’s phenomenal appearance from some 
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metaphysically possible Good experience EG’s phenomenal appearance. 
(Instance of Reflective Indiscriminability) 
 
Again, my objector argues that, since reflectively indiscriminable experiences are tokens of the 
same phenomenal type, and since it is non-controversial that hallucinatory and ‘Good’ 
experiences are reflectively indiscriminable, Spreading vis-à-vis hallucination is true. Hence,  
 
(4) Spreading*: For all subjects s: If s cannot reflectively discriminate (i) a Good 
experience EG’s phenomenal appearance from some metaphysically possible 
hallucinatory experience EH’s phenomenal appearance, or, (ii) a hallucinatory 
experience EH’s phenomenal appearance from some metaphysically possible 
Good experience EG’s phenomenal appearance, then EG and EH are of 
phenomenal type F. (Abductive implication of (3), Instance of Spreading) 
 
And since Base* tells us that hallucinations are phenomenally typed by p-imaginings, it is 
concluded that Good’ experiences must also be phenomenally typed by p-imaginings. 
 
As expected, (I.D) blocks the prima facie abductive move from Reflective Indiscriminability* 
to Spreading* by replacing the latter with Apparent Spreading vis-à-vis hallucinatory 
experience. Hence,  
 
(5) Apparent Spreading*: For all subjects s: If s cannot reflectively discriminate 
(i) a Good experience EG’s phenomenal appearance from some metaphysically 
possible hallucinatory experience EH’s phenomenal appearance, or, (ii) a 
hallucinatory experience EH’s phenomenal appearance from some 
metaphysically possible Good experience EG’s phenomenal appearance, then 
EG and EH can appear to s to be of phenomenal type F (where EG and EH are 
tokens of different phenomenal types). 
 
Naïve realism, if it is to be toppled, is not to be toppled by the non-naïve realist spectre of 
hallucination.  
 
5.1.1 Imaginative Disjunctivism and the Remarkable Features of Hallucination 
 
(I.D)’s second task is to satisfactorily meet Sturgeon’s Adequacy Condition on hallucination, 
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which is,  
 
Adequacy Condition*: A theory t of experience is explanatorily adequate iff t 
explains why a Good experience EG and hallucinatory experience EH are (i) 
reflectively indiscriminable (EG ≡ RI EH) (ii) scene-immediate (EG ≡SI EH) (iii) subjectively 
equivalent (EG ≡SE EH) (iv) rationally equivalent (EG ≡RE EH), and, (iv) behaviourally 
equivalent (EG ≡BE EH). (Instance of Adequacy Condition) 
 
At this early stage, I am not claiming that (I.D) can explain features (i)-(v) better than its 
rivals122, only that, if hallucinations are p-imaginings, then (I.D) can consistently explain their 
remarkable features. 
 
Beginning with hallucinatory scene-immediacy, I claim that when, 
 
(1) A subject s has a hallucinatory experience EH which is phenomenally scene-
immediate. 
 
It is because, 
 
(2) EH’s objective phenomenal character is typed by p-imaginings IP1, IP2 … IPN, 
where IP1, IP2 … IPN are phenomenally scene-immediate. 
 
I claim that what goes for dream scene-immediacy straightforwardly goes for hallucinatory 
scene-immediacy. That is, since p-imaginings have all the Humean force and vivacity or world-
presentingness of ‘Good’ perceptual experiences, and since their attention-dependent nature 
secures a scene-immediacy, it is unsurprising that, if hallucinations are p-imaginings, they too 
have a world-presenting scene-immediacy.  
 
Someone might object that attention-dependent p-imaginings cannot secure hallucinatory 
scene-immediacy since, unlike dreams, not at all hallucinations are attention-dependent. But it 
is unclear what.these hallucinations might be: For instance, subjects with Charles Bonnet 
Syndrome can banish their hallucinations by rapidly moving their eyes left and right, where this 
banishment occurs because such movements force them to mentally attend to something else; 
                                                     
122 I consider Johnston’s account of hallucination’s remarkable features in §5.3.1. 
161 
 
and subjects can banish auditory hallucinations by performing various tasks that engage their 
attention, e.g. mentally instructing the ‘voices’ to disappear is often effective. Actual 
hallucinations, at least, do not seem to survive the subject’s successful mental shifts of 
attention. 
 
I claim that this world-presenting scene-immediacy is what secures hallucinatory reflective 
indiscriminability. That is, I claim that when, 
 
(1) A subject s has a hallucinatory experience EH which is reflectively 
indiscriminable from a Good experience EG. 
 
It is because, 
 
(2) EH’s objective phenomenal character is typed by p-imaginings IP1, IP2 … IPN, 
where IP1, IP2 … IPN convincingly simulate EG’s world-presenting scene-
immediate objective phenomenal character. 
 
Suppose that I hallucinate a mango. If my hallucination is p-imagined, and if p-imaginings have a 
world-presenting scene-immediacy, it is unsurprising that I cannot reflectively discriminate it 
from some corresponding ‘Good’ experience that likewise has a world-presenting scene-
immediacy. 
 
Onto subjective equivalence, I claim that when, 
 
(1) A subject s has a hallucinatory experience EH which has a subjective perceptual 
phenomenal character. 
 
It is because, 
 
(2) EH’s objective phenomenal character is typed by p-imaginings IP1, IP2 … IPN, 
where IP1, IP2 … IPN have a subjective perceptual phenomenal character. 
 
My claim is simply this: Definitionally, p-imaginings have a subjective perceptual phenomenal 
character; so if hallucinations are p-imaginings, then they too must have subjective perceptual 
phenomenal characters. Thus, if my mango-hallucination really is p-imagined, then since my p-
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imagining is a successful simulation of the corresponding ‘Good’ experience, it is unsurprising 
that it has a subjective perceptual phenomenal character – and even those who deny that (2) is 
(1)’s truth-maker do not deny that hallucinations have a subjective perceptual phenomenal 
character (indeed, this is what someone who denies that hallucinations are intrinsically 
perceptual must explain). 
 
Concerning rational equivalence, I want to distinguish between a strong and weak version. A 
proponent of the former claims that when, 
 
(1) A subject s has a hallucinatory experience EH which rationally occasions a 
belief that p.  
 
It is because, 
 
(2) EH’s objective phenomenal character is of phenomenal type F, where EH is a 
particular token of F that rationally occasions s’s belief that p. 
 
The idea is that (2) is (1)’s truth-maker since the objective phenomenal characters of 
hallucinations are typed by something – standardly, a perceptual experience – that rationally 
occasions a real belief. I hallucinate a mango and naturally form the belief that there is a mango in 
front of me; or if I have reason to.think that I am hallucinating, the more cautious belief that it as 
if I am seeing a mango in front of me, so the story.standardly goes. 
 
Unlike non-lucid dreamer’s, most hallucinator’s realize that they are hallucinating. Most 
subjects with Charles Bonnet Syndrome, for instance, are untroubled by their hallucinations 
(e.g. Jacob et al. (2004: 238) describe a typical case in which an.87 year old man was 
untroubled by the apparent presence of bears and cows in his house); voice-hearers usually 
understand that the ‘voices’ are unreal (e.g. Brian Wilson of ‘The Beach Boys’ no longer takes 
the ‘voices’ which threaten his.family at face-value); and those who have drug-induced 
hallucinations usually understand their atieology (e.g. Huxley realized that “a slow dance of 
golden lights” (1954: 4) was induced by his taking mescaline). Or consider peduncular 
hallucinations (i.e. vivid hallucinations that usually occur during dark environments) that, 
although are typically of ordinary scenes and are thus likely candidates for being believed, are 
rarely taken at face-value (e.g. Penney & Gallarneu describe a typical case in which a 59 year 
old woman was untroubled by the apparent presence of “animals and people that ranged from 
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shadows to bright colours” (2014: 450)). In these cases, subjects have real beliefs of the form: I 
believe that [it is as if I experience that {P is.the case}], where these beliefs are strongly 
rationally equivalent to those that are rationally occasioned by doxastically resisted ‘Good’ 
experiences, i.e. situations in which the subject has a ‘Good’ experience that she suspects is 
really ‘Bad.’  
 
What is at issue is whether subjects who seem to believe their hallucinations have real beliefs. 
Now since I think that dreams are a species of hallucination, and since I claim that dreamers 
have i-beliefs, I am conceptually committed to a weak rational equivalence which claims that 
when,   
 
(1) A subject s has a hallucinatory experience EH which seems to rationally 
occasion a belief that p. 
 
It is because, 
 
(2) EH’s objective phenomenal character is typed by p-imaginings IP1, IP2 … IPN, 
where IP1, IP2 … IPN rationally occasion s’s i-belief that p. 
 
I claim that (2) is (1)’s truth-maker since p-imagined hallucinations can rationally occasion i-
beliefs, where the subject’s inability to reflectively discriminate her p-imagined hallucination 
from the corresponding ‘Good’ experience that would rationally occasion the same real belief 
then grounds the erroneous intuition that her hallucination is strongly rationally equivalent to 
that ‘Good’ experience. When I hallucinate a mango in front of me, I am imagining seeing a 
mango, and this p-imagining rationally occasions my i-belief that there is a mango in front of me. 
And because I cannot reflectively discriminate my hallucination from the corresponding ‘Good’ 
experience that would rationally occasion the real belief that there is a mango in front of me, I 
mistakenly think that I really believe that there is a mango in front of me, or so my alternative 
story goes. 
 
For weak rational equivalence to be made plausible, I must explain what is occurring in cases 
where subjects do not simply “stand and marvel” (Dennett 1991: 9) but reportedly act upon 
their hallucinations. The answer to this is obviously an explanation of behavioural equivalence. I 
claim that when,  
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(1)  A subject s has a hallucinatory experience EH which rationally occasions her 
action a. 
 
It is because, 
 
(2) EH rationally occasions s’s i-belief which conjoins with a desire and emotion 
to rationally occasion an action a. 
 
To see how this works, consider the following case report of a hallucination that the subject 
thought predicted the death of her Grandmother: 
 
 “She could see her grandmother's dead body lying on her funeral bed in the 
drawing room of her house […] and people sitting around her weeping. […] She 
herself would begin weeping on witnessing the sight and had to leave the room. 
[…] This scene of the grandmother's death on other hand was (as if) happening in 
reality, where she clearly saw all the people and objects in the room in full detail 
and could interact with them.” (Chakrabarty & Reddy 2011: 71) 
 
My explanation of the subject’s behaviour is that her hallucination as of her “grandmother’s 
dead body” naturally generated a grief-like emotion; this emotion, together with some i-belief 
(e.g. that I am foreseeing my Grandmother’s death) and the desire not to ‘see’ the funereal scene, 
rationally occasioned her leaving the room, or so my story goes. 
 
This model can also explain cases in which subjects reportedly act upon their command 
hallucinations, i.e. hallucinations which command them to act in.specific ways. One famous 
example is that of Joan of Arc who reported being instructed by the Archangel Saint Michael to 
“Go raise the siege, which is being made before the city of Orleans” (second public 
examination, 22 February, 1431). Assuming that this was a genuine command hallucination, 
the thought is that the ‘voice’ generated an emotion (e.g. at her trial, Joan described feeling 
guarded by the voices), which together with some i-belief (e.g. that Saint Michael is commanding 
me to assist the Dauphin) and desire (e.g. to thwart the English besiegers), rationally occasioned 
her travelling to Orleans and playing a decisive role in ending the siege.  
 
My story of the remarkable features of hallucinations can now be summarized thus: It is the 
attention-dependent nature of p-imaginings, together with their world-presenting 
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phenomenology, that secures hallucinatory scene-immediacy, and, in turn, this secures reflective 
indiscriminability. Hallucinatory subjective equivalence simply consists in the fact that p-imaginings 
have a subjective perceptual phenomenal character. Hallucinatory rational equivalence was 
understood weakly, where the subject’s i-beliefs, together with reflective indiscriminability, 
secures the erroneous intuition of strong rational equivalence. Hallucinatory behavioural 
equivalence occurs when the subject’s p-imagining evokes an emotion that conjoins with her i-
beliefs and desires to rationally occasion a certain action. 
 
5.1.2 Summary 
 
I have now explained how (I.D) can (i) answer the p.m.e vis-à-vis hallucination, and, (ii) explain 
the remarkable features of hallucination. In what follows, I develop (I.D)’s overall theory of 
hallucination by ‘testing’ it against Johnston’s rival Sensible Profile theory of hallucination. I 
begin by arguing that (I.D) can meet Johnston’s demand to explain two interesting features of 
hallucination. 
 
5.2 Hallucination and Original De Re Thought 
 
Hallucination’s first interesting feature, Johnston (2004: 127) points out, is that it cannot be an 
original source of de re thought123, i.e. thoughts which are referentially about particular things in 
contrast to de dicto thoughts which merely characterize them.124 To illustrate, I presently seem to 
see Scrabble the terrier, sunbathing in the garden. This look rationally occasions my belief that I 
am thinking about that particular dog, hence, I am plausibly entertaining a de re thought about 
Scrabble, the terrier sunbathing in the garden. But suppose I have no particular dog in mind 
and think instead under the description ‘The terrier sunbathing in the garden.’ Then I am 
thinking about any dog that happens to satisfy that description, and so, plausibly entertaining a 
de dicto thought that refers to anything which satisfies its extension, e.g. my neighbour’s dog. 
Crucially, ‘Good’ experience can referentially ground original de re thoughts about worldly 
objects. For should I peer out of the window and see a sunbathing canine-interloper that I have 
                                                     
123 Independent arguments (e.g. Kripkean (1980) modal arguments; Perry’s (2001) indexical argument; and 
Strawson’s (1959: 20–22) reduplication argument) for the existence of de re thoughts are sidestepped since someone 
(e.g. Hinchliff, 1988) who disputes their existence will presumably agree that hallucination cannot be an original 
source of them.  
124 This distinction is the least controversial gloss, though it has been argued (e.g. Donellan 1966) that definite 
descriptions can sometimes have both a de re and de dicto use. 
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never seen before, my experience still allows me to entertain original de re thoughts about it 
such as that dog sunbathing in the garden. 
 
But suppose that the mad-scientist is lurking nearby and somehow causes me to have a 
reflectively indiscriminable hallucination as of Scrabble, the terrier sunbathing in the garden. In 
this scenario, it is conceptually very difficult to see how I could hallucinate Scrabble qua 
Scrabble without some antecedent “way of making singular reference” (Johnston 2004: 129) to 
her. Absent some prior ‘Good’ experience, my hallucination is no more of Scrabble than it is of 
another dog that happens to satisfy the same qualitative description. A necessary condition on 
the hallucination of particular objects thus seems to be that the subject has had at least one 
antecedent ‘Good’ experience of that particular which she hallucinates. 
 
An apparent counterexample supposes that the mad-scientist has extensively brain-washed me 
to the effect that, one year from now, I will be caused to hallucinate a particular philosopher 
whose existence I am unaware of but will soon meet. In this scenario, my objector reasons that 
since my hallucination successfully referred to the philosopher that I met, hallucination can be a 
source of original de re thought. Following Johnston (2004: 130), I reply that this example 
neglects the distinction between the referential intentions of the brainwasher and the content of 
my hallucination. My hallucination only seems to be an original source of de re thought about 
that particular philosopher because that is just what the mad-scientist referentially intended. 
But the actual content of my hallucination is nothing more than some descriptive template that 
that philosopher serendipitously satisfies. Again, it is antecedent acquaintance with particular 
things which referentially guarantees that hallucinations are genuinely de re. 
 
That the ability to hallucinate particular things is parasitic upon antecedent ‘Good’ experiences 
of them is unsurprising should hallucinations be p-imaginings. Suppose that I imagine seeing 
Scrabble, the terrier, sunbathing in the garden. Unless I have had some antecedent ‘Good’ 
experience of Scrabble, my p-imagining is just some descriptive template that she happens to 
satisfy: in other words, I have a de dicto p-imagining that is not referentially tied to the identity 
of any particular dog – indeed, I may be surprised to meet the real Scrabble and think ‘I 
visualized a dog that looked remarkably like you.’ For the supposition that I can have a 
genuinely de re p-imagining without having had some antecedent ‘Good’ experience of Scrabble 
problematically presupposes that I can successfully refer to something of which I lack 
knowledge – alas, there is no compelling reason for thinking that I possess fantastic referential 
powers. A necessary condition on p-imagining particular objects thus seems to be that the 
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subject has had at least one antecedent ‘Good’ experience of that particular which she p-
imagines. 
 
This conception of antecedent ‘Good’ experience admits of one refinement. Suppose that I 
have a hallucinatory experience as of a Siren from Greek mythology; it might be suspected that 
my hallucination.cannot be parasitic upon some antecedent ‘Good’ experience since Sirens are 
fictional entities. In this scenario, I suggest that my hallucination will be parasitic upon an 
antecedent ‘Good’ experience of either (i) a depicted Siren (e.g. the animated entity that has 
repeatedly slain my avatar in the video-game, ‘God of War’), or, (ii) particular objects that have 
been previously seen separately (viz., a woman and a bird), where imaginatively combining my 
ideas of these individual objects allows me to have a hallucinatory experience as of a Siren. 
 
I can now explain Johnston’s first interesting feature of hallucination. For if the objective 
phenomenal characters of hallucinatory experiences are typed by p-imaginings, then, since 
such imaginings cannot be an original source of de re thought, it is conceptually unremarkable 
that hallucinatory experiences cannot be an original source of de re thought.  
 
5.2.1 Hallucination and Original De Re Knowledge of Quality 
 
Hallucination’s second interesting feature, Johnston claims, is that it can be an original source 
of de re knowledge of quality. He writes, 
 
“I can secure my first singular reference to the quality cherry red or to the 
structural property C major by way of hallucinating a scene or tune. […] a 
painter might discover in hallucination a strange, alluring color, which he then 
produces samples of by mixing paints in a novel way.” (2004: 130) 
 
A prima facie objection is that a subject cannot truly have first-order knowledge of a quality that 
she hallucinates unless that knowledge has been antecedently secured by some ‘Good’ 
experience. Thus someone who hallucinates “the structural property C-major” cannot 
conceptually recognize that property as C-major unless she has had at least one antecedent 
‘Good’ experience of, and conceptually recognized, the property C-major. The worry then, is 
that only ‘Good’ experience, together with conceptual recognition of those qualities that are 
presented, can secure original de re knowledge of quality. 
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I suggest that this objection points to a plausible refinement of Johnston’s position, namely, that 
we should distinguish between a subject’s ability to conceptually recognize a hallucinated 
quality Q as being F and her hallucinating Q simpliciter, i.e. between Q’s manner of 
presentation and Q itself. Employing this distinction, my suggestion is that a subject can first 
acquire de re knowledge of a quality Q in hallucination and then (though there is no 
requirement that this must occur) subsequently conceptually recognize Q as F in ‘Good’ 
experience. There is nothing conceptually inchoate about the thought that a subject could 
secure original de re knowledge of the quality cherry red through hallucination, and then when 
she sees cherry red, thinks, “A-ha! So that is what I hallucinated.” Though should no such 
‘Good’ experience ever occur, it remains the case that her hallucination provided her with 
original de re knowledge of the quality cherry red. On my view, a subject need not have any 
antecedent ‘Good’ experience of a quality that she hallucinates – she simply hallucinates, and this 
is sufficient for original de re knowledge of quality. 
 
To sustain the claim that hallucinations are p-imaginings, it must be shown that p-imaginings 
can likewise.be an original source of de re knowledge of quality. Now I am.not claiming that 
hallucinations which provide original de re knowledge of quality do occur (reports of actual 
hallucinations often describe qualities that the subject has previously experienced): I am 
claiming rather, that if such a hallucination were to occur, then (I.D) has conceptual space to 
accommodate it. To see how, consider Hume’s ‘missing’ shade of blue in which we are 
presented with a spectrum of blue colours.that are ordered according to their degree of 
brightness and invited to “raise up to [ourselves] the idea of that particular shade” (1748: §2).  
To illustrate: 
 
Hume’s ‘missing’ shade of blue 
 
 
                                    A              B              C                               E               F              G 
 
I claim that a normally sighted subject can p-imagine the missing shade by imaginatively 
combining her ideas of the surrounding shades of blue – the most likely combination being ‘C’ 
and ‘E’, though perhaps other combinations are possible. To see how, consider the widely 
169 
 
accepted distinction125 between unique and binary hues – unique hues (red, green, yellow, and 
blue) are phenomenally unmixed hues that look to.contain no other chromatic component, 
whereas binary hues are phenomenally mixed hues that look to be composed of two unique 
hues: turquoise, for instance, looks to be an admixture of blue and green, and psychedelic.purple 
looks to be an admixture of red and blue (see, e.g. Allen 2010a: 13). Exploiting this distinction, I 
suggest that it is possible to successfully p-imagine the missing shade of blue by imaginatively 
combining the binary hues that are previously seen (compare: someone who imagines a centaur 
has plausibly combined her ideas of worldly objects that have previously been seen separately, 
viz., a man and a horse).126 
 
Applying my model to Johnston’s examples, the suggestion is that someone who secures 
original de re knowledge of the quality cherry red through hallucination has imaginatively 
combined her ideas of some.antecedently experienced similar shades (e.g. perhaps a dark 
purple and a dark red); and someone who secures original de re knowledge of the quality C-
major through hallucination has imaginatively combined her ideas of some antecedently 
experienced similar sounds (e.g. perhaps B-major and C-minor). Johnston’s original position 
has now been refined even further: For novel qualities are not somehow conjured up ex nihilo; 
in all cases, the quality in question is essentially related to other qualities that the subject has 
previously experienced. But this does not endanger my claim that p-imaginings can be an 
original source of de re knowledge of quality since there is no requirement that such knowledge 
must be acquired ex nihilo. It is significant enough that the subject can expand her knowledge of 
qualities.by p-imagining, even if she cannot p-imagine novel qualities from scratch. 
 
My model can conceptually accommodate Johnston’s example of ‘supersaturated red’ which, 
he thinks, is a quality that is only knowable through hallucination. He writes: 
 
“There is a state that a subject can get into by being exposed to bright 
monochromatic unique green light […] in an otherwise dark room for about 
twenty minutes. If we then turn the stimulus off, illuminate the room, and have 
the subject look at a small, not-too-bright achromatic surface, he will see a red 
                                                     
125 I lack space to defend this distinction. For present purposes, it is sufficient that normally sighted subjects can 
conceptually grasp it. 
126 Perhaps a sufficiently imaginative and sedulous person could successfully p-imagine the missing shade by 
imaginatively extending her idea of e.g. ‘C’ in the spectrum above – though admittedly, this seems less likely than 
imaginatively combining her ideas of at least two shades. 
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afterimage. If the subject turns so that the afterimage is then superimposed on a 
small red background then [he will] be after-imaging a supersaturated red […]  a 
red purer than the purest spectral red light.” (2004: 141-2) 
 
Now, it is far from obvious that this really exemplifies a hallucination127; however, it is worth 
granting Johnston this assumption since he denies that any brand of disjunctivism can explain.it 
(2004: 131). I think.that it can be explained along the same lines as Hume’s missing shade of 
blue: specifically, the thought would be that the successive presentation of the unique green 
light in a dark room, an achromatic surface, and the small red background perceptually-
cognitively, prime128 the subject to imaginatively combine her ideas of these antecedently 
experienced qualities to successfully p-imagine supersaturated red. 
  
I can now explain our second interesting feature of hallucination: For if the objective 
phenomenal characters of hallucinatory experiences are typed by p-imaginings, then since such 
imaginings can be an original source of de re quality, it is conceptually unremarkable that 
                                                     
127 I suspect that this set-up enables the normally sighted subject to have a ‘Good’ experience of a naïve colour 
property that is ordinarily visually inaccessible owing to the behaviour of her photoreceptors. To see how this 
works, consider this simpler case: First, stare at the dot in the red circle for ten seconds and then transfer your 
gaze to the black dot on the right.   
 
 
 
You are likely to see a greenish-blue afterimage. Here is what I think occurred: when you fixated on the dot in 
the red circle, an area of your retina was stimulated by red light; hence there is an adaptation by your 
photoreceptor cells that are more sensitive to red light. Then, when you looked.at the white surface, the area of 
your retina which adapted to red light was less sensitive to the red than green and blue properties of the white 
surface (white being a phenomenal mixture of all visible wavelengths): in short, you effectively become blind to 
red but not green and blue; hence you saw a greenish-blue patch. I am suggesting that this greenish-blue patch is a 
naïve colour property that was instantiated by the green and blue properties of the white surface. 
 Now in Johnston’s example, I suspect that normally sighted subjects adapt to see magenta and not supersaturated 
red (see Manzotti 2014) – still, whatever colour one adapts to see will be a naïve property that is instantiated by 
the small red background. And whether I treat afterimages as p-imaginings or awareness of naïve colour 
properties that are normally hidden, what matters is that I am not committed to treating them as perceptual 
experiences, and so, do not risk resurrecting the p.m.e. 
128 I elaborate this notion of priming in §6.1.1 and §6.1.2. 
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hallucination can be an original source of de re knowledge of quality. 
 
5.2.2 Summary 
 
I have now shown how (I.D) can explain hallucination’s two interesting features. I suspect that 
Johnston’s.complaint that no form of disjunctivism can accomplish this stems from his 
concentrating on the view’s more problematic forms: For he considers a Martin-esque negative 
form which simply denies that hallucination and seeing involve a common “act of awareness” 
(2004: 121) and a Fish-y positive form according to which “hallucinating a dagger is falsely 
seeming to oneself to be seeing a dagger” (2004: 124). But the former is naturally too 
deflationary to secure hallucination’s two interesting features (§2.2.1), whereas the latter 
objectionably identifies the explanans (a dagger-hallucination) with the explanandum (why it 
falsely seems to the subject that she sees a dagger) (§2.2.2). Johnston is quite right to complain 
about the “irritating unhelpfulness” (2004: 131) of these two forms: But it is the conception of 
hallucinatory experience as being p-imagined that is the more helpful form which he has 
overlooked. With this conception elaborated, it is now time to test it against Johnston’s 
Sensible Profile Theory of hallucination. 
 
5.3 Johnston’s Sensible Profile Theory of Hallucination 
 
Johnston’s Sensible Profile theory of hallucination can be seen as springing from the need to 
explain its two interesting features.129 He reasons that since hallucination cannot be a source of 
original de re knowledge about particulars, but can be a source of original de re knowledge 
about qualities “the primary object of hallucination is individuated in terms of properties rather 
than particulars” (2004: 131).130 Construing the direct object of hallucination as being purely 
                                                     
129 Johnston’s other motivation is that any adequate theory of hallucination must “combine the common object of 
awareness that is […] present in hallucination and seeing with the no less “direct” awareness of external objects 
that is definitive of seeing” (2004: 120). For disjunctivism, Johnston objects, “has nothing satisfactory to say” 
(2004: 124) about those experientially seamless transitions that can occur between ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experiences 
which abductively imply that they are phenomenally type-identical mental states; whereas conjunctivism, 
Johnston also objects, counterintuitively entails that, in ‘Good’ experience, worldly objects are “less” (2004: 119) 
present than the non-worldly objects of hallucination. A robust theory of hallucination should thus, Johnston 
insists, explain what is common to ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experience whilst preserving the former’s world-
acquaintingness. 
130 This implies that there can be secondary objects of hallucination which are “determined by how the primary 
object immediately strikes” (Johnston 2004: 132) one, e.g. if you hallucinate a qualitative complex that “strikes” 
172 
 
qualitative thus explains why hallucination can be an original source of de re knowledge of 
quality (subjects are directly acquainted with qualities) but not of particulars (no particulars 
are directly presented). This qualitative object, Johnston tells us, is a complex of purely 
qualitative and relational ingredients called a Sensible Profile. He writes: 
 
“Consider the […] scene before your eyes. Now attend to the relational and 
qualitative structure that is visibly instantiated there in the scene. It consists of just 
the properties and relations of which you are visually aware, when you are seeing 
the scene. It is a […] sensible profile, a complex, partly qualitative, and partly 
relational property, which exhausts the way the particular scene before your eyes is 
if your present experience is veridical.” (2004: 134) 
 
But in hallucination, no candidate worldly objects exist to instantiate those qualities and 
relations of which the subject is directly aware.131  Hence she is left,  
 
“[…] simply aware of the partly qualitative, partly relational profile. […] When the 
visual system misfires, as in hallucination, it presents uninstantiated complexes of 
sensible qualities and relations, at least complexes not instantiated there in the 
scene before the eyes.” (2004: 135, my emphasis) 
 
These remarks suggest,  
 
Johnston’s Hallucination Thesis: For any hallucinatory experience EH had by a subject 
s at time t, the primary object of awareness is a Sensible Profile SP, where SP is (i) 
a complex property that is structured out of an array of uninstantiated universal 
sensible Qs1, Qs2 … Qsn and relations R1, R2 … RN, and, (ii) immediately 
presented to s’s consciousness at t.  
 
Johnston (2004: 147) illustrates his Hallucination Thesis by analogy with the complex property 
                                                                                                                                                                
you as being of Ares, the Greek God of war, then Ares is the secondary object of your hallucination. 
Hallucinations will lack secondary objects when the Sensible Profile does not strike the subject as being about any 
particular thing. I discuss the difficulty with this distinction in §5.3.2. 
131 Though I share Thompson’s suspicion that uninstantiated qualities and relations cannot “do the metaphysical 
job of constituting phenomenal character” (2008: 402), I lack space to argue for this claim here. In the present 
context, what matters is that Johnston’s account is not, or so I shall argue (§5.3.2), disjunctivist enough to block 
the resurrection of Spreading. 
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of being-a-HCI-molecule, i.e. the complex property of being-a-hydrogen-ion-that-is-covalently-
bonded-to-a-chlorine-ion. Chemistry tells us that the instantiation of this complex property 
necessarily requires the instantiation of two basic properties and one relation: namely, (i) being-
a-hydrogen-ion (P1), (ii) being-a-chlorine-ion (P2) and (iii) the relation of covalent bonding (R1), 
which holds between P1 and P2. Johnston claims that those necessary connections which hold 
between the instantiation of the complex property of being-a-HCI-molecule and the instantiation 
of these more fundamental qualitative and relational properties are best explained by the fact 
that these ingredients are not themselves “wholly distinct from the complex property” (ibid) 
that is ontologically structured out of them. The complex property of being-a-HCI-molecule is 
thus understood as fundamentally consisting in the basic properties P1 and P2 and a particular 
type of relation, R1, that holds between them. 
 
Johnston’s analogy is that, just as the complex property of being-a-HCI-molecule fundamentally 
consists in three basic ingredients, so the direct object of a hallucinatory experience is a 
complex property (viz., a Sensible Profile) that fundamentally consists in uninstantiated sensible 
qualities and relations. Take my present, presumably ‘Good’, experience. As I visually attend to 
the “relational and qualitative structure” that is “visibly instantiated” by various candidate 
worldly objects, I am presented with a range of sensible qualities and relations such as a-
rectangular-shape-in-front-of-me and a-green-colour-to-my-right, where these qualities and relations 
are experientially instantiated by my computer monitor and Scrabble, the terrier’s tennis ball 
respectively. As Johnston tells it, a ‘Good’ experience’s phenomenal character132 is typed by a 
complex Sensible Profile that is experientially instantiated133 by those worldly objects with 
which the subject is directly acquainted. 
 
Particularly important is Johnston’s claim that a Sensible Profile’s qualities and relations are, 
since “different things could instantiate the same spatio-temporal layout” (2004: 135), mind-
                                                     
132 As Johnston treats the objective and subjective phenomenal characters of both ‘Good’ and hallucinatory 
experiences as being identical, I will simply speak of phenomenal character throughout the remainder of this chapter 
unless otherwise indicated. 
133 Johnston does not clarify if ‘Good’ experience involves awareness of instantiations of Sensible Profiles or just 
Sensible Profiles that are instantiated. I assume that he means the former: For otherwise, as Dunn (2008: 379) 
notes, a Sensible Profile might be instantiated even when it is the primary object of a hallucination, since I could 
hallucinate a Sensible Profile that is not instantiated by any candidate worldly object in my immediate 
environment (e.g. as of a mango) but which happens to be instantiated thousands of miles away. If ‘Good’ 
experience involves awareness of Sensible Profiles that are instantiated (somewhere), then I would, absurdly, be 
veridically seeing a mango.  
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independent universals as standardly conceived, i.e. mind-independent properties that can be 
instantiated by numerically distinct things. Such universality is said to explain why the 
hallucinating subject can only ever be directly aware of “the partly qualitative, partly relational 
profile.” Suppose that I am now having a reflectively indiscriminable hallucination as of 
Scrabble, the terrier, sunbathing in the garden. Johnston’s thought is that I am directly aware of 
the very same qualities and relations as those that I would be directly aware of the corresponding 
‘Good’ experience: it is just that they cannot, since hallucination is neither world-involving nor 
world-acquainting, be experientially instantiated by any candidate worldly object.134 As 
Johnston tells it, a hallucinatory experience’s phenomenal character is typed by a complex 
Sensible Profile that is not experientially instantiated by candidate worldly objects. 
 
We can now see that Johnston’s story of hallucination differs from (I.D)’s in two key ways. 
First, I think that a hallucinatory experience’s qualitative and relational properties are p-
imaginings, whereas Johnston thinks that they are uninstantiated universals. Second, it is 
neither purely Conjunctivist nor purely Disjunctivist, but amalgamates ingredients from both rival 
theories. The conjunctivist ingredient that ‘Good’ and hallucinatory experiences share is, of 
course, a reflectively indiscriminable Sensible Profile; whereas its disjunctivist ingredient 
consists in the fact that a hallucination’s Sensible Profile is not experientially instantiated by 
candidate worldly objects, thus explaining the intuition that “Any case of hallucination is thus a 
case of “direct” visual awareness of less than one would be “directly” aware of in the 
corresponding case of seeing” (Johnston 2004: 137).  That is, ‘Good’ and hallucinatory 
experiences are phenomenally typed by the same Sensible Profiles, whilst it is the presence of 
candidate worldly items to experientially instantiate the former’s qualities and relations which 
ensures that it is world-involving and world-acquainting in just the way that naïve realism 
requires.  
 
5.3.1 Two (Out of Three) Constraints on Hallucinatory Experience isn’t Bad 
 
Johnston’s Sensible Profile theory of hallucination can plausibly explain two out of our three 
constraints on any explanatory adequate theory of hallucinatory experience.  
                                                     
134 Suppose that I doxastically resist my hallucination. Assuming that my resistance does not stem from being told 
that I am hallucinating, then it can, Johnston thinks, be explained by the fact that the “sensible profile […] 
matches nothing” (2004: 144) that I have been experientially presented with before, i.e. the puzzle of belief-
independence is resolved by positing a Sensible Profile which exemplifies some scene that the subject thinks 
cannot be experientially instantiated by anything worldly.  
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1. Positive Explanation of Hallucinatory Experience  
 
I have argued (§2.2) that any explanatory adequate disjunctivism must positively explain a ‘Bad’ 
(here, hallucinatory) experience’s remarkable features. Johnston’s Sensible Profile theory of 
hallucination would seem to accomplish just this since he claims that hallucinatory reflective 
indiscriminability springs from the fact that the hallucinatory Sensible Profile directly presents 
the subject with the same universal qualities and relations that would be experientially 
instantiated by worldly items in the corresponding ‘Good’ case. This positive conception of 
reflective indiscriminability can plausibly be employed to secure remaining hallucinatory 
remarkable features. 
 
Take hallucinatory scene-immediacy. Johnston’s argument presumably goes: Reflective 
indiscriminability consists in the fact that ‘Good’ and hallucinatory experiences share reflectively 
indiscriminable Sensible Profiles; since ‘Good’ Sensible Profiles are phenomenally scene-
immediate, reflectively indiscriminable hallucinatory Sensible Profiles must also be 
phenomenally scene-immediate. That is, when, 
 
(1) A subject s has a hallucinatory experience EH, where it is as if EH immediately 
presents an object, o, as being F.  
 
It is because, 
 
(2) S cannot reflectively discriminate the uninstantiated Sensible Profile that is the 
direct object of EH from the instantiated phenomenally scene-immediate 
Sensible Profile that is the direct object of some metaphysically possible Good 
experience, EG. 
 
The thought is that a hallucinatory experience is phenomenally scene-immediate since the 
subject cannot reflectively discriminate the uninstantiated Sensible Profile that is the direct 
object of her awareness from the phenomenally scene-immediate Sensible Profile that would 
be instantiated by the corresponding ‘Good’ experience. For instance, my mango-hallucination 
will be phenomenally scene-immediate iff I cannot reflectively discriminate those 
uninstantiated qualities and relations from the phenomenally scene-immediate ones that would 
be instantiated by the corresponding ‘Good’ experience of a mango (these remarks apply, 
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mutatis mutandis, to the other hallucinatory remarkable features of subjective, rational, and 
behavioural equivalence).  
 
Positively grounding the indiscriminability property that ‘Good’ and hallucinatory experiences 
share in the reflective indiscriminability of their Sensible Profiles thus means that Johnston’s, 
unlike Langsam’s negative, conception of hallucinatory indiscriminability can robustly secure 
hallucination’s remaining remarkable features. Neither is there any Fish-y circularity in this 
thought since the explanans (reflectively indiscriminable ‘Good’ and hallucinatory Sensible 
Profiles) and explanandum (a hallucinatory experience’s remaining remarkable features) are 
distinct properties. 
 
2. Unidisjunctivism  
 
I have argued (§2.3) that any explanatory adequate disjunctivism must have the resources to 
tell a unified story of dreams, hallucination, and illusion. Johnston’s Sensible Profile theory of 
hallucination would seem to accomplish just this. Consider his description of the ‘Waterfall’ 
illusion: 
 
“You see the stationary rungs over there and at the same time you are presented 
with a complex quality – upward movement of the rungs over there – which if it 
were instantiated would be instantiated by the same rungs moving upward. But 
[…] nothing is instantiating this quality; that is why it counts as an illusion.” 
(2004: 144) 
 
Johnston’s thought seems to be that the direct object of an illusory experience is a ‘hybrid’ 
Sensible Profile that is ontologically structured out of both instantiated and uninstantiated 
universal qualities and relations, where its uninstantiated ingredients ground its misleading 
aspects. Thus the direct object of the ‘Waterfall’ illusion is a hybrid Sensible Profile that is 
ontologically structured out of the instantiated universal sensible quality and relation stationary-
rungs-over-there and the uninstantiated universal sensible quality and relation upward-movement-of-
the-rungs-over-there, where this uninstantiated ingredient grounds the misleading look as of 
stationary rungs simultaneously moving upwards. 
 
Though Johnston does mention dreams, his thought would presumably be that the direct 
objects of dream experiences are wholly uninstantiated Sensible Profiles that, in order to 
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preserve the distinction between dreaming and hallucination, are presented to the dreamer’s 
consciousness during sleep. Someone who reports a dream in which she was tasked with finding 
the one non-fake barn in a field of paper mâché barns would thus have been immediately 
presented with a Sensible Profile during sleep that was ontologically structured out of certain 
uninstantiated universal sensible qualities and relations such as rectangular-shapes-around-me and 
green-ish-colours-on-my-right. 
 
Johnston’s unidisjunctivism seems to range ‘Bad’ experiences along a ‘spectrum’ according to 
their number of uninstantiated properties. At the ‘Illusory’ pole will lie those experiences (e.g. 
the ‘Waterfall’ illusion) with hybrid Sensible Profiles; whereas at the ‘Hallucination and 
Dreaming’ pole will lie those experiences (e.g. ‘veridically’ hallucinating lights above one) with 
Sensible Profiles that are constituted by only uninstantiated ingredients. Between the poles will 
lie a series of experiences that are ranged according to how many of their qualities and 
relations are experientially instantiated by worldly particulars.135 Johnston’s story of ‘Bad’ 
experience is thus structurally parallel to (I.D)’s except for one crucial difference: namely, I 
deny that ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experiences share any basic ingredient which explains their being 
the type of experiences that they are – a more accurate version of Johnston’s ‘spectrum’ 
would, to reflect his thought that Sensible Profiles are also the direct objects of ‘Good’ 
experiences, also have a ‘Good’ pole at which will lie those experiences with Sensible Profiles 
that are constituted by only instantiated ingredients. 
 
5.3.2 Revisiting the Problem of Explanatory Screening Off 
 
I have argued (§2.1) that any successful naïve realist solution to the p.m.e must be some form of 
Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism. According to Johnston, his story is just disjunctivist enough to save 
naïve realism since … 
 
“When we see we are aware of instantiations of sensible profiles. When we 
hallucinate we are aware merely of sensible profiles which are structured 
qualitative parts of the sensible profiles whose instantiations we see.” (2004: 140) 
 
As a result, 
 
                                                     
135 Though it is likely to be disputed just where certain experiences lie, it only matters that such an ordering is 
possible in principle. 
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“[…] distinctively different acts of awareness [are] involved in hallucinating and 
seeing, individuated by different objects of awareness.” (2004: 139) 
 
Johnston’s reasoning is simply that since a ‘Good’ experience’s qualities and relations are 
instantiated by worldly objects, and since a hallucinatory experience’s qualities and relations 
are not instantiated by worldly objects, reflectively indiscriminable ‘Good’ and hallucinatory 
experiences cannot involve the same act of awareness. That is, reflectively indiscriminable 
‘Good’ and hallucinatory experiences have a common experiential ingredient (viz., a Sensible 
Profile) but cannot involve the same mental act of seeing since only the former’s Sensible 
Profile is intrinsically world-involving and world-acquainting, i.e. naïve realist.   
 
Unfortunately, Johnston’s quasi-disjunctivism runs headlong into the Problem of Explanatory 
Screening Off since he claims that neurophysical activity is minimally sufficient for a 
hallucinatory experience. He writes: 
 
“The constitutional basis for the act of awareness involved in hallucination is the 
state of the hallucinator’s visual system” (2004: 139, my emphasis) “One’s brain could 
just go into a state that constitutes one’s hallucinating.” (2004: 167) 
 
For instance, Johnston describes a case in which a mischievous surgeon could cause me to 
veridically hallucinate spotlights on in a ceiling (2004: 122). In this scenario, it is said that I am 
directly aware of uninstantiated qualities and relations such as a white-ish-glowQ1-above-meR1 
where Q1 and R1 constitutively depend.upon certain physical processes and events that are 
occurring within my brain. This commits him to, 
 
(1)  Local Supervenience of Hallucination Thesis*: For any hallucinatory experience EH 
had by a subject S, there is some type of neurophysical state, N, in S, such 
that N is minimally sufficient for the occurrence of EH, and the instantiation 
of EH’s uninstantiated Sensible Profile. (Instance of the Local Supervenience of 
Hallucination Thesis) 
 
 In a familiar move, the Local Supervenience of Hallucination Thesis* can be conjoined with, 
 
(2)  Converse Modal Claim*: For any two subjects S1 and S2 (where S1 is having a 
hallucinatory experience EH and S2 a Good experience EG): It is 
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metaphysically possible that the neurophysical state, N, that is minimally 
sufficient for the occurrence of EH, and the instantiation of EH’s 
uninstantiated Sensible Profile, can occur in S2. (Instance of Converse Modal 
Claim) 
 
For instance, if a certain type of neurophysical state is realized within me that is minimally 
sufficient for the occurrence of my veridical hallucination as of spotlights on in a ceiling (where 
this consists in direct awareness of an uninstantiated Sensible Profile), then it is metaphysically 
possible that that same state is realized within another subject when she is having a ‘Good’ 
experience of spotlights on in a ceiling.  
 
Conjoining the Local Supervenience of Hallucination Thesis* and the Converse Modal Claim* spells 
trouble for Johnston’s story: For if a certain type of neurophysical state is minimally sufficient 
for my awareness of an uninstantiated Sensible Profile, and if that same state occurs within 
another subject who is having a ‘Good’ experience, then we must be having phenomenally 
type-identical experiences, viz., of uninstantiated Sensible Profiles. In other words, the Local 
Supervenience of Hallucination Thesis* and the Converse Modal Claim* are conjoined to resurrect, 
 
(3) Spreading*: For any two experiencing subjects S1 and S2 (where S1 is having a 
hallucinatory experience EH and S2 a Good experience EG): Necessarily, if S1 
and S2 are in the same type of neurophysical state, N (where N is minimally 
sufficient for the occurrence of EH, and the instantiation of its uninstantiated 
Sensible Profile), EH and EG are of phenomenal type F, where F is an 
uninstantiated Sensible Profile. (Instance of Spreading, metaphysical 
implication of (1) & (2)) 
 
A ‘Good’ experience’s naïve properties are now rendered epiphenomenal: For if my awareness 
of an uninstantiated Sensible Profile is sufficient to explain why my hallucinatory experience as 
of spotlights on in a ceiling has that phenomenal character; then, if another subject’s ‘Good’ 
experience of spotlights on in a ceiling has that uninstantiated Sensible Profile, then that too 
must be sufficient to explain why it has that phenomenal character. Hence, 
 
(4)  Principle of Explanatory Screening Off: For any two experiencing subjects S1 and 
S2, where S1 is having a hallucinatory experience EH and S2 is having a Good 
experience EG: If EH and EG are phenomenally typed by an uninstantiated 
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Sensible Profile SP, then SP screens off any of EG’s naïve properties PN1, PN2 … 
PNN from constitutively explaining its phenomenal character. (Metaphysical 
implication of (3))
 
 
Johnston might now reject the unrestricted form of the Local Supervenience of Hallucination 
Thesis* on.the.grounds that the uninstantiated Sensible Profiles of at least some hallucinatory 
experiences are.metaphysically individuated by their secondary objects or manners of 
presentation, i.e. what the subject experiences the uninstantiated property complex as. Of 
such cases, Johnston says: 
 
“[…] X’s hallucinating @ amounts to there being some uninstantiated profile of 
which X is visually aware and X’s awareness of this profile being caused in the 
right way by a perception of @ or by a thought to the effect that @ is such and 
so. […] Thus, in so far as we think of hallucinations as individuated by their 
secondary objects, hallucinations will not narrowly supervene, even on the total 
brain state of the subject.” (2004: 169) 
 
As I read him, Johnston’s de re externalism about those hallucinatory experiences (i.e. 
experiences that are essentially of mind-independent things) which are metaphysically 
individuated by their manners of presentation is a natural consequence of the claim that such 
experiences cannot be an original source of de re thought (§5.2). Though Johnston’s remarks 
are brief, his argument seems to be this: First, it is claimed that a complex of uninstantiated 
qualities and relations can only strike a subject, s, as being of some particular object, o, if she 
has had at least one antecedent ‘Good’ experience of o; it is then reasoned that if the 
uninstantiated property complex that determines the phenomenal character of s’s hallucinatory 
experience, EH, is metaphysically individuated by its secondary object (viz., o), then, since s’s 
antecedent ‘Good’ experience of o presupposes that o has a mind-independent existence136, s’s 
neurophysical state cannot be minimally sufficient for the occurrence of EH, together with its 
uninstantiated Sensible Profile. 
 
                                                     
136 Suppose that an uninstantiated property complex strikes me as being of Hermes, the winged messenger, who 
has no mind-independent existence: in this case, I take it that Johnston would say that I must have had either at 
least one antecedent ‘Good’ experience of (i) a depiction of Hermes, or, (ii) a man and something with wings, 
where imaginatively combining the two objects that have been seen separately allows me to hallucinate Hermes 
(§5.2). 
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To illustrate. Suppose that an uninstantiated property complex strikes me as being of Scrabble, 
the terrier, and that my hallucinatory experience is metaphysically individuated in terms of this 
secondary object. For my hallucination to occur, there must be some “external causal 
connection to [Scrabble, the terrier] that is positively relevant” (Johnston 2004: 167) to my 
hallucinating a complex of uninstantiated qualities and relations as Scrabble, the terrier; and the 
relevant causal connection is, of course, some antecedent ‘Good’ experience(s) that I have had 
of her – at least I take it that this is what Johnston means when he speaks of my “awareness of 
this profile being caused in the right way.” But this antecedent ‘Good’ experience conceptually 
entails that Scrabble has a mind-independent existence; hence my hallucinatory experience’s 
phenomenal character does not narrowly supervene upon my neurophysical state, but rather, 
widely supervenes upon a worldly particular, viz., Scrabble, the terrier. 
 
Though Johnston does not explicitly explain how construing hallucinatory experience in this 
way resists.the Argument.from Explanatory Screening Off, we can envisage the following scenario. 
Consider two intrinsic physical duplicates, S1 and S2, where S1 is having a hallucinatory 
experience (EH) as of a particular object, o, and S2 is having a ‘Good’ experience (EG) of o. 
Construing EH’s uninstantiated Sensible Profile as being.metaphysically individuated by o allows 
Johnston to reason thus: since EH can only occur relative to a non-causal background condition 
(i.e. S1’s antecedent ‘Good’ experience of o), and since that condition is not necessary for the 
occurrence of EG (EG’s occurrence.can hardly require that S2 has had an antecedent ‘Good’ 
experience of o since we are then surfing an infinite regress: EG, rather, can provide S2 with 
original de re knowledge of o), the uninstantiated Sensible Profile that determines EH’s 
phenomenal character cannot ‘spread’ itself over to EG, and hence, screen off its naïve 
properties from playing their distinctive explanatory role. 
 
I find Johnston’s partial rejection of the Local Supervenience of Hallucination Thesis* unpersuasive 
for two reasons. First, I am not convinced that the uninstantiated Sensible Profile of any 
hallucinatory experience can in fact be metaphysically individuated in terms of its secondary 
object given Johnston’s insistence that the only genuine items with which the subject is directly 
acquainted are its qualities and relations simpliciter. For the, 
 
“[…] appeal to [secondary objects] is just a facon de parler. […] When we talk of 
secondary [objects of hallucination] […] we are to be understood as talking of how 
certain genuine items, namely the primary objects, strike the relevant subjects. There is 
no need to further suppose that there are further genuine, but somehow non-
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existent, items whose identity […] is a construal-dependent matter.” (2004: 143, 
my emphasis) 
 
Consider again my hallucination as of Scrabble, the terrier: if the only genuine items of which I 
am directly aware are uninstantiated qualities and relations such as a ginger-ishQ1-shape-of-a-
certain-sortQ2-in-front-of-meR1, then, since there is “no obstacle” (Johnston 2004: 168) to 
supposing that this uninstantiated.property complex narrowly supervenes upon my 
neurophysical state, Johnston must still explain why my intrinsic physical duplicate who is 
having the corresponding ‘Good’ experience is not likewise directly aware of the same 
uninstantiated property complex, which then screens off her experience’s naïve properties 
from constitutively explaining its phenomenal character. 
 
Second, even if Johnston could find some intelligible way to metaphysically individuate the 
uninstantiated Sensible Profiles of some hallucinatory experiences in terms of their secondary 
objects, it still remains the case that the uninstantiated Sensible Profiles of remaining 
hallucinatory experiences are metaphysically individuated in terms of their primary objects 
which are said to narrowly supervene upon the subject’s internal constitution (2004: 168). This 
is precisely Johnston’s point when he talks of a subject’s “brain [that] could just go into a 
[hallucinatory] state”: indeed, such a subject might hallucinate “nothing more.than a dagger-like 
array of visible qualities” (2004: 133, my emphasis), which would be an uninstantiated 
property complex that does not strike her as being of any particular object, i.e. a hallucinatory 
experience that lacks a secondary object altogether.137 Once such cases are granted, the Problem 
of Explanatory Screening Off plays out as before: if the subject’s hallucinatory experience of 
uninstantiated “dagger-like” qualities narrowly supervenes upon her neurophysical state, then 
the realization of that same state within another subject who is having the corresponding 
‘Good’ experience is likewise minimally sufficient for her experiential awareness of the same 
uninstantiated property complex, which then screens off her experience’s naïve properties 
from constitutively explaining its phenomenal character. 
 
At this stage, Johnston might bluntly insist that those hallucinatory experiences which are 
metaphysically.individuated in terms of their primary objects narrowly supervene upon the 
                                                     
137 If, as the empirical evidence suggests, concept-less creatures can hallucinate, then their hallucinations would 
always lack secondary objects; hence the cane toad that veridically hallucinates bright lights and scurries away 
would simply be having a physiological response to a light that does not strike it as being of any particular thing 
(Johnston 2004: 125). 
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subject’s neurophysical state whilst independently rejecting Spreading* on the grounds that it 
cannot convincingly explain a series.of experiences involving gradual change (2004: 152-3). 
Johnston invites us to imagine lying in bed.at dawn as the room gradually goes from darkness 
to daylight: he says that for any two times tn and tn+1 that occur very close together (for 
simplicity, say 5:30 am and 5:31 am), the brightness at tn is reflectively indiscriminable from 
the brightness at tn+1 (you cannot, owing to the physiological limitations.of your visual system, 
experientially detect any change in the level of brightness between 5:30 am and 5:31 am). 
Assuming that the room is gradually becoming brighter, that you woke in.the dark and watched 
the smooth transition to daylight, we must conclude that the brightness in the room at tn was 
different from the brightness in the room at tn+1; hence your inability to reflectively 
discriminate between the brightness at tn and tn+1 does not entail that the direct objects of 
awareness are the same. 
 
I find myself perplexed by what this argument is supposed to accomplish. True, your inability 
to reflectively discriminate between the different brightness levels at tn and tn+1 does not show 
that the direct objects of awareness are the same; but that is quite consistent with those objects 
being of the same.basic phenomenal type. Suppose that I awake in the dark and immediately 
begin having a continuous.series of veridical hallucinations as of a gradually increasing 
brightness in the room, where my first hallucinatory experience as of darkness and my last 
hallucinatory experience as of daylight are, though each successive hallucinatory experience in 
the series is not, reflectively discriminable from one another. According to Johnston, I am 
directly aware of a series of not quite noticeably different but metaphysically distinct 
uninstantiated Sensible Profiles. Now if each hallucinatory experience, together.with its 
uninstantiated Sensible Profile, narrowly supervenes upon a slightly different neurophysical 
state as Johnston allows, then I cannot see why the realization of those same states in you.when 
you wake in the dark and watch the smooth transition to daylight are not likewise 
minimally.sufficient for your experiential awareness of the same series of not quite noticeably 
different but metaphysically distinct uninstantiated Sensible Profiles. In which case, the 
phenomenal character.of.each successive ‘Good’ experience in the series cannot be 
constitutively explained by its naïve properties. 
 
My objection to Johnston then, is just this: once it is granted that the phenomenal characters of 
hallucinatory.experiences are typed by uninstantiated property complexes, and once it 
is.granted that such complexes (at least those that are metaphysically individuated in terms of 
their primary objects).narrowly supervene upon the subject’s neurophysical state, it then 
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becomes very difficult to successfully deny that the phenomenal characters of ‘Good’ 
experiences are likewise typed by uninstantiated property complexes, which then renders their 
naïve properties explanatorily inert. For this reason, Johnston’s Sensible Profile theory of 
hallucination is put out of play. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that the objective phenomenal characters of hallucinations are 
typed by perception-like imaginings that convincingly simulate the objective phenomenal 
characters of metaphysically possible ‘Good’ experiences, where this claim can block the p.m.e 
qua hallucination and explain hallucinatory remarkable features. I then developed (I.D) by 
showing how it can explain why hallucination cannot be a source of original de re thought but 
can be a source of original de re knowledge.of quality. I then rejected Johnston’s rival Sensible 
Profile theory of hallucination on the grounds that it is ultimately felled by the Problem of 
Explanatory Screening Off. As (I.D) adequately explains.the remarkable and interesting features 
of hallucinatory experience whilst successfully resisting the Problem of Explanatory Screening Off, 
it remains the preferred theory of hallucination. 
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6 
Imaginative Disjunctivism and Illusion 
 
In this chapter, I explain and defend the claim that the objective phenomenal characters of 
illusory experiences are naïve realist, whilst an aspect of their subjective phenomenal 
characters (that which constitutes the experience’s illusory aspect) is p-imagined. I begin by 
distinguishing between three varieties of illusion: namely, (i) cognitive illusions (§6.1) which 
admit of a joint subject-independent physical and subject-dependent cognitive explanation (e.g. 
as when we see a certain shaped tree as a person), (ii) optical illusions (§6.1.1) which admit of a 
joint subject-independent physical and subject-dependent perceptual explanation (e.g. as when 
the Müller-Lyer lines’ end-hashes somehow mislead our visual system into seeing them as 
unequal in length), and, (iii) physical illusions (§6.1.2) which admit of a purely subject-
independent physical explanation (e.g. as when light refracted through a wedge prism causes 
objects viewed through it to look displaced).138 I argue that experiences which exemplify (i) 
and (ii).are disjunctive ‘hybrids’ that are neither completely ‘Bad’ (since their objective 
phenomenal character are intrinsically constituted by naïve properties) nor completely ‘Good’ 
(since their subjective phenomenal characters have at least one p-imagined apparent naïve 
property that is no part of their objective phenomenal characters), whereas experiences which 
exemplify (iii) are ‘Good’ (since there is no mismatch between their objective and subjective 
phenomenal characters). 
 
I then (§6.2) sketch Brewer’s rival (2008; 2011) object view (o.v) of illusion according to 
illusory experiences occur when the candidate worldly object (which is said to constitutively 
explain the experience’s phenomenal character) visually resembles a paradigm empirical kind 
that it does not objectively exemplify. I reject (o.v) on two counts: first, I argue that it fails to 
offer a unified theory of illusion (§6.2.1); and second, I argue that (o.v) can only explain an 
illusory experience’s remarkable phenomenal feature of scene-immediacy on pain of abandoning 
its naïve realist treatment of illusion. As (I.D) offers a unified account of illusion that keeps 
faith with its naïve realist commitments, it remains the preferred theory of illusion.  
 
 
                                                     
138 That some illusions may not fall neatly into a given sub-class is not problematic since we surely grasp the 
distinctions between each sub-class even when we may be unsure to which one a particular illusion belongs – (I.D) 
requires only this to do its explanatory work. 
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6.1 Cognitive Illusion 
 
Cognitive illusions are said to occur when “we see something–for example, a coil of rope or a 
horse–but take it to be something it is not, such as a snake or a cow” (Fish 2009: 149). The 
basic idea is that cognitive illusions occur when a candidate worldly object is arranged in such a 
way that it produces some kind of anomalous cognitive effect in the subject. A cognitive 
illusion thus admits of a dual explanation consisting of someeset of subject subject-independent 
physical factors (i.e. the world must be a certain way for the illusion to occur) and some set of 
subject-dependent cognitive factors (i.e. the subject’s cognitive equipment must also be a 
certain way for the illusion to occur). 
 
Cases belonging to this class are usually unpredictable and non-intersubjective.139 They are usually 
unpredictable since subjects do not usually have the same cognitive responses to the same 
object at different times and in different situations, e.g. I might see a bundle of clothes on a 
chair as my dog during.the night and realize that she slept elsewhere when I simply see a 
bundle of clothes in the morning. They are not usually intersubjective since cognitive 
responses to the same object often differ between subjects, e.g. a cloud that I see as saucer-
shaped might be seen by the fervent U.F.O enthusiast as an alien spacecraft. 
 
Cognitive illusions are said to threaten naïve realism since they involve situations in which a 
subject perceives a worldly object, ow, as being F when there is nothing that is F for her to be 
directly acquainted with. In Fish’s example, Hellie and friends will simply point out that the 
subject cannot be visually aware.of a snake since there is no snake in her immediate 
environment to instantiate the experience’s ‘snake-ish’ phenomenal character140; it is then 
tempting to conclude that some non-naïve ingredient must be doing this instantiatory work – 
an ingredient that will, since they think that reflectively.indiscriminable experiences are 
phenomenally type-identical mental states, type the corresponding ‘Good’ experience of 
seeing a snake. I am thus tasked with explaining why subjects.occasionally think that they see 
something which is not objectively there without positing something non-naïve that then 
constitutively explains the corresponding ‘Good’ experience’s phenomenal character. 
                                                     
139 There may be contrived cases, e.g. perhaps we can predict, to a degree greater than chance, that the U.F.O 
enthusiast will see a saucer-shaped cloud as a spacecraft; and if she is with fellow enthusiasts, it may be that many 
see a saucer-shaped cloud as a spacecraft, and refuse to believe that it is just a cloud. 
140 My opponent treats a cognitive illusion’s subjective phenomenal character as its objective phenomenal 
character, so I will simply speak of phenomenal character until I introduce my story. 
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I begin this task by sketching Fish’s story of cognitive illusion since, or so I will argue, its 
core.defect highlight’s my story’s plausibility. Fish claims that a cognitive illusion occurs 
when, 
 
“The layout of the tract of the environment that subjects are open to […] leads 
them to deploy inappropriate conceptual-recognitional capacities and thereby 
form erroneous beliefs and judgements about their experiences of that particular. 
[…] Such beliefs can explain the occurrence of the illusion in a way consistent 
with naïve realism—the ˝illusion˝ is just a ghost generated by the subject’s belief 
or judgement that they are seeing something.” (2009: 179) 
 
Fish’s thought is that aspects of the subject’s immediate environment – specifically, those 
perceptible properties of the worldly object that is presented and the conditions under which it 
is viewed – causally interact with certain aspects of her psychological state in such a way that 
she is cognitively primed or disposed to deploy incorrect concepts to describe what she thinks 
or believes she has seen. Thus someone who sees a rope as a snake simply sees the rope (for there 
is nothing else to see); but it is some degree of.similarity between its perceptible.properties 
and those of (subject-relative) paradigmatic snakes that, perhaps in conjunction with her snake 
phobia, induce her to.deploy the incorrect concept snake to describe what she thinks is 
objectively there (compare: someone without a.snake phobia might simply deploy the correct 
concept rope to describe what she thinks she sees). 
 
This is our first proper sighting of a ‘Two Level’ theory of illusion. At the first level, worldly 
objects are non-misleadingly presented to subjects; hence Fish’s claim that “the snakeish aspect 
of the illusion is not a feature of the experience itself” (2009: 171, my emphasis). Then at the 
second level, subjects form false beliefs about those worldly objects that are non-misleadingly 
presented at the first; hence Fish’s claim that “if there is no false belief, then there is no 
illusion” (2009: 172). To illustrate: 
 
Fish’s Two Level Theory of Cognitive Illusion 
 
Cognitive Illusion Misleading 
 
Level 1 (Phenomenal character): worldly object-
 
No 
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property couples are experientially presented to 
subjects. 
 
Level 2 (Cognitive response to level 1): subjects 
form false beliefs about experientially presented 
worldly object-property couples. 
 
Yes 
 
 
It might now be obvious how Fish’s story saves naïve realism. In cognitive illusion, worldly 
object-property couples can intrinsically constitute the experience’s phenomenal character 
since how they are in those experiences, at the first level, is how they objectively are. Any 
mismatch between the experience’s phenomenal character and its subjective phenomenal 
appearance occurs only at the second level which, Fish thinks, consists in the subject’s false 
beliefs about what is non-misleadingly presented at the first: Error belongs only to those false 
beliefs that subjects are cognitively induced to form about their intrinsically naïve realist 
experiences. 
 
Fish is thus claiming that, 
 
Standard Illusion Thesis: For all subjects s: If s has an experience e in which 
worldly objects oW1, oW2 … oWN phenomenally appear to be F, but oW1, oW2 … 
oWN are objectively G, then s has an illusory experience. 
 
does not entail, 
 
Base: For all subjects s: If s has a misleading experience EM, then EM’s 
phenomenal character is not typed by any naïve properties PN1, PN2 … PNN. 
 
Since a cognitive illusion consists in the subject’s false beliefs about the worldly object that is 
non-misleadingly presented. Blocking Base thus blocks the transition from Reflective 
Indiscriminability to Spreading since there is now nothing non-naïve within the nature of the 
experience itself that can type the.corresponding ‘Good’ case. 
 
Though I think that Fish’s description of cognitive illusion is essentially correct (the illusion 
does indeed.cease once the subject abandons her false belief about what is seen), I am not 
convinced that it assuages the worry that the experience is intrinsically non-naïve realist since the 
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subject’s belief that a snake is over there surely springs from a subjective look as of a snake 
(granted, such looks are usually fleeting since most subjects quickly realize their error, but it is 
still a look which requires explanation); a subjective look that the Naïve Realist obviously 
wants to deny constitutes the experience’s essential nature at the first level. Now if a 
subjective look as of a snake is what rationally occasions the subject’s belief that a snake is over 
there, then I do not see how that belief can sensibly be invoked to explain it (causes explain 
effects; effects do not explain causes – or here, subjective looks causally motivate beliefs; 
beliefs do not explain subjective looks); so we are still left without a substantive explanation of 
the subjective look as of a snake itself. Absent any such explanation, it is understandable why 
Hellie and friends reason that the ‘snake-ish’ look just is the first-level experience, which 
cannot be (since no snake is there) naïve realist. 
 
Fish might reply that I have misunderstood since a subjective look as of a snake consists in, 
rather than causes, the.subject’s false belief – “having exploited [a] conceptual-recognitional 
capacity [for snakes] in error, the subject takes himself to have seen” (2009: 169) a snake. But I 
do not see how a subjective look as of a snake can be alchemized from epistemic facts about the 
subject’s belief (e.g. its truth-value, its being rationally responsive to evidence) when beliefs 
are qualitatively very different from subjective looks (e.g. Robinson 1994: 165) – the 
epistemic properties of beliefs are simply the wrong shape to convincingly explain phenomenal 
appearances.141 I am not denying that this might be accomplished: But Fish’s insistence that a 
‘snake-ish’ look can be alchemized from epistemic facts about the subject’s belief is not 
illuminating without some positive explanation of how that alchemization is supposed to 
occur. 
 
I think that Fish’s story is missing one step: specifically, I claim that certain of a worldly 
object’s perceptible properties interact with the subject’s psychological state in such a way that 
she is cognitively primed to imagine that something is seen, where this p-imagining then 
produces a false belief.142 But because what is p-imagined is no part of the experience’s 
                                                     
141 Other objections to the belief theory of illusion are (i) it cannot explain the puzzle of belief-independence (e.g. 
those familiar with the Müller-Lyer lines do not believe their persisting unequal-in-length look), and (ii) it entails 
that some illusions have contradictory contents – as Crane points out, someone susceptible to the ‘Waterfall 
Illusion’ would simultaneously believe that a stationary object is “both moving and not moving at the same time” 
(1988: 145). 
142 The reader might ask: Why not i-beliefs? Answer: There is no requirement that p-imaginings only produce i-
beliefs or real beliefs. We must consider each case and see if it is reasonable to ascribe real beliefs to subjects – this 
ascription is plausible here since subjects usually revise their beliefs in response to evidence (e.g. Fish’s subject is 
190 
 
objective phenomenal character, cognitive illusions pose no serious threat to naïve realism. To 
see how this works, it is instructive to consider an analogy with.Walton’s description of an 
ordinary case: 
 
“While walking in the woods, Heather comes across a stump shaped strikingly 
like a bear, or so it seems to her anyway, and she imagines a bear blocking her 
path. Her imagining is prompted by the stump; but for it she would not have 
done so. The twittering of sparrows induces a person to imagine the sounds of a 
cocktail party […] These are cases in which things in our environment prompt our 
imagination.” (1990: 21, my emphasis) 
 
In keeping with a cognitive illusion’s unpredictability and non-intersubjectivity, what we are 
prompted to p-imagine … 
 
“[…] is partly a matter of chance, depending on what shapes or other 
characteristics [worldly objects] happen to have.” (1990: 22-23) 
 
 And because, 
 
“[…] there is something—something real and solid and kickable—which can be 
called the imaginary bear.” (1990: 26) 
 
A cognitive illusion’s objective phenomenal character will be relationally typed by the worldly 
object-property couple itself in just the way that naïve realism requires. 
 
To elaborate. I am suggesting that just as Heather is prompted to imagine “a bear blocking her 
path” when.she sees a stump of a certain shape and colour, so someone might be prompted to 
imagine seeing a snake when she sees a rope of a certain shape and colour.143 The rope can be 
understood as what Walton (1990: 22) calls a natural prompter (i.e. something that prompts an 
imagining by being perceived) since it causally interacts with some aspect of the subject’s 
psychological state (e.g. her snake phobia) in such a way that she imagines seeing a snake. “The 
nature and layout of the environment” and “facets of the subject’s mental makeup” (Fish 2009: 
                                                                                                                                                                
likely to believe, should she investigate the scene, that she simply sees a rope). 
143 I do not intend this analogy to be taken too literally since Heather clearly does not think that she really sees a 
bear – my aim is only to show that there is a plausible mechanism by which p-imaginings can enter the story. 
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167) do not conjoin to just produce false beliefs about the object that.is seen, but rather, 
conjoin to produce a p-imagining, where this p-imagining then produces a false.belief. 
 
I am claiming that when, 
 
(1) A subject s sees a worldly object, ow, as F (where ow is objectively G). 
 
It is because, 
 
(2) S stands in a direct sui generis acquaintance relation r to, ow, where certain of 
ow’s perceptible properties prompt her to imagine seeing it as F. 
 
Fish’s subject can alchemize a subjective ‘snake-ish’ look from her p-imagining since that 
imagining simulates a ‘Good’ experience of seeing a snake; and imagining seeing a snake can 
then rationally occasion.her false belief that a snake is over there (as well as certain behaviours, 
e.g. fleeing). 
 
My story neatly explains a cognitive illusion’s unpredictability and non-intersubjectivity. Take 
unpredictability: since natural prompters are not designed to prompt particular imaginings, and 
since imagination-driven mental states are typically unpredictable, it is unsurprising that 
cognitive illusions are unpredictable, e.g. a rope is not designed to prompt any particular 
imagining (unless perhaps, it is deliberately arranged in a certain way) – it is just that its being 
coiled and striped interacts with some “evanescent disturbance” (Fish 2009: 176) in the 
subject’s mental state so that she happens to imagine seeing a snake. Take non-
intersubjectivity: since natural prompters are not designed to prompt different subjects to 
imagine seeing the same thing, and since different subjects are very likely to have different 
“mental makeups”, it is unsurprising that cognitive illusions are non-intersubjective, e.g. since 
a rope is not designed to prompt different subjects to imagine seeing a snake, and since 
different subjects are likely to have different responses to the same object, it would be 
surprising if different subjects all took themselves to see a snake. 
 
My story differs from Fish’s since it is a ‘Three Level’ theory of cognitive illusion. At the first 
level, worldly objects are indeed non-misleadingly presented to subjects; at the second level, 
subjects are cognitively primed to form p-imaginings about those worldly objects that are non-
misleadingly presented at the first; then at the third, those p-imaginings rationally occasion 
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false beliefs. To illustrate: 
 
Imaginative Disjunctivism’s Three-Level Theory of Cognitive Illusion 
 
Cognitive Illusion Misleading 
 
Level 1 (Objective phenomenal character): 
worldly object-property couples are presented to 
subjects. 
 
No 
 
Level 2 (Subjective phenomenal character):  
subjects form p-imaginings about experientially 
presented worldly-object property couples. 
 
Yes 
 
Level 3: (Cognitive response to level 2): p-
imaginings rationally occasion false beliefs. 
 
Yes 
 
 
This clearly sustains naïve realism since someone subject to a cognitive illusion will have an 
experience whose objective phenomenal character is relationally typed by naïve properties. 
Any mismatch between the experience’s objective phenomenal character and its subjective 
phenomenal character occurs only at the second level when she forms a p-imagining about 
what is non-misleadingly presented to her at the first, where what is p-imagined does not affect 
the nature of the experience’s objective phenomenal character (compare: when I invited you 
to visualize a banana (§4.1.2), your perceptual experience did not.suddenly become intrinsically 
non-naïve realist; likewise, when a rope’s perceptible properties cognitively prime you to 
imagine seeing a snake, you do not suddenly become indirectly aware of the rope). A cognitive 
illusion is thus a ‘hybrid’ experience that is neither ‘Bad’ (since its objective phenomenal 
character is intrinsically constituted by naïve properties) nor ‘Good’ (since its subjective 
phenomenal character has at least one p-imagined apparent naïve property that is no part of its 
objective phenomenal character, e.g. being-a-case-of-visual-awareness-of-a-snake). 
 
Some clarificatory remarks about the difference between a cognitive illusion and the 
corresponding ‘Good’ experience are in order. Suppose that two normally sighted subjects – 
an adult (s1).with a snake phobia.and a pre-linguistic infant (s2) who has not yet acquired a 
conceptual-recognitional capacity for either.ropes or snakes – are experientially presented 
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with a rope, where s1 flees since she thinks that she has seen a snake and s2 simply sees a rope 
(though of course she does not see it as such). In this scenario, the rope looks different to s1 
not because she is directly aware.of any different objects or qualities from s2 (their first-level 
experiences, like those of the scientist’s and child’s when looking at a cathode ray tube, have 
many of the same naïve properties), but because only she is cognitively prompted to imagine 
seeing the common object that is seen as a snake, where this p-imagining then rationally 
occasions her false.belief that a snake is over there: s1’s seeing the rope as a snake thus consists in 
her p-imagining and not in any fundamental change in the type.of phenomenal properties of 
which she is directly aware, viz., naïve. 
 
6.1.1 Optical Illusion 
 
Optical illusions are said to occur when “relevant features of the perceived scene function so as 
to trick or mislead our perceptual mechanisms” (Fish 2009: 173) in some way. The basic idea 
is that optical illusions occur when a candidate worldly object is arranged in such a way that it 
produces some kind of anomalous perceptual effect in the subject. An optical illusion thus 
admits of a dual explanation consisting of someeset of subject subject-independent physical 
factors (i.e. the world must be a certain way for the illusion to occur) and some set of subject-
dependent perceptual factors (i.e. the subject’s perceptual equipment must also be a certain 
way for the illusion to occur).  
 
Paradigm optical illusions are said to be perceptual experiences in which the candidate worldly 
object looks different in respect of its objective shape and/or colour owing to some feature(s) 
of the overall scene perceptually misleading us in some way. Müller-Lyer lines, ‘flipping’ 
figures such as the ‘Necker Cube’ in which a drawing of a cube looks to ‘flip’ between a 2-D 
and 3-D orientation, and motion after-effects such as the ‘Waterfall Illusion’ are oft-cited 
cases. One clear cut example seems to be the Craik-Cornsweet (1966; 1970) picture: 
 
Craik-Cornsweet Picture 
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Image reproduced from http://scienceblogs.com/mixingmemory/2006/07/08/cool-visual-illusions-craikobr/ 
 
If your visual system processes perceptual information about colour similar to mine, then the 
lower square should look much brighter than the upper one – the illusion, of course, is that 
both squares are objectively the same shade of grey (simply place a finger across the join where 
the squares meet to confirm). As there really seem to be different colours inhering in the 
picture at.the loci of the squares that.do not cease to be seen when we stop believing that they 
are objectively the same shade of grey, it is.most unlikely that we are dealing with a cognitive 
illusion. 
 
Cases belonging to this class are usually predictable and intersubjective. They are usually 
predictable.since, given certain physical and nomological facts about how the subject’s 
perceptual machinery operates in different conditions, we can usually predict that the 
candidate worldly object will look different in some respect from how it objectively is, e.g. 
contingent empirical facts about how the human visual system usually adapts to variations in 
illumination allow us to predict that, when presented with the Craik-Cornsweet picture, most 
normally sighted subjects will report that the lower square looks brighter than the upper.one. 
They are usually intersubjective since subjects who have evolved to process perceptual 
information in very similar ways can be subject to the same illusion at the same time, e.g. 
subjects who adapt to variations in illumination in very similar ways will see the lower square 
as looking brighter than the upper one. 
 
Optical illusions are said to threaten naïve realism since they involve situations in which a 
subject perceives a worldly object, ow, as being F when there is no worldly F-ness for her to be 
directly acquainted with (since ow is objectively G). Of the Craik-Cornsweet picture, Hellie 
and friends will simply point out that the subject’s experience cannot have the phenomenally 
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apparent naïve properties being-a-case-of-visual-awareness-of-a-shade-of-light-whitePN1-and-a-shade-
of-dark-greyPN2 since there is nothing that has those particular shades in her.immediate 
environment which can instantiate those properties within her experience’s phenomenal 
character144; it is then tempting to conclude that some non-naïve ingredient must be doing this 
instantiatory work – an ingredient that will, since they think that reflectively.indiscriminable 
experiences are phenomenally type-identical mental states, type the corresponding ‘Good’ 
experience of seeing two squares that are those particular shades. I am thus tasked with 
explaining why subjects who see the same scene (e.g. Müller-Lyer lines, rocks near a 
waterfall) often take themselves to see qualities that are not objectively there (e.g. unequal 
lengths, upwards motion) without positing something non-naïve realist that then constitutively 
explains the corresponding ‘Good’ experience’s phenomenal character. 
 
Similar to cognitive illusion, I want to suggest that certain of a worldly object’s perceptible 
properties causally interact with the subject’s perceptual-cognitive equipment in such a way 
that she is perceptually primed to imagine that something is seen. The difference is just that the 
worldly object is what Walton (1990: 22) calls an artificial prompter, i.e. something that is 
intended or designed to prompt a specific imagining when perceived. Again, it is instructive to 
consider an analogy with.Walton’s description of an ordinary case: 
 
“Snowmen, dolls, and toy trucks are designed by their makers to induce those who 
see or use them to imagine men, babies, and trucks of certain sorts. One might 
carve a stump into an unmistakeable bear “likeness” in order to make sure that it 
will prompt people to imagine a bear. (1990: 22, my emphasis) 
 
In line with an optical illusion’s predictability and intersubjectivity, what is seen, 
 
“[…] direct[s] the imaginings of others in predetermined ways. […] A toy 
truck or a well-executed snowman induces all who see it to imagine approximately 
the same things — a truck or a man of a certain sort.” (1990: 22-23, my 
emphasis) 
 
And because the subject is experientially presented with a worldly object-property couple, an 
optical illusion’s objective phenomenal character will be relationally typed in just the way that 
naïve realism requires. 
                                                     
144 Again, I will simply speak of phenomenal character until I introduce my story. 
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To elaborate. I am suggesting that just as someone might be induced to imagine a man when 
presented with a cleverly made snowman, so the colour and arrangement of the individual 
squares relative to one another and their surrounds can induce a normally sighted subject to 
imagine seeing different colours inhering in the picture at.the loci of the squares.145 Each 
square is an artificial prompter that causally interacts with relevant aspects of the.subject’s 
visual system (the way in which it processes, and adapts to, visual information about their 
colours) and cognitive equipment (the sub-personal way in which it forms a p-imagining 
as.prescribed by that visual information) in such a way that she is strongly disposed to imagine 
seeing different colours inhering in the picture at.the loci of the squares (compare: someone 
whose visual system is malfunctioning in some way might not be induced to imagine.seeing 
different colours).  
 
My story neatly explains an optical illusion’s predictability and intersubjectivity. Take 
predictability: since artificial prompters are designed to prompt particular imaginings, it is 
unsurprising that optical illusions are predictable, e.g. in the Müller-Lyer illusion, the location 
of the inverted and exverted end-hashes relative to one another are supposed to induce the 
subject to imagine seeing two lines that look unequal in length. Take non-intersubjectivity: 
since artificial prompters are designed to induce different subjects with very similar 
perceptual-cognitive equipment to imagine very similar things, it is unsurprising that optical 
illusions are intersubjective, e.g. Müller-Lyer lines are supposed to induce normally sighted 
subjects who live in a predominantly rectilinear environment to imagine seeing two lines of 
unequal lengths.146 
 
My story is essentially a ‘Two Level’ theory of optical illusion. At the first level, worldly 
                                                     
145 Again, this analogy is not to be taken too literally since someone looking at a cleverly made snowman does not 
usually take themselves to really see a person (that would be a cognitive illusion) – my aim is only to show that 
there is a plausible mechanism by which p-imaginings can enter the story. 
146 One influential sub-personal explanation is the ‘Carpentered World’ hypothesis (Segall et al. 1966) according 
to which we see depth in the Müller-Lyer lines because our environment contains many straight lines and right 
angles (e.g. in buildings, furniture etc.); hence explaining why subjects living in predominantly non-rectilinear 
environments are usually less susceptible to the illusion, e.g. some African foragers require the top line to be 
around 1% longer than the bottom line before the lines appear equal in length, whereas the difference is around 
20% for typical Western subjects (McCauley & Henrich 2006).  
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objects are non-misleadingly presented to subjects; then at the second level, subjects are 
perceptually-cognitively induced.to form p-imaginings about those worldly objects that are 
non-misleadingly presented at the first (there will be a third level only when those p-
imaginings rationally occasion false beliefs). To illustrate: 
 
Imaginative Disjunctivism’s Two-Level Theory of Optical Illusion 
 
Optical Illusion Misleading 
 
Level 1 (objective phenomenal character): worldly 
object-property couples are presented to subjects. 
 
No 
 
Level 2 (subjective phenomenal character):  
subjects form p-imaginings about experientially 
presented worldly-object property couples. 
 
Yes 
   
 
This clearly sustains naïve realism since someone subject to an optical illusion will have an 
experience whose objective phenomenal character is relationally typed by naïve properties. 
Any mismatch between the experience’s objective phenomenal character and its subjective 
phenomenal character occurs only at the second level when she forms a p-imagining about 
what is non-misleadingly presented to her at the first, where what is p-imagined does not affect 
the nature of the experience’s objective phenomenal character. An optical illusion is thus a 
‘hybrid’ experience that is neither ‘Bad’ (since its objective phenomenal character is 
intrinsically constituted by naïve properties) nor ‘Good’ (since its subjective phenomenal 
character has at least one p-imagined apparent naïve property that is no part of its objective 
phenomenal character, e.g. being-a-case-of-visual-awareness-of-a-shade-of-light-white). 
 
I can forsee three objections. First, it might be objected that I cannot explain doxastically 
resisted optical.illusions: specifically, my objector might reason that since we often 
doxastically resist optical illusions (e.g. I take it that you no longer believe that the lower 
square in the Craik-Cornsweet picture is light white even though that look continues to 
persist), and since successful p-imaginings are not doxastically.resisted, the illusory aspects of 
doxastically resisted optical illusions cannot be p-imagined. As doxastically resisted optical 
illusions comprise a large class, we should seek an alternative explanation.of the subjective 
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phenomenal character of all optical illusions147 (e.g. perhaps it will be said that your 
experience of the Craik-Cornsweet picture is typed by a certain sort of false representational 
content). 
 
Reply: Although subjects do not doxastically resist successful p-imaginings qua perceptual 
experiences, there is no additional requirement that they must also believe their content 
(§3.2.1.2); that is, a successful p-imagining is one that is mistaken for a perceptual experience 
and not one whose content must always be believed. I am thus suggesting that the subject with 
normal vision and normal visual-spatial abilities who is presented with the Craik-Cornsweet 
picture will be strongly disposed to imagine seeing a fairly light shade of white.at the location 
of the lower square and a fairly dark shade of grey at the location of the upper square; and 
because this p-imagining is not directly or mentally subject to the will, a subjective look as of 
two.differently coloured squares persists even though it is doxastically resisted. 
 
Second, my objector might reason that since some subjects are not – perhaps owing to a 
cultural, physiological, or some other reason – susceptible to certain optical illusions (e.g. I am 
not usually susceptible to ‘flipping’ figures for reasons unknown), and since many of those 
subjects have well developed visual-spatial skills that underpin the ability to successfully p-
imagine, it is implausible that the subjective phenomenal characters of optical illusions are p-
imaginings.148  
 
Reply: The subject who has the ability to successfully p-imagine will not be susceptible to an 
optical illusion when there is a ‘break’ somewhere in the perceptual-cognitive processing 
chain, i.e. there will be.a failure to process information at either the sub-personal perceptual 
or higher-order cognitive level (exactly where such breaks occur will require further empirical 
investigation). In such cases, relevant perceptible properties of the candidate worldly object 
will have either (i) failed to causally interact with the subject’s perceptual equipment (e.g. 
someone with a chromatic processing deficit may not be susceptible to the Craik-Cornsweet 
illusion), or, (ii) causally interacted with the subject’s perceptual equipment but failed to 
causally interact with her cognitive machinery (e.g. as perhaps occurs in some non-Western 
subjects who are less susceptible to the Müller-Lyer and in autistic subjects who tend to be less 
susceptible to optical illusions in general149 (e.g. Walter et al. 2009)). In either of these 
                                                     
147 Many such explanations will be of phenomenal character simpliciter. 
148 Thanks to Keith Allen (York Mind & Reason group, Autumn 2012) for pressing this objection. 
149 Since one of the ‘Triad of Impairments’ (Wing & Gould 1979) that characterise autism is an impoverished 
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situations, the subject is simply having a ‘Good’ experience (since there is no mismatch 
between its objective and subjective phenomenal character). 
 
Third, my objector might reason that I have not sufficiently distinguished optical from 
cognitive illusions: specifically, it might be reasoned that optical and cognitive illusions have 
different explanans since they have radically different properties, viz., predictability vs. 
unpredictability, intersubjectivity vs. non-intersubjectivity, and belief-dependence vs. belief-
independence. Further prima facie support for this objection is.that non-linguistic infants and 
lower animals are usually susceptible to optical but not (since they lack the requisite 
conceptual-recognitional capacity) cognitive illusion. For instance, susceptibility to the.Ames 
room emerges at around seven months of age (Oross et al. 1987) and to illusory motion 
at.around six months of age (Kanazawa et al. 2013); then there is evidence that pigeons are 
susceptible to the standard Müller-Lyer (Nakamura et al. 2006) and that fish are susceptible to 
the Ebbinghaus illusion (Sovrano et al. 2015). 
 
Reply: Construing optical and cognitive illusions as differing only in degree and not 
fundamental kind involves no conceptual incoherence; hence my explanation of each need only 
differ in its fine-grained details (e.g. the worldly object with which the subject is directly 
acquainted is a natural prompter in cognitive illusion and an artificial prompter in optical 
illusion). As I see it, there is a ‘spectrum’ of illusions: at one ‘pole’ lie those unpredictable and 
non-intersubjective cognitive illusions which occur when the subject believes what she is 
cognitively primed to p-imagine, whereas at the other ‘pole’ lie those predictable and 
intersubjective optical illusions.which occur when the subject doxastically resists what she is 
perceptually-cognitively primed to.p-imagine; between the ‘poles’ lie those optical illusions 
which are not doxastically resisted – subjects who do not know that what is presented is 
illusory, as well as non-linguistic infants and lower animals will occupy this area of the 
spectrum. I submit that it is a theoretical advantage of my story that its fine-grained details can 
be modified to capture the different properties of cognitive and optical illusions whilst still 
                                                                                                                                                                
imagination, my account predicts that autistic subjects will tend to be less susceptible to optical illusion. This 
prediction is presently supported by Happé’s (1996) study in which twenty five autistic children reported less 
susceptibility to the Kanisza Triangle (in which an illusory ‘triangle’ is reportedly seen bounded by three pacman 
figures), the Ebbinghaus Illusion (a size-perception illusion in which a circle reportedly looks larger when 
surrounded by smaller circles than when surrounded by larger ones), and the Hering illusion (in which vertical 
lines reportedly look curved when overlapping a radial background). Intriguingly, Chouinard et al (2013) recently 
found that susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer decreased as a function of autistic traits related to communication and 
the imagination but not attention to detail. 
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being able to offer the same fundamental.explanation of their objective and subjective 
phenomenal characters, i.e. as being intrinsically naïve realist experiences that prompt certain 
p-imaginings. 
 
6.1.2 Physical Illusion 
 
Physical illusions are radically different from cognitive and optical illusions since they are said 
to occur purely as a result of “how things are in the external world” (Fish 2009: 148). The 
basic idea is that physical illusions spring from facts about how the world is physically 
arranged, where that arrangement includes facts about (i) the candidate object’s determinate 
spatio-temporal location relative to surrounding objects and the perceiver, and, (b) how 
certain of the candidate object’s properties causally interact with well-established nomological 
laws. A physical illusion thus admits of a monistic explanation consisting of some.set of 
subject-independent physical factors, i.e. the world, and not the subject’s perceptual and/or 
cognitive equipment, must be a certain way for the illusion to occur. 
 
Paradigmatic cases are said to be those in which the candidate worldly object looks different in 
some respect from how it objectively is owing to the physical phenomenon of refraction, i.e. 
how light behaves as it is refracted through different mediums. Two classes of refraction effect 
in particular seem problematic for the Naïve Realist: namely, 
 
1. The candidate worldly object seen through surfaces with different refractive 
indexes.  
 
and, 
 
2. The candidate worldly object seen through an inverting lens.150 
 
My objector’s flagship example that exemplifies (1) is the straight stick that, when submerged 
in water, is.standardly said to look bent (e.g. Ayer 1963: 6; Berkeley 1731: 3-31) – indeed, 
                                                     
150 Cases in which the candidate worldly object is seen through a corrective lens can be understood as cases that 
enable the subject with a visual deficit such as myopia to become acquainted with more naïve properties (§1.1.1). 
In a similar vein, the powerful lenses of telescopes and microscopes enable us to become acquainted with worldly 
object-property couples that are ordinarily visually inaccessible, e.g. as when a macro-lens visually enables the 
(brave) photographer to see the bobbly surface of a scorpion. 
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even naïve realists describe the “bent stick in water” (Fish 2009: 165) and the “stick [which] 
looks bent” (Brewer 2011, Ch.5: 21). To illustrate: 
 
 
Image reproduced from 
http://lrrpublic.cli.det.nsw.edu.au/lrrSecure/Sites/Web/prelimphysics/prelim/lo/refraction_01/graphics/refr_01.gif 
 
We can also include cases in which the stick’s submerged part looks to be non-continuous with 
its non-submerged part, i.e. cases in which the stick might be said to look broken. My own 
photograph of a pencil part-submerged in water illustrates: 
 
 
 
And cases in which the candidate worldly object is entirely submerged and is said to look to 
occupy a different spatial location. The following image which depicts someone spear-fishing151 
illustrates:  
 
 
                                                     
151 Thanks to Tom Stoneham for drawing my attention to this example. 
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Image reproduced from http://survivingtech.com/2012/05/22/spearing-fish-wilderness-survival/ 
 
A paradigmatic example of (2) is the ‘Reversing Arrow Illusion’ in which an arrow looks to 
reverse direction when seen through a clear glass of water: in the photograph below, it is 
standardly said that both arrows are objectively pointing left, and so we misperceive the lower 
one that is seen through the water in.the glass:  
  
 
Image reproduced from http://thekidshouldseethis.com/post/79356632627 
 
These four examples clearly seem to be physical illusions since it is the physical phenomenon 
of refraction.which determines the candidate object’s look independently of any subject-
dependent cognitive-perceptual processes.  
 
Physical illusions, like optical illusions, are usually predictable and intersubjective. They are 
usually predictable since, given certain empirical and nomological facts about the behaviour of 
light as it travels through different mediums, we can usually predict that the candidate worldly 
object will look different in some respect from how it objectively is, e.g. the law of refraction 
allows us to reliably predict that a part-submerged stick will look bent when viewed from 
certain perspectives. They are usually intersubjective since all episodes of perceiving in the 
actual world are constrained by the same subject-independent empirical facts and nomological 
laws, e.g. that the law of refraction remains invariant across all determinate spatio-temporal 
locations in the actual world means that spear-fishers on different continents can see that 
their.would-be lunch looks to occupy a different spatial location than it objectively does (the 
skilled spear-fisher compensates for this phenomenally apparent spatial displacement). 
 
Physical illusions are said to threaten naïve realism since they involve situations in which a 
subject perceives a worldly object, ow, as being F when there is no worldly F-ness for her to be 
directly acquainted with (since ow is objectively G). Of the ‘Reversing Arrow Illusion, Hellie 
and friends will simply point out that the subject’s experience cannot have the phenomenally 
apparent naïve property being-a-case-of-visual-awareness-of-an-arrow-pointing-right since there is 
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no arrow that is pointing right within her immediate environment that can instantiate that 
property within her experience’s.phenomenal character152; it is then tempting to conclude that 
some non-naïve ingredient must be doing this instantiatory work – an ingredient that will, 
since they think that reflectively.indiscriminable experiences are phenomenally type-identical 
mental states, type the corresponding ‘Good’ experience of seeing an arrow pointing right. I 
am thus tasked with explaining why subjects who see the same scene (e.g. a part-submerged 
stick in water, a fish underwater) often take themselves to see something that is not objectively 
there (e.g. a bent stick, a fish at a determinate location) without positing something non-naïve 
realist that then constitutively explains the corresponding ‘Good’ experience’s phenomenal 
character. 
 
Treating a physical illusion’s subjective phenomenal character as a p-imagining does not seem 
promising since they have a purely subject-independent metaphysical nature, whereas p-
imaginings have a purely subject-dependent metaphysical nature; hence it seems likely that the 
nature of their explanans radically differs to the extent that the latter cannot convincingly 
explain the subjective phenomenal character of the former, e.g. it is hard to see how a subject-
dependent p-imagining can convincingly explain a part-submerged stick’s phenomenally 
apparent bent-ness when that look is sufficiently explained.by the subject-independent physical 
phenomenon of refraction. 
 
I am now ostensibly committed to one of three claims: namely, I can either (i) insist, like rival 
positive.disjunctivism’s, that something other than a p-imagining explains the illusory 
appearance, or, (ii) tell the same non-naïve realist story of ‘Good’ experience and physical 
illusion, or, (iii) assign physical illusions to the ‘Good’ disjunct. Clearly, (i) commits me to a 
problematic multi-disjunctivism, and anyway, invoking something non-naive that is not a p-
imagining to explain just one class of illusion is distinctively ad hoc; whereas (ii) swiftly puts me 
of experiential business. In what follows, I defend (iii) by.showing how physical illusions are 
“special case[s] of veridical perception” (Fish 2009: 151), and so, block the transition from Base 
qua physical illusion to Spreading in Hellie’s p.m.e. 
 
Of the first class of refraction effect, I think that the Naïve Realist can make headway by 
exploiting Arthadeva’s thought that, on occasion, experiencing subjects can stand in two visual 
relations to perceptible properties of the same.worldly object153, and because of this:  
                                                     
152 Again, I will simply speak of phenomenal character until I introduce my story. 
153 Double vision can be explained similarly: when I press a finger upon my left eye and look at the paperweight on 
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“We can say that we cannot in these conditions see the shape of the whole stick, 
though we can see the shapes of its two parts, the part above the water and the 
part below it. […] we see it in parts; each part is seen separately or through a 
separate act or kind of seeing.” (1959: 133) 
 
Our thought is that the water visually blocks the subject looking at a part-submerged straight 
stick from.seeing its full spatial extension or the “shape of [its] whole” body; she thus stands in 
one visual relation to its submerged straight part and a different visual relation to its non-
submerged part, where each constituent part is non-misleadingly seen. I am thus suggesting 
that there are “separate.act[s]” of seeing occurring at the same time: a non-misleading seeing of 
the stick’s submerged straight part and a non-misleading seeing of its non-submerged straight 
part, or as I would say, the subject has a ‘Good’ experience that is phenomenally typed by the 
naïve properties being-a-case-of-visual-awareness-of-a-submerged-part-of-a-straight-stick and being-a-
case-of-visual-awareness-of-a-non-submerged-part-of-a-straight-stick. A part-submerged straight stick 
fails to look continuously straight (and on that basis, has been said to look bent or broken) not 
because the subject is directly aware of something non-naive (say, a ‘crooked’ sense-datum), 
but because the refractive properties of the water visually block her from seeing.the 
continuous spatial relation between its submerged and non-submerged part to which she 
stands in different visual relations (analogy: I suggested that after-images occur when the 
adaptation of our photoreceptor cells to.the colour of one surface visually blocks us from 
seeing a chromatic component of another surface (§5.2.1); likewise, I am suggesting that the 
lens action of the water visually blocks us from seeing the stick’s entire shape – in neither case 
is our experience ‘Bad’). 
 
The spear-fishing case has a similar explanation. Here, the subject sees a spear through the 
medium of air.and sees a fish through the different medium of water; she thus stands in one 
visual relation to the.spear and a different visual relation to the fish, where each worldly object 
is non-misleadingly seen. Again, different.acts of seeing occur at the same time: a non-
misleading seeing of the spear that is in the.air and a non-misleading seeing of the fish that is 
                                                                                                                                                                
my desk, “I immediately perceive it to become double” (Hume 1739/40: Bk 1, Part 4, §2). But I am not directly 
aware of something mind-dependent since the light emitted from it has struck two different sets of 
photoreceptors enabling me to see “one thing twice” (Arthadeva 1959: 134): I non-misleadingly see the 
paperweight by means of the light striking the photoreceptor’s in the centre of the retina of my right eye, and I 
non-misleadingly see it again by means of the light striking the photoreceptor’s in the retina of my left eye. 
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underwater, or as I would say, the subject.has a ‘Good’ experience that is phenomenally typed 
by the naïve properties being-a-case-of-visual-awareness-of-a-spear-in-the-air and being-a-case-of-
visual-awareness-of-a-fish-underwater. A submerged fish.fails to look to occupy the spear’s target 
location not because the subject is directly aware of something non-naïve (say, a ‘fish-y’ 
representatum), but because the refractive properties of the water visually block her from 
seeing the true spatial relation between the spear that is in the air and the fish underwater to 
which she stands in different visual relations. 
 
Perhaps it will be objected that by allowing a subject’s ‘Good’ experience of a part-submerged 
straight to.have a complex metaphysical structure (at a minimum, the supposition that two 
different acts of seeing are occurring concurrently seems to require that her experience’s 
objective phenomenal character.has two distinct structural parts with different explanations), I 
must concede that that structure.springs from a certain sort of structured non-naïve realist 
content, e.g. representational. But then it will be said that something non-naïve constitutively 
explains her ‘Good’ experience’s objective phenomenal character, and the stage is again set for 
Spreading’s return. 
 
The answer is surely that the complex metaphysical structure of the subject’s ‘Good’ 
experience of a part-submerged straight stick is intrinsically constituted by a structure that 
exists in mind-independent reality: specifically, her ‘Good’ experience has two distinct 
structural parts because the entire stick is.seen through two different mediums that have 
different refractive properties. Our seeing a submerged part of a straight stick through water is 
one sort of non-misleading seeing and our seeing that same stick’s non-submerged straight part 
through air is another sort of non-misleading seeing154 precisely because each medium through 
which we see its constituent parts refract light in different ways. Our ‘Good’ experience of a 
part-submerged straight stick is, like all our other ‘Good’ experiences, intrinsically structured 
out of aspects of the world itself and not some type of mind-dependent content. 
 
Now it seems that the Naïve Realist cannot exploit Arthadeva’s explanation of the part-
submerged straight stick to explain the second class of refraction effect: For though we stand in 
a different visual relation to the arrow that is said to look inverted than to an immediately 
adjacent object that is not seen through the water in the glass, this cannot explain its inverted 
look (consider how it would still look inverted were.it seen through a glass of water in the 
                                                     
154 It is perhaps natural to forget that the medium of air “is as material as other things” (Arthadeva 1959: 135) until 
e.g. we are on an aeroplane that encounters turbulence as it moves through different types of air masses. 
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vacuum of outer space). But I think that the Naïve Realist can.still make headway by 
construing the inverted arrow as a pure visibilium, i.e. an object of sight that cannot be 
perceived by any other sense-modality: these “creature’s [that are] solely of the visual.world” 
(Martin 2010: 188) plausibly include objects such as holograms, shadows, and the sky, and the 
explanatory parallel that I now want to draw is with that of the rainbow.  
 
It is now known that a rainbow is seen when incident light rays are refracted as they enter an 
aggregate.of raindrops, then reflected by their curved mirror-like surfaces, and refracted again 
as they exit the drops and strike our eyes: raindrops thus function like miniature prisms which 
refract or break sunlight into various colours, as well as reflecting it to produce the rainbow 
that is seen.155 Given these empirical facts, I suggest that a subject who sees a rainbow is simply 
having a ‘Good’ experience of various naïve colour properties that are instantiated by an 
aggregate of raindrops: when you, for example, see the green band of a rainbow, you are 
enjoying a ‘Good’ experience that has the naïve property being-a-case-of-visual-awareness-of-green 
which is instantiated by a collection of raindrops that refract light at a certain angle (the 
‘rainbow angle’ for green is 41°). Though the physiological limitations.of your visual 
equipment preclude you from seeing the raindrops (they would be visible through a powerful 
enough lens), they are still worldly objects that instantiate mind-independent colours all the 
same – colours which intrinsically constitute the objective and subjective phenomenal 
character of your ‘Good’ experience.  
 
The explanatory parallel then, is this: if a rainbow is a pure visibilium, the colours of which are 
instantiated by an aggregate of visually undetectable raindrops, then there is nothing especially 
puzzling.about likewise supposing that the arrow which looks to be pointing right is a pure 
visibilium, the colour and shape of which is instantiated by an aggregate of visually 
undetectable water drops in the glass. In this case, each water drop in the aggregate functions 
like a miniature convex lens (i.e. a lens that.converges light rays towards each other) which 
refracts and bend the light rays that are travelling through it in such a way so as to produce the 
arrow that is seen. Given this empirical fact, I suggest that.the subject who thinks that an 
arrow looks to point right in this situation is simply having a ‘Good’.experience that has the 
naïve properties being-a-case-of-visual-awareness-of-a-blackPN1-arrow-shapePN2.which is instantiated 
                                                     
155 Although Descartes is usually credited with discovering that the “way in which the rays of light act on 
[raindrops]” (1637: second appendix) form the rainbow, Aristotle also recognized that rainbows are formed when 
light strikes “very small particles continuous with one another” (350 B.C.E: Meteorology, Book 3, part 4). Boyer 
(1959) provides a nice history of the rainbow. 
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by a group of water drops that refract and bend incident light rays in a certain way. For this 
reason, talk of misperceiving the arrow behind the glass is mistaken since the subject.is directly 
acquainted with type of worldly object that is made visually detectible by that particular set-up 
(the position of the glass relative to the arrow that is pointing left and the water within it) – an 
object which intrinsically constitutes the objective and subjective phenomenal character of her 
‘Good’ experience. 
 
There might be some intuitive resistance to construing a black arrow shape as a pure.visibilium 
given that.we ordinarily describe shapes as solid objects that are tactually detectible: not only 
can I see the three-dimensional spherical shape of the paperweight on my desk, but I could also 
reach out and touch its smooth surface. But in my story, the.arrow is nothing more than a light 
phenomenon: hence it might now be objected that the subject must be hallucinating an arrow 
pointing right since there is no tactually.detectible solid object to be found (if you were to 
place a hand inside the glass, you would only feel the water). My answer is simply that it is not 
a necessary condition on a worldly object’s being shaped that it must be a tactually detectible 
solid object: I see nothing ontologically puzzling about the thought that a worldly object can be 
visually shaped without also being a tactually detectible solid object (see Martin 2010: 204). 
And the present thought is that a group of water drops in the glass instantiate a purely visual 
shape – a shape that intrinsically constitutes the objective and subjective phenomenal character 
of the subject’s ‘Good’ experience. 
 
The story on offer is just a ‘one-level’ theory of physical illusion. To illustrate:  
 
Physical Illusion Misleading 
 
Level 1 (objective and subjective phenomenal 
character): worldly object-property couples are 
presented to subjects. 
 
No 
 
This clearly sustains naïve realism since someone experiencing a physical illusion is simply 
having a ‘Good’ experience, the objective and subjective phenomenal character of which is 
relationally typed by.the same naïve properties. The curious case of the part-submerged 
straight stick, the fish that is said to.look to occupy a different location, and objects that are 
said to misleadingly look inverted when viewed through a glass of water can all be explained 
without positing something non-naïve within the nature of the experience itself that can 
phenomenally type the.corresponding ‘Good’ case (trivially, since physical illusions are 
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grouped under the ‘Good’ disjunct). 
 
6.1.3 Summary 
 
I have now argued that, of the three varieties of illusion, only the cognitive and optical varieties 
are illusory.in the sense that their subjective phenomenal characters have at least one 
phenomenally apparent.naive property that is metaphysically built from a p-imagining; 
although their objective phenomenal characters are metaphysically built from naïve properties, 
it is this partial mismatch between their objective and subjective phenomenal characters which 
prevent cognitive and optical illusions from falling under the umbrella of the ‘Good’ disjunct. 
Talk of physical illusion is innocuous.once.we understand how such cases can be ‘Good’ 
through and through. (I.D) cannot yet rest.easy since there is one influential structurally 
similar rival, viz., Brewer’s object view of illusion.   
 
6.2 Brewer’s Object View of Illusion 
 
Brewer’s (2004; 2008; 2011) Object View (o.v) of illusion asserts that the direct objects of 
illusory experience are worldly objects themselves which mislead the subject’s judgement in virtue 
of bearing visually relevant similarities to paradigm empirical kinds that they do not objectively 
exemplify. He writes:  
 
“[…] the core subjective character of perceptual experience [is] given simply by 
citing the physical object which is its mind-independent direct object. (2008: 6-7) […] 
in a case of visual illusion in which a mind-independent physical object, o, looks 
F, although o is not actually F, o is the direct object of visual perception from a 
spatiotemporal point of view and in circumstances of perception relative to which 
o has visually relevant similarities to paradigm exemplars of F although it is not itself 
actually an instance of F.” (2011, Ch.5: 20, my emphasis) 
 
Three premises can be distinguished in Brewer’s remarks. The first premise is Brewer’s 
positive claim that a ‘Good’ experience’s phenomenal character156 can be sufficiently 
characterized “simply by citing the physical object which [is its] mind-independent direct 
                                                     
156 As Brewer treats a ‘Good’ and illusory experience’s subjective phenomenal character as its objective 
phenomenal character, I will simply speak of phenomenal character until I consider his distinction between ‘Thick’ 
and ‘Thin’ looks in §6.2.2. 
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object.”157 Clearly, this is not simply the ‘vulgar’ intuition that ‘Good’ experience seems to be 
world-involving and world-acquainting, but rather, the stronger claim that it is world-
involving and world-acquainting. Hence,  
 
(1) For all subjects s: If s has a Good experience EG, then; 
  
(a) s stands in an object-dependent direct acquaintance relation r to worldly 
objects oW1, oW2 … oWN; and, 
 
(b) oW1, oW2 … oWN intrinsically constitute EG’s phenomenal character.  
 
This is ambiguous between naïve realism and phenomenal relationalism (§1.1.1). Here, Brewer 
claims that a ‘Good’ experience’s phenomenal character is characterized simply by describing 
those worldly objects which relationally individuate it (naïve realism); but elsewhere, he 
claims that such phenomenal characters are characterized in terms of “a relation of conscious 
acquaintance between a subject and certain mind-independent physical objects” (2011, Ch.5: 
8), which seems to suggest that they essentially consist in purely mental relations of awareness 
to worldly objects (phenomenal relationalism). As Brewer’s story is not significantly affected 
by either reading, I leave this question open. 
 
Brewer’s second premise is that those worldly objects with which a subject is directly 
acquainted with look a particular way to her in virtue of bearing “visually relevant similarities” 
to certain paradigm empirical kinds, i.e. such similarities metaphysically ground subjective 
looks. Being visual, such similarities are not, Brewer (2011, Ch.5:7) notes, to be understood as 
relations that hold between non-visual object-properties (i.e. those properties of objects such as 
Molybdenum’s atomic number that cannot constitute visual phenomenal characters at all): instead, 
Brewer (2011, Ch.5: 17) claims that worldly objects and their paradigm empirical kinds look 
relevantly similar only if both share a sufficient number of common properties amongst those 
involved in the ways that the subject visually processes their perceptible properties. Hence, 
 
(2) A worldly object, oW, is visually relevantly similar to a paradigm empirical 
                                                     
157 This is Brewer’s attempt to “rehabilitate the early modern [empiricist] insight” (2011. Ch.5: 2) that ‘Good’ 
experience essentially consists in an object-dependent direct acquaintance relation (e.g. Locke 1690; Berkeley 
1975) whilst also defending an empirical realism which insists that the direct objects of such experience are simply 
the worldly objects of commonsense. 
210 
 
kind k only if oW and k share a sufficient number of common properties P1, P2 
… Pn amongst those involved in the ways that the subject’s visual system 
processes visual information from o and k. 
 
It is puzzling that, given Brewer’s (2008: 7; 2011, Ch.5:6) insistence that premise (2) 
constitutes a third relatum of the direct acquaintance which holds between subject and worldly 
object, he acknowledges that “a far more developed account of visually relevant similarities” 
(2008: 12) is required.158 Still, I venture some remarks. 
 
One example that Brewer (2011, Ch.5: 9) employs to illustrate premise (2) is that of looking 
at a coin head-on. In daylight it should look relevantly similar to your159 paradigm of, say, silver 
colour. But when the illumination changes it will look relevantly similar to certain of your 
other colour paradigms, e.g. when the room goes dark it will look relevantly similar to your 
paradigm of black colour. And when viewed head-on in daylight, that same coin should look 
relevantly similar to your paradigm of circular shape, but when your perspective changes as 
when you view it edge-on, relevantly similar to your paradigm of elliptical shape. Moreover, 
the ways in which your visual system processes colour and shape information from both the 
coin and its paradigm kinds should be neurophysically type-identical, e.g. a part of what it is 
for the coin to be visually relevantly similar to your paradigm of silver colour is that your 
visual system should process this shape information just as if you were looking at your 
paradigm of silver colour. So, illumination, perspective, and visual processing seem to be those 
common properties which Brewer thinks are sufficient for determining that an object is 
visually relevantly similar to some paradigm empirical kind. 
 
                                                     
158 Brewer (2011, Ch.5: 39) is sensitive to this dilemma. Either (o.v) explicitly defines its key concepts visually 
relevant similarities and paradigm empirical kinds or it does not; if so, then counterexamples can be marshalled; but if 
not, then (o.v) is insufficiently robust. On either option, (o.v) is implausible. Brewer responds that neither 
option is exhaustive since a “detailed combination of theoretical-definitional pointers” (ibid) has been provided to 
illustrate (o.v)’s key concepts which, whilst not fully explicit, are nevertheless sufficiently robust enough to go 
beyond our commonsense understanding. Given this, we can see my objections (§6.2.1, §6.2.2) as arguing that 
Brewer’s “pointers” do not immunize (o.v) to counterexamples, and for this reason, is insufficiently robust, i.e. 
Brewer’s failure to defuse the dilemma’s first horn means that he cannot adequately defuse its second. 
159 Brewer (2011, Ch.5: 51) introduces his subject-relative clause in order to explain variations in colour vision. 
Suppose that two subjects, s1 and s2, are looking at the same coin head-on in daylight and that s2 is achromatopic. 
Then even though the coin is reflecting highly similar light, it will presumably look relevantly similar to s1’s 
paradigm of silver colour and s2‘s paradigm of, say, grey-ishness.  
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Brewer’s third premise is that “paradigm exemplars” explanatorily ground those visually relevant 
similarities in virtue of which a worldly object, o, looks F to a subject s, i.e. paradigm empirical 
kinds explanatorily ground visually relevant similarities which then metaphysically ground 
subjective looks. According to Brewer (2008: 8; 2011, Ch.5: 18), a paradigm empirical kind is 
simply an instance of that kind, and it is through the subject’s experiences of its instances and 
grasp of the kind concept under which it falls that she comes to understand it, e.g. it is through 
my swimming in, and drinking, a certain kind of stuff in conjunction with my linguistic training in 
the kind concept <water> that determines my paradigm of the empirical kind water. Hence, 
 
(3) A paradigm empirical kind k explanatorily grounds those visually relevant 
similarities which metaphysically ground a worldly object, oW’s, phenomenal 
appearance iff a subject s (i) has experienced n instances of k and (ii) grasps 
the kind-concept c which refers to k.  
 
Unlike premise (2)’s undeveloped account of visually relevant similarities, it is not so puzzling 
that Brewer “commit[s] [himself] without defence to a controversial account of concept 
possession” (2011, Ch.5:2) since, whatever concepts are (e.g. Kenny’s (2010) cognitive-
discriminative abilities; Zalta’s (2001) Fregean senses; or something else again) it matters here 
only that the subject understands what she is doing when she deploys concepts to refer to those 
objects around her (analogy: that I do not fully grasp the physics which explain the nature of 
gravity when throwing a ball for my dog is unimportant since I need only understand what I 
am doing, viz., playing a game with my dog).  
 
Premises (1)-(3) now conjoin to explain, 
 
Standard Illusion Thesis: For all subjects s: If s has an experience e in which 
worldly objects oW1, oW2 … oWN phenomenally appear to be F, but oW1, oW2 … 
oWN are objectively G, then s has an illusory experience.  
 
Brewer’s contention is that those worldly objects with which the subject is directly acquainted 
with can look other than how they objectively are when they bear visually relevant similarities 
to paradigm empirical kinds that they do not objectively exemplify. Hence, 
 
(4) The Object View of Illusion: A subject s has an illusory experience EI iff she, 
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     (i) stands in an object-dependent direct acquaintance relation r to a worldly 
object, oW, where oW intrinsically constitutes EI’s phenomenal character; 
and, 
 
 (ii) oW is visually relevantly similar to s’s conception
160 of some paradigm 
empirical kind k, where oW does not objectively exemplify k. (Conjunction 
of (1), (2) & (3)) 
 
Consider the part-submerged straight stick. Brewer’s contention is that the subject is directly 
acquainted with the straight stick itself which intrinsically constitutes her experience’s 
phenomenal character (instance of premise (1)); then the stick’s submerged part refracts light 
and causes a neural response in her that is relevantly similar to the refracted light and neural 
response that would be caused in her if she were looking at her paradigm of a bent stick 
(instance of premise (2)); and what explanatorily grounds these visually relevant similarities is 
that she has experienced similar looking bent sticks and appropriately grasps the concept 
<bent stick> that refers to her paradigm of a bent stick (instance of premise (3)). A part-
submerged straight stick is thus said to look bent because the straight stick which is.the direct 
object of her experience looks visually relevantly similar to her paradigmatic conception of a 
bent stick (Brewer (2011, Ch.5: 15, 42) applies these remarks mutatis mutandis to other, less 
disputed, cases such as Müller-Lyer lines and the Necker Cube).161 
 
Like (I.D)’s story of doxastically resisted optical illusion, (o.v) is also a ‘Two-Level’ account. 
At the first level, worldly objects can intrinsically constitute the experience’s phenomenal 
character since how they are in those experiences is how they objectively are; hence Brewer’s 
remark that “the direct object of perception is the very (straight) stick itself” (2011, Ch.5:20). 
Error occurs only at the second level when.the subject mistakes certain visually relevant 
                                                     
160 Suppose that s lacks any conception of a paradigm object (say, if s is a pre-linguistic infant or non-linguistic 
animal): in this scenario, Brewer claims that the candidate worldly object looks visually relevantly similar to our 
conception of a paradigm object, where this “entirely captures [her experience’s] phenomenology” (2011, Ch.5: 
43). Now I am rather baffled as to how my conception of, say, a paradigmatic duck explains the subjective 
phenomenology of s’s experience when she is presented with the ‘Duck-Rabbit’ (my conception seems 
irrelevant). Nevertheless, I set this worry aside since it does not feature in my objections to (o.v). 
161 An intuitive worry is that, since similarity is a symmetrical relation, Brewer is committed to the strange claim 
that an unsubmerged bent stick looks straight. Brewer (2011, Ch.5:22) rightly, I think, responds that although 
similarity simpliciter is symmetric, an unsubmerged bent stick, because it is bent, fails to meet the relevant condition 
of similarity to a paradigm straight stick.  
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similarities for qualitative identities as when she incorrectly judges that a part-submerged 
straight stick is visually relevantly similar to her paradigm of a bent one. 
 
Brewer is thus claiming that, 
 
Standard Illusion Thesis: For all subjects s: If s has an experience e in which 
worldly objects oW1, oW2 … oWN phenomenally appear to be F, but oW1, oW2 … 
oWN are objectively G, then s has an illusory experience. 
 
does not entail, 
 
Base: For all subjects s: If s has a misleading experience EM, then EM’s 
phenomenal character is not typed by any naïve properties PN1, PN2 … PNN. 
 
Since illusions consist solely in the subject’s cognitive response to what is non-misleadingly 
presented. Blocking Base thus renders the transition from Reflective Indiscriminability to Spreading 
“dialectically unnecessary” (Brewer 2011, Ch.5: 24) since there is now nothing non-naïve 
within the nature of the experience itself that can phenomenally type the.corresponding 
‘Good’ case (trivially, since Brewer groups illusory experiences under the ‘Good’ disjunct).  
 
6.2.1 The Argument from a Unified Theory of Illusion 
 
My Argument from a Unified Theory of Illusion begins from the claim that (o.v) has narrower 
explanatory scope than (I.D) qua theory of illusion since there is at least one illusory 
experience162 in which no paradigm worldly object (empirical kind) objectively exists163 to 
ground those visually.relevant similarities in virtue of which the candidate worldly object, ow, is 
said to.misleadingly look F. I am thus claiming that the following principle is true of at least 
one illusory experience: 
 
      (P)  A subject s can have an illusory experience EI as of a candidate worldly 
                                                     
162 Strictly speaking, I should perhaps say ‘Good’ given that Brewer assigns illusions to the ‘Good’ disjunct: 
however, I will use the term illusory experience throughout the remainder of this chapter since Brewer does not 
deny that there are misleading looks to be explained (at the second level). 
163 Pautz (2010: 287-8) presses this point from a different angle, viz., that (o.v) cannot explain a range of ‘Good’ 
experiences (as standardly conceived). 
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object, ow, phenomenally appearing F (when it is objectively G), where 
ow’s phenomenally apparent F-ness cannot be metaphysically grounded in 
ow’s false visual resemblance to a numerically distinct paradigm worldly 
object, ow, that is objectively F. 
 
I think that one clear cut case which exemplifies (P) is the ‘Waterfall Illusion’ in which, for 
example, a.nearby.stationary rock subjectively looks to simultaneously move upwards after 
staring at a waterfall for several seconds. According to Brewer’s visually relevant similarities 
account, this misleading look as of a stationary rock that simultaneously moves upwards occurs 
because a paradigm worldly object that is both stationary and moving upwards would have 
relevantly similar effects on the subject’s visual system as the rock that she sees. But there is no 
such paradigm object in the actual world that Brewer can point to which grounds the 
stationary rock’s misleading look (physicist’s would surely be drastically revising the theory of 
gravity were such an object to be conclusively discovered). The ‘Waterfall Illusion’ thus 
exemplifies an illusory experience in which the candidate worldly object’s misleading look is 
not determined by.its falsely visually resembling some paradigm worldly object. 
 
My story, unsurprisingly, is that the subject with normal vision and normal visual-spatial 
abilities who.looks at a nearby stationary rock after staring at a waterfall for several seconds 
will be strongly disposed to imagine seeing a rock that is both stationary and moving upwards. 
The downwards flowing.water and the rock are artificial prompters that causally interact with 
relevant aspects of the subject’s visual system (such as the way in which those neurons that 
code for motion in area V5 adapt to the downwards motion of the water (see e.g. Hautzel et 
al. 2001)) and cognitive equipment (the sub-personal way in which it forms a p-imagining 
as.prescribed by that visual information) in such a way that she is strongly disposed to imagine 
seeing a rock that is both stationary and moving upwards – indeed, there is nothing 
conceptually unintelligible in this suggestion since it simply exemplifies an instance of the 
prosaic claim that we can.imagine events that are physically impossible in the actual world 
(e.g. I can imagine teleporting myself, by a mental act of will, to Fake Barn County).  
 
Perhaps Brewer will deny my assumption that the rock must be visually relevantly similar to a 
paradigm.worldly object that is both stationary and moving upwards. He might say that 
a.subject has an illusory experience as of a rock that is both stationary and moving upwards iff it 
has (a) visually relevant similarities to a paradigmatic moving object, and, (b) visually relevant 
similarities to a paradigmatic stationary object. Now Brewer defines visually relevant 
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similarities as “identities in such things as, the way in which light is reflected and transmitted 
from the objects in question, and the way in which stimuli are handled by the visual system” 
(2011, Ch.5: 17). Hence condition (a) will be met iff the rock reflects light and causes a neural 
response in the subject that is relevantly similar to the.reflected light and neural response that 
would be caused in her if she were looking at a paradigmatic moving object. But this condition 
cannot be met: First, the light that is reflected from the rock cannot be relevantly similar 
to.the light that is reflected from a moving object since it is still; and second, the rock also 
causes a neural response that codes for stillness as well as motion, whereas a moving object 
causes a neural response that codes only for motion.  
 
Alternatively, Brewer might say that paradigm objects need only be conceptually.possible in 
order to secure (o.v)’s visually relevant similarity relation. He considers a white.wall that is 
illuminated with red light in a possible world in which nothing is objectively red, and.says that 
… 
 
“[…] although there are no actual exemplars of red, the redly illuminated wall 
nevertheless has visually relevant similarities with possible but non-actual 
exemplars of red: the paradigm exemplars, our imagination of which plays a 
central role in our understanding of the predicate ‘is red.’” (2011, Ch.5: 54, my 
emphasis) 
 
His thought is that in a possible world in which no paradigm red object objectively exists, we 
can still.appeal to the.subject’s imaginary conception of red to secure (o.v)’s visually relevant 
similarity relation, and so, explain the white wall’s red look. That is, a white wall that is 
illuminated with red light in a possible world in which no paradigm red object objectively 
exists nevertheless subjectively looks red in virtue of being visually relevantly similar to the 
subject’s imagined conception of paradigmatic red. Likewise, Brewer would deny that the 
‘Waterfall Illusion’ constitutes a genuine counterexample to (o.v) since we can appeal to the 
subject’s imaginary conception of a rock that is both stationary and moving upwards.to secure 
the necessary visually relevant similarity relation, and so, the.misleading look. (P) is thus 
replaced with:  
 
(P*) A subject s can have an illusory experience EI as of a candidate worldly 
object, ow, phenomenally appearing F when it is objectively G (where ow is 
not visually relevantly similar to any numerically distinct paradigm worldly 
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object, ow, that is objectively F in the actual world) since ow falsely visually 
resembles s’s imagined conception of a paradigm object, o, that is F. 
(Negation of (P)) 
 
Notice now that a multi-disjunctive conception of illusory experience is on offer: some 
misleading looks spring from the candidate worldly object falsely visually resembling some 
paradigm object in the actual.world, whereas those illusory looks that cannot be explained in 
this way are said to spring from the candidate worldly object falsely visually resembling the 
subject’s imagined conception of some paradigmatic object, i.e. different illusory.experiences 
are now assigned mutually exclusive ‘Good’ disjuncts. Ceteris paribus, we should look for a 
theory (and (I.D) is one) that need not posit two independent theories in order to explain 
different illusory experiences. 
 
Brewer might now deny that his explanation of the ‘Waterfall Illusion’ differs in any 
fundamental way from that of, say, the Müller-Lyer which is said to falsely visually resemble a 
paradigm of two.actual unequal lines positioned at different depths (2008: 15). This would be 
a mistake: For it is not that we can safely assume the.necessary visually relevant similarity 
relation and then modify the nature of the relatum depending.upon the particular illusory 
experience that requires explanation; rather, it is that.that relation is said to be secured by 
fundamentally different relata, viz., a paradigm object in the actual world or the subject’s 
imagined conception of some paradigm object. Talk of a candidate worldly object falsely 
visually resembling something cannot even begin until Brewer has specified the essential nature 
of.that something; and when the essential nature of that something radically 
changes.depending upon the.particular illusory experience requiring explanation, an 
explanatorily inelegant multi-disjunctive conception of illusory experience is the result. 
 
My Argument from a Unified Theory of Illusion then, has two distinct forms. The first form is that 
Brewer’s.visually.relevant similarities account has narrower explanatory scope than (I.D) since 
there is at least one illusory experience that cannot be explained in terms of the candidate 
worldly object falsely visually resembling some paradigm object in the actual world. The 
second form is that Brewer’s attempt to explain problematic cases by appeal to imagined 
paradigmatic objects runs into an explanatorily inelegant multi-disjunctivism. Either way, 
Brewer’s visually relevant similarities account does not satisfactorily meet the.unificatory 
constraint (§2.3) on a theory of illusory experience, and so, has limited explanatory appeal. 
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6.2.2 A Dilemma for (O.V)’s Account of Illusion 
 
I now want to raise a dilemma for (o.v)’s account of illusion that springs from Brewer’s 
distinction between two ways that he thinks an object, o, can look to have a certain property. 
He writes: 
 
“[…] o looks F iff o is the direct object of a visual experience from a point of view 
and in circumstances relative to which o has visually relevant similarities with 
paradigm exemplars of F. I will say in such cases that o thinly looks F. O thickly 
looks F iff o thinly looks F and the subject recognizes it as an F, or registers its 
visually relevant similarities with paradigm exemplars of F in an active application 
of that very concept.” (2011, Ch.5: 43-44) 
 
I am now looking at a paperweight on my desk: it is said to thinly look spherical iff it is visually 
relevant similar to paradigm spherical things; and it thickly looks spherical iff, additionally, I 
conceptually recognize it as instantiating the property spherical-ness. I think that this distinction 
generates the following.dilemma when it comes to explaining illusory scene-immediacy164 (i.e. 
why o looks F to a subject s when it is objectively G): either the purely physical nature of 
visually relevant similarities means that they are too weak to secure o’s thinly looking F or the 
subject’s conceptual categorization of o as looking visually relevantly similar to paradigm F’s 
undermines (o.v)’s naïve realist treatment of illusory.experience. Either way, (o.v)’s theory of 
illusion is inadequate. 
 
As a way into this dilemma, consider again the Müller-Lyer: 
 
 
 
It looks to me (and I suspect you) that the lower line is longer in length than the upper; a 
subjective look that Brewer obviously wants to deny constitutively explains our experience’s 
                                                     
164 I choose scene-immediacy since we cannot sensibly speak of Müller-Lyer lines being reflectively indiscriminable 
from the corresponding ‘Good’ experience unless the look as of two unequal lines is explained.   
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phenomenal character – as evidenced by his claim that our experience of the Müller-Lyer is 
“fundamentally one of conscious visual.acquaintance with that very diagram as its mind-
independent physical object”165 (2011, Ch.5: 47). Of this look, Brewer says:  
 
“The (ML) […] has relevant similarities with a pair of lines, one longer and more 
distant than the plane of the diagram, one shorter and less distant; and those lines 
in themselves are a paradigm of inequality in length. In this sense the two lines look 
unequal in length.” (2011, Ch.5: 15, my emphasis) 
 
His thought is that when, 
 
(1) A candidate worldly object, ow, looks F to a subject s (where ow is not 
objectively F). 
 
It is because, 
 
(2) OW, falsely visually resembles some numerically distinct paradigm object, o, 
that is objectively F.166 
 
And of the Müller-Lyer, Brewer’s thought is that the lines thinly look unequal in length in virtue 
of their falsely visually resembling a paradigm of two unequal lines positioned at different 
depths. 
 
Recall (§6.2) that visually relevant similarities are just the physical properties of illumination, 
perspective, and visual processing. Müller-Lyer lines are thus visually.relevantly similar to a 
paradigm of two.unequal lines positioned at different depths iff the lines.reflect light and cause 
a neural response in the subject that is relevantly similar to the reflected light and neural 
response that would be caused in her.if she were looking at a paradigm of two unequal lines 
positioned at different depths; and these visually relevant similarities are then said to secure a 
thin look as of two unequal.lines. Except when I look at the Müller-Lyer, I have no conscious 
phenomenal awareness of any such similarities since.they are.“simply [psychophysical] 
processes” (Smith 2010: 393) that partly underpin the occurrence of my experience as of two 
                                                     
165 As evidence for this claim, Brewer notes that subjects can usually accurately point to the end points of each 
line, which suggests that their property of equality-in-length is phenomenally manifest (2006: 10). 
166 Imagined paradigms aside. 
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lines thinly looking unequal in length. When I see Müller-Lyer lines, I have no more conscious 
phenomenal awareness of the light167 striking my eyes and being perceptually processed than I 
do of my myelin sheaths growing or telomeres shortening; hence I cannot see how purely 
physical visually relevant similarities can robustly secure their thinly looking unequal in length. 
 
One way that Brewer can resist this worry is to claim that although o’s thinly looking F is 
determined by its visually resembling some paradigm (actual or imagined) F-thing, it is still o 
itself that looks F (2011 Ch.5: 41); and applied to Müller-Lyer lines, Brewer’s thought is that 
although their thinly looking unequal in length is determined by their falsely visually 
resembling a paradigm of two unequal lines positioned at different depths, it is still the lines 
themselves that thinly look unequal in length. But this cannot help: For we cannot even speak 
of Müller-Lyer lines thinly looking unequal in length until visually.relevant similarities have 
secured this look; and the whole problem is that their purely physical nature precludes them 
from securing this thin look in the first place. 
 
This contrasts with (I.D)’s explanation of illusory scene-immediacy. I claim that when,  
 
(1) A candidate worldly object, ow, looks F to a subject s (where ow is not 
objectively F). 
 
It is because, 
 
(2) OW’s phenomenally apparent F-ness is metaphysically constituted by a world-
presenting.scene-immediate p-imagining. 
 
When I am presented with Müller-Lyer lines, a subjective look as of two.unequal lines is 
metaphysically.constituted by my world-presenting scene-immediate p-imagining itself rather 
than those.physical processes and events that are one necessary condition on its occurrence168: 
p-imaginings thus have the right conceptual shape to explain illusory scene-immediacy. 
 
                                                     
167 Putting glints, gleams, highlights, pure visibilia, and Sorenson’s (2008: Ch.9) filtows (i.e. a body of coloured 
light that is produced by a filter) aside. 
168 The other being the absence of two objectively unequal lines (§3.3.1). 
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If illusory scene-immediacy cannot be found at the level of thin looks, then perhaps it can be 
found at the level of thick looks, or as Brewer might put it, conceptual phenomenology (2008: 
14). He writes: 
 
“[…] possessing the concept of inequality in length as I do, I may notice the 
visually relevant similarities in question with my paradigms, either because the 
question of the relative length of its main lines becomes relevant in some way […] 
or simply because they jump out at me and capture my attention. As a result of this 
conceptual registration, the lines thickly look unequal in length […] this is a perfectly 
genuinely phenomenological matter.” (2011, Ch.5: 47-8, my emphasis) 
 
Brewer’s general thought seems to be that the subject’s conceptually registering certain visually 
relevant.similarities169 rather than others makes a genuine difference to the overall 
phenomenology of the experience. Applied to the Müller-Lyer, this means that when I 
conceptually register the lines as visually resembling my paradigm of inequality in length, the 
lines thickly look unequal in length; and because my conceptual classification of the diagram as 
looking visually relevantly similar to my paradigm of inequality in length is a “genuine 
phenomenological matter”, a subjective look as of two unequal lines is secured. 
 
The problem with this move is that, by (o.v)’s own lights, it risks introducing some sort of 
conceptual content into the phenomenal character of the illusory experience. Consider 
Brewer’s charge.against the Representationalist: 
 
“[Representationalism] trades direct openness to the physical elements of reality 
themselves, for some intellectual act of classification or categorization. As a result, 
[representationalism] loses all right to the idea that it is the actual physical objects 
before her which are subjectively presented in a person’s perception.” (2006: 18) 
 
If it is my conceptual classification of the Müller-Lyer as looking visually relevantly similar to 
my paradigm of inequality in length that secures their genuinely looking unequal in length, 
then this is the.very “intellectual act of classification” that precludes my experience from being 
fundamentally one of.direct acquaintance with the lines themselves. Grounding a look as of two 
unequal lines in conceptual.phenomenology thus screens off the mind-independent object that 
                                                     
169 Though the previous objection suggests that this conceptual registration is implausible, I want to grant it here 
in order to see if something can be made of grounding illusory scene-immediacy in thick looks. 
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is the Müller-Lyer diagram from constitutively explaining my experience’s phenomenal 
character.170 
 
In conclusion, I think that (o.v)’s account of illusory scene-immediacy faces this dilemma: illusory 
scene-immediacy cannot be located at the level of thin looks since purely physical visually 
relevant similarities cannot look any way at all; and it cannot be located at the level of thick 
looks since that precludes the candidate worldly object itself from constitutively explaining the 
experience’s phenomenal character. So, (o.v) either has no explanation of illusory scene-
immediacy or it must abandon its naïve realist treatment.of illusory experience. I submit that 
this dilemma, in conjunction with (o.v)’s failure to meet.the unificatory constraint, is enough 
to put it out of business. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that cognitive and optical illusions are disjunctive hybrids that are 
neither ‘Bad’ (since unlike dreams and hallucinations, their objective phenomenal characters are 
metaphysically built from naïve properties) nor ‘Good’ (since their subjective phenomenal 
characters have at least one phenomenally apparent naïve property that is p-imagined); whereas 
physical illusions are ‘Good’ experiences through and through. I then rejected Brewer’s object 
view of illusion on the grounds that it has narrower explanatory scope than (I.D), and can only 
explain illusory scene-immediacy at the cost of.sacrificing its naïve realist account of illusion. As 
(I.D) offers a unified theory of illusion that is compatible with naïve realism, it remains in play. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
170 I think that there is a case for extending this objection to (o.v)’s account of ‘Good’ experience; however, 
considerations of space mean I must be content with objecting to its story of illusion. 
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7 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, it is highly plausible that any successful naïve realist solution to the p.m.e must 
be some kind of positive phenomenal disjunctivism that has the conceptual and empirical resources 
to offer the same fundamental explanation of dreams, hallucinations, and illusions; and I have 
argued that Imaginative Disjunctivism can meet this explanatory demand.t 
 
To recap. Chapter 1 developed Hume’s ‘vulgar’ naïve realism and pitched this “common 
understanding we have of.perceptual contact with the world” (Martin, 2006:2) against Hellie’s 
Problem of Misleading Experience. Chapter 2 then sketched three theoretically desireable 
constraints on any successful naïve realist solution: namely, (i) a metaphysical constraint that 
commits the Naïve Realist to Basic Phenomenal Disjunctivism, (ii) an.explanatory constraint that 
commits the Naïve Realist to positively explaining a ‘Bad’ experience’s remarkable features, 
and, (iii) a unificatory constraint that commits the Naïve.Realist to telling the same fundamental 
story of dream, hallucinatory, and illusory experiences. Building on these constraints, I 
introduced Imaginative Disjunctivism in.Chapter 3: I argued that there is no conceptual or 
empirical incoherence in the supposition that subjects are sometimes radically mistaken 
about.the true phenomenal character or nature of their experiences; and I further argued that 
(I.D) is not to be toppled by either the Argument from Local Supervenience or the Argument from 
Explanatory Screening Off since ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ experiences have jointly different necessary 
and sufficient conditions for their occurrence. 
 
Chapter 4 first put (I.D) to work by explaining dreams: I sketched a number of conceptual and 
empirical considerations that collectively told against the received view; and although the dream 
fabrication view initially.seemed promising, it was unable to convincingly explain the 
phenomenology of lucid dreams, and so, could not offer a theoretically attractive unified 
theory of dreaming. Chapter 5 extended (I.D) to explaining hallucination: I argued that it met 
Johnston’s demand to explain why hallucination cannot be a source of original de re thought 
but can – in a suitably qualified sense – be a source of original de re knowledge of quality; and I 
further argued that Johnston’s attempt to marry conjunctivism and disjunctivism was 
ultimately felled by the Problem of Explanatory Screening Off. Chapter 6 extended (I.D) to 
explaining illusion: I explained how cognitive and optical illusions could be understood as 
‘hybrid’ experiences that are neither ‘Good’ nor ‘Bad’, and how physical illusions could be 
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understood as being ‘Good’ through and through. Finally, I argued that Brewer’s object view 
of.illusion could not offer a theoretically attractive unified theory of illusion, and could only 
explain illusory scene-immediacy on pain of abandoning its naïve realist conception of illusion. 
 
According to the story told herein, a ‘Good’ experience’s (objective and subjective) 
phenomenal character is relationally individuated by the perceptible properties of those 
worldly objects with which the subject is immediately and irreducibly acquainted. But when 
we are misled, this is because we are having perception-like imaginings that convincingly 
simulate genuine perceptual phenomenology. Whether or not (I.D)’s story of ‘Bad’ 
experience is in fact true, I simply don’t know. But its ability to offer a conceptually and 
empirically consistent account of ‘Bad’ experience means that the ‘vulgar’ conception 
of.perceptual experience with which we began is not easily put out of business by the 
existence.of.dreams, hallucinations, or illusions. 
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